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Résumé 
  
Depuis les années cinquante la sociologie a été concernée par le phénomène 
des mouvements sociaux. Diverses théories ont essayé de les expliquer. Du 
collective behaviour à la mobilisation des ressources, par l`entremise de processus 
politiques, et de la perspective de framing jusqu'à la théorie des nouveaux 
mouvements sociaux, la sociologie a trouvé certains moyens pour expliquer ces 
phénomènes. Bien que toutes ces perspectives couvrent et saisissent des facettes 
importantes des angles de l'action collective, ils le font de manière disparate, en 
regardant un côté et en omettant l'autre. Les différences entre les points de vue 
proviennent, d'une part, d'un changement dans les contextes sociaux, historiques et 
scientifiques, et d'autre part du fait que les différentes approches ne posent pas les 
mêmes questions, même si certaines questions se chevauchent. Poser des questions 
différentes amène à considérer des aspects différents. En conséquence, ce n'est pas 
seulement une question de donner une réponse différente à la même question, mais 
aussi une question de regarder le même objet d'étude, à partir d'un angle différent. 
Cette situation réside à la base de la première partie de ma thèse principale: le 
champ de la théorie des mouvements sociaux n'est pas suffisant, ni suffisamment 
intégré pour expliquer l'action collective et nous avons besoin d'une théorie plus 
complète afin d'obtenir une meilleure compréhension des mouvements et la façon 
dont ils remplissent leur rôle de précurseurs de changement dans la société. Par 
conséquent, je considère que nous avons besoin d'une théorie qui est en mesure 
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d'examiner tous les aspects des mouvements en même temps et, en outre, est 
capable de regarder au-delà de la forme de l'objet d’étude afin de se concentrer sur 
l'objet lui-même. Cela m'amène à la deuxième partie de l'argument, qui est 
l'affirmation selon laquelle la théorie générale des systèmes telle que formulée par 
Niklas Luhmann peut contribuer à une meilleure compréhension de l'action collective. 
Il s'agit d'une théorie intégrale qui peut compléter le domaine de la théorie de l`action 
collective en nous fournissant les outils nécessaires pour rechercher dynamiquement 
les mouvements sociaux et de les comprendre dans le contexte social en perpétuel 
changement.  
Une analyse du mouvement environnementaliste sera utilisé pour montrer 
comment les outils fournis par cette théorie nous permettent de mieux comprendre 
non seulement les mouvements sociaux, mais également le contexte dans lequel ils 
fonctionnent, comment ils remplissent leur rôle, comment ils évoluent et comment ils 
changent aussi la société. 
 
Mots-clés: mouvements sociaux, environnementalisme, Niklas Luhmann 
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Abstract 
 
Since the fifties sociology has been concerned with the phenomenon of social 
movements. Various theories tried to explain them. From collective behaviour to 
resource mobilization, through political processes and framing perspective all the way 
to the theory of new social movements, sociology found ways to explain these 
phenomena. Although all these perspectives cover and capture important facets and 
angles of collective action, they do so in disparate ways, looking at one side and 
neglecting the other. The differences between the perspectives come, on the one 
hand, from a change in the social, historical and scientific contexts, and on the other 
hand from the fact that the various approaches don’t ask the same questions, even 
though some questions overlap. Asking different questions leads to looking at 
different things. Thus, it is not only a matter of giving a different answer to the same 
question, but also a matter of looking at the same object of study from a different 
angle.  
This situation resides at the root of the first part of my main thesis: the field of 
social movement theory is not sufficient nor integrated enough to explain collective 
action and we need a more comprehensive theory in order to obtain a better 
understanding of movements and the way in which they fulfill their role of promoters 
of change in society. Hence, I consider that we need a theory that is able to look at all 
facets of the movements at the same time and furthermore, is able to look beyond the 
form of the object in order to focus on the object itself. This brings me to the second 
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part of the argument, which is the claim that the general systems theory as formulated 
by Niklas Luhmann can contribute to a better understanding of collective action. It is a 
comprehensive theory that can supplement the field of social movement theory by 
providing us with the necessary tools to look dynamically at social movements and 
understand them within the shifting social context. 
An analysis of environmentalism will be used to show how the tools provided 
by this communication theory help us to better understand not only social movements 
but also the context in which they function, how they fulfill their role, how they are 
changed and in turn change society as well. 
 
Keywords: social movements, environmentalism, Niklas Luhmann 
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 Introduction 
 
A day in the news: 
“Michael Brown shooting: Police fire tear gas, stun grenades”, CBC News August 19 
2014;  
“Premier Couillard slams protester’s actions, calls for calm” The Montreal Gazette 
August 19 2014;  
“Plenty of room at the top of Ukraine’s fading rebellion”, New York Times, August 19 
2014;  
“Gaza Strip: Oakland activists block Israeli ship for third day”, Aljazeera News August 
19 2014;  
“Pakistan: Imran Khan supporters gather in Islamabad to protest against 
government”; The Guardian August 19 2014;  
These are just a few of the world news headlines for one single day of August. 
Close to home or far away, in local press or on international TV news stations, there 
is one theme that can be seen every day: people protest. Peaceful or violent, in the 
form of street march or gatherings, sabotage, against the status quo, for economic 
security, freedom or simply for the sake of peace in a part of the world where they 
don’t even live, people protest. There is one common denominator in all this however: 
people come together to protest for change or to resist change. Protest is an already 
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established form of trying to bring about change in the world we live in. As 
sociologists, we are trying to understand this world and I believe that if we are to truly 
understand it, we need to understand change, and thus protest as an attempt to bring 
it.  
 Human history is full of rebellions and revolutions that brought important 
transformations. The French Revolution in 1789, the 1848 European revolutions, the 
Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the anti-communism revolutions in Eastern Europe 
in 1989 are all examples of large scale protests that brought change on a large scale. 
But are large scale protests always enough to produce long lasting transformations in 
society? The civil rights movements are a testament to the fact that this is not the 
case. Sometimes, in order to bring change, there is a need for more than 
spontaneous gatherings of people. Black Power, the gender equality movement, the 
gay and lesbian rights movement all show that many times you need organization, 
endurance and the employment of other means besides street protest in order to 
achieve social transformation. That is why I also think that if we want to understand 
the world we live in, and thus change, and therefore protest, we need to understand 
these, if not permanent, then at least long lasting forms of collective action. 
Change the world…, understand the world…, these are misleading phrases as 
the world is more than human society. Nevertheless they are not as misleading as 
they may seem. Yes, sociology has as its main object of study the human society. 
And yes, all the forms of collective action that I mentioned so far have attempted to 
change this human society and nothing more. While understanding human society in 
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itself, as well as the mechanisms through which it changes is paramount, we can’t 
ignore the fact that this society is placed in, depends on, and impacts a larger world, 
the natural world, its physical environment.  
The same day in the news that I referred to previously, also voiced the 
following concerns: 
“If you think the water crisis cannot get any worse, wait until the aquifers are drained”, 
National Geographic August 19 2014;  
“Global Warming didn’t divorce us, it’s just on a break”, Science 2.0 August 19 2014; 
“Fracking impact on water”, Campbell River Mirror August 19 2014;  
“Poachers killed more than 100,000 elephants in 3 years”, Fox News August 19 2014; 
“When forests aren’t really forests: the high cost of Chile’s tree plantations”, 
www.mongabay.com August 19 2014; 
 These are just a few of the science news headlines for one single day of 
August. And once again, close to home or far away, in local press, on international TV 
news stations or independent news websites, there is one theme that can be seen 
every day. This time the theme regards the fact that society impacts its environment 
and it is impacted back by it. The way in which society relates to its environment has 
long lasting effects on both. The way in which this relationship unfolds is also subject 
to transformations and to calls for change coming from collective action. And as with 
the civil rights movements, the environmental movement needed more than sudden 
aggregations in order to bring about change and to attract attention to the fact that 
human society is not as separated as it seems from the rest of the world.  
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 Therefore, I believe that if we are to understand society, we need to 
understand the long-term mechanisms through which it changes and the way it 
relates to its environment. Moving from the general to the specific, in not so many 
words, the interest of this dissertation is social movements as promoters of change in 
society with a focus on the environmental movement as an example of, on one hand, 
how these instances of collective action perform their role and, on the other hand, an 
observation of how society relates to its environment. It should be noted from the start 
that I am interested in these matters from a purely theoretical perspective. From my 
point of view we are unable to understand the empirical reality without relying on a 
strong theory. 
This interest naturally leads to the field of social movement theory. The 
literature within this domain is extensive and very different paths were taken within it 
in order to understand collective action. By studying it we learn that collective action 
can go beyond the emotions of the moment to become a meaningful and coherent 
force that drives change in society. We also learn that social movements are 
structured organizations involved in political processes. They use sets of beliefs and 
meanings to inspire and legitimate their activities and they are connected to a larger 
historical and cultural context. Social movement theory shows us the importance of 
this mechanism of social change and thus it provides us with a better understanding 
of society. However, due exactly to the fact that very different paths were chosen in 
order to understand collective action, the field of social movement theory only offers 
us a fragmented view of social movements.  
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There is a great variety of perspectives and approaches within this domain, 
and although they all cover and capture important facets and angles of collective 
action, they do so in disparate ways, looking at one side and ignoring the other. The 
differences between the perspectives come, on the one hand, from a change in the 
social, historical and scientific contexts, and on the other hand from the fact that the 
various approaches don’t all ask the same questions, even though some questions 
overlap. Asking different questions leads to looking at different things. Thus, it is not 
only a matter of giving a different answer to the same question, but also a matter of 
looking at the object of study from a different angle.  
This situation resides at the root of the first part of my main thesis: social 
movement theory is not sufficient nor integrated enough to explain collective action 
and we need a more comprehensive theory in order to obtain a better understanding 
of movements and the way in which they fulfill their role of promoters of change in 
society. Hence, I consider that we need a theory that is able to look at all facets of the 
movements at the same time and furthermore, is able to look beyond the form of the 
object in order to focus on the object itself. This brings me to the second part of the 
argument, which is the claim that the general systems theory as formulated by Niklas 
Luhmann can contribute to a better understanding of collective action. It is a 
comprehensive theory that can supplement the field of social movement theory by 
providing us with the necessary tools to look dynamically at social movements and 
understand them within the shifting social context.  
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Why do I choose this specific theory? First, in my estimation, we need a 
general sociological theory in order to understand any occurrence in society. If we 
want to understand social movements as agents of change in and of society, we need 
to understand all the links between the two and only a general theory can provide that 
kind of understanding. The theory that Niklas Luhmann formulates is such a general 
sociological theory. Secondly, following a long line of sociologists such as Auguste 
Comte, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, 
Luhmann is among the last theorists to formulate a comprehensive theory. The great 
significance that is given in the field of sociological theory to the debate between him 
and Jurgen Habermas on their different views of society is a testament of the great 
importance and impact this theory has had and still has on the field. Third, while most, 
if not all approaches to social movements come from a theory of action, Luhmann’s 
theory is a theory of communication, which is much closer to my own view of society. 
Thus, in a way, I could say that this is also a personal preference and inclination1. Any 
action is performed in a context that gives it meaning. I believe that it is important that 
we try to understand the meaning and not the action. Both the Jazz Festival and the 
summer of 2012 student protests represent great gatherings of people in Montreal. 
However, the fact that many people came together is not what is significant if we try to 
understand what happens, but the reasons for which they decided to do so are. 
Action always communicates something and it is that communication that makes its 
way in society, not the action itself. 
                                                          
1 While Habermas also formulates a communication theory the difference between his theory and the 
one formulated by Luhmann can be summarized by Kenneth Allen’s (2013) dichotomy of social vs. 
sociological theory. Habermas formulates a social theory, which is critical and normative while 
Luhmann formulates a sociological theory which aims for objectivity and avoids normative claims.     
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An analysis of environmentalism will be used to show how the tools provided 
by this communication theory help us better understand not only social movements 
but also the context in which they function, how they fulfill their role, how they are 
changed and in turn change society as well. The short list of science news headlines 
for a single day offers only a small glimpse of the variety and importance of the 
environmental issues confronting society today. The relation between society and its 
environment seems to gain increasing significance as ever more influences between 
the two become more visible. However, due to the theoretical interest of this study the 
focus will not be on how society and environment are related, but on how this relation 
is viewed from inside society by environmentalism and, as it was mentioned above, 
on how the environmental movement can be better understood from the general 
systems theoretical perspective formulated by Niklas Luhmann as opposed to from 
one of the perspectives formulated within the field of social movement theory.  
Thus, the research question for this investigation can be formulated as follows: 
if the field of social movement theory is not sufficient to explain collective action, how 
is the general theory developed by Luhmann better suited for investigating, analyzing 
and explaining social movements? Three main steps will be taken in order to answer 
this question. First, the general systems theory formulated by Luhmann will be 
presented. Second, an overview of the field of social movement theory will be 
introduced in order to support the argument that it is not sufficient nor integrated 
enough to offer a clear understanding of collective action. Third, the environmental 
movement will be analyzed through the lens of Luhmann’s theory in order to see if we 
do obtain a better understanding of social movements by using it.  
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The dissertation is structured in four chapters. The first chapter details more 
explicitly why the thesis focuses on the field of social movement theory, Luhmann’s 
theory and environmentalism. Its purpose is mainly to introduce the reader to the 
problematic surrounding the main argument by discussing and presenting more in-
depth the particulars around it. Therefore, the issues posed by the social movement 
theory field as an area of expertise are highlighted here. This sheds more light on why 
an argument is made that the perspectives within this field are not sufficient to explain 
collective action. The chapter also offers a few notes on the theory proposed by 
Luhmann so as to emphasize why and how I consider that it can be used as an 
alternative or enhancement to the way social movements have been studied so far. A 
short overview of environmentalism is also introduced here with the intention of 
showing the issues surrounding it and the way it is generally approached. Finally, 
several observations on methodology indicate the specifics of the steps taken in 
supporting the main thesis.  
The second chapter is an in-depth presentation of the general systems theory 
as proposed by Niklas Luhmann. I consider that such a meticulous analysis is 
important due to the fact that part of my main thesis claims that this theory is better 
suited for investigating and explaining social movements. This argument cannot be 
supported without a thorough understanding of the theory. Thus, on the one hand, the 
role of the chapter is to familiarize the reader with the theory. On the other hand, the 
purpose is to introduce the concepts that will be used later on in the dissertation in 
order to perform the analysis of a specific social movement, namely the 
environmental movement. The detailed explanation of Luhmann’s theory is carried out 
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by starting from the most simple (or basic) notions and going towards the more 
complex and provides a clarification of the main concepts used throughout the 
dissertation in support of the main thesis.  
Chapter three presents the main perspectives and approaches to social 
movements in an in-depth overview of the field. This review shows how social 
movements are generally analyzed, how the focus changes from one perspective to 
another and how different facets of the social movement are analyzed separately 
instead of together. This is seen as the major shortcoming of the field of collective 
action research. In my view, a thorough analysis of the field of social movement 
theory is needed in order to support the first part of the main thesis. Hence, the role of 
this chapter is to show that indeed, the field of social movement theory is not sufficient 
nor integrated enough to explain collective action and that we need a more 
comprehensive theory in order to obtain a better understanding of movements and 
the way in which they fulfill their role of promoters of change in society.  
In chapter four an analysis of environmentalism will be used as an illustration 
of how the general systems theory formulated by Luhmann can be employed to 
improve our knowledge of social movements. Consequently, the environmental 
movement will be overviewed, in an outline of its history and the way it changed 
overtime in relation to the social context. Luhmann’s theory will be used throughout 
this overview in order to interpret and analyze these changes. The objective here is to 
show how we can better understand the environmental movement through the use of 
a specific theory, not to present the history of environmentalism. Thus, at the same 
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time as presenting its history and evolution, the chapter will also discuss the 
conditions that led to the emergence of environmentalism as a protest movement, 
how it is organized and how it relates to society, as well as what functions and roles it 
fulfills within it.  
Due to the fact that this dissertation represents an entirely theoretical 
approach, it of course relies on a variety of texts and on a thorough literature review 
of three different subjects: social movement theory, Luhmann’s theory, and 
environmentalism. In order to perform an as comprehensive as possible review of the 
literature, a variety of research tools were used. First, the library offers access to a 
few different databases (such as ProQuest, EBSCO and Erudit) that can be searched 
for quickly finding articles and bibliographical information on any topic of interest. 
These databases were searched by using keywords like social movements, collective 
action, systemic theory, functionalism, Luhmann, environmentalism, environmental 
movement, green movement or even more specific terms such as collective behavior, 
framing, second order cybernetics and neo-functionalism. These keywords were used 
both alone and in combination (i.e. framing and social movements) in order to refine 
the results. The library itself was searched using the same kind of keywords for 
finding books on these subjects. 
Secondly, I searched for publications about the field of social movement 
theory, Luhmann’s theory and environmental thought (or green theory) in order to find 
more information about the specific theoretical perspectives for each subject (or area 
of expertise) and the most representative and prominent texts and authors in order to 
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refine the results more. In other words, I went from the general (i.e. an article about 
the collective behavior perspective) to the specific within each field (the actual 
theories belonging to the collective behavior perspective). Third, the bibliographical 
listings for most of the texts read were perused, especially if I came across quotes or 
ideas of a special interest, and the publications of authors that were recognized in the 
field as representative for the subject were examined as close to their entirety as 
possible.  Also, periodicals such as Mobilization, Social Movement Studies, Sociology 
Compass, Social Science Quarterly, and Environmental Politics were searched 
directly.     
      
Knowing how society sees its relation with the environment and how it is trying 
to change it is important in understanding society itself. Do we have a better 
knowledge of the environmental movement in particular, social movements in general, 
and of society once we looked at them from within the general systems theory 
developed by Niklas Luhmann? Answering this question is the purpose of this 
dissertation.  
  
 Chapter 1: Introductory Notes: Developing 
the argument 
 
Ask a room full of physicists what is gravity and they will all give you the same 
answer. The wording might be different but they will all agree that it is a force which 
makes all physical bodies attract each other. Even in simpler terms, it is what gives us 
weight and it is keeping us here. Ask a room full of sociologists what is society and 
you will get a variety of answers. Some might say it is a network, others an imagined 
community; some might define it as a system of interactions, actions or 
communication. If sociology were like physics we would have one answer too. We 
would find the laws regulating society and we would precisely calculate where it is 
going. But sociology is not like physics. There is a very simple reason for that. Society 
is more than just the physical world. It doesn’t follow the same rules, it doesn’t have 
the same types of laws and it incorporates subjective aspects.  
If it is one thing we can all agree on however, I think that thing is that society is 
changing over time. Therefore, to better understand society we need to understand 
social change and the mechanisms through which it takes place. Moreover, if we look 
either at history or at the news headlines for today, or if we look at both history and 
current events around the world, there is one other thing that becomes clear: one of 
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the mechanisms via which social change takes place (or at the very least it is often 
attempted) is collective action. Consequently, I believe that understanding collective 
action better will help us improve our knowledge of society. Hence questions like 
“what is collective action?”, or “what is a social movement or a protest movement”? 
naturally come to mind.  
While perusing the extensive academic literature on social movements it 
becomes apparent that both social movements and the way they were approached 
theoretically are influenced by shifts in the social, cultural, historical and scientific 
context. As this context changes so do the movements and, with the movements, the 
theory transforms as well (Garner 1997; Tarrow 1998, Tilly 1998). Due to this situation 
another question comes to mind: is the theory adequate to explain collective action if 
it needs to keep changing to fit its object of study? I believe that it is not. Therefore, 
my main thesis is that social movement theory is not sufficient or integrated enough to 
explain collective action and that we need a more comprehensive theory in order to 
obtain a better understanding of movements and the way in which they fulfill their role 
of promoters of change in society. I furthermore claim that Niklas Luhmann’s general 
theory is that comprehensive theory that can supplement the theory of social 
movements by providing us with the necessary tools to look dynamically at social 
movements and understand them within the shifting social context. An analysis of 
environmentalism will be used to show how these tools help us better understand not 
only social movements but also the context in which they function, how they fulfill their 
role, how they are changed and in turn how they change society as well. 
   
 
14 
 
In this context the research question becomes: if the field of social movement 
theory is not sufficient to explain collective action, how is the general theory 
developed by Luhmann better suited for investigating, analyzing and explaining social 
movements?  In what follows the particulars around the main thesis and the research 
question will be discussed it in more details. After an explanation of why the field of 
social movement theory, Niklas Luhmann’s theory and environmentalism were 
chosen for this work, three main sections follow. The first section will be a very short 
overview of the social movement theory field that will indicate the issues it presents as 
an area of expertise. The second section will present how and why Luhmann’s theory 
can be used as a better alternative to the way collective action has been studied so 
far and the third section will be an overview of the issues surrounding 
environmentalism and the way it was approached. The chapter will end with a few 
notes on methodology.  
Social movement theory was chosen because, as it was mentioned earlier, I 
believe that a better comprehension of collective action is important for improving our 
knowledge about society in general. If society is in constant flux then understanding 
one of the mechanisms through which this change takes place is paramount for 
understanding society itself. In fact, although there are many varied definitions and 
analyses of social movements, they all converge on one important point: one of the 
goals of social movements is change. Why then choose a different theory to look at 
collective action? I believe that even though the varied perspectives and approaches 
within the theory of social movements all cover and capture important facets and 
angles of collective action, they do so in disparate ways, looking at one side and 
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ignoring the other. That is why I consider Luhmann’s theory more appropriate for 
analyzing social movements; it provides us with one integrated view of society and 
with the necessary tools to analyze all facets of movements at the same time in a 
cohesive manner. 
 Luhmann’s general theory was also chosen due to the fact that it enables us 
to understand not only social movements and society but also the way in which they 
interact and change each other. Due to the fact that society evolves and changes, 
social movements need to adjust to these changes and alter the way they interact 
with other systems and evolve themselves. Through the use of the concepts 
developed by Luhmann we can understand social movements as social systems that 
differentiate when an irregularity or a contradiction is observed in society. Through 
their interaction with other subsystems they try to change that irregularity or to resolve 
the contradiction. In this way, their function is double folded. On the one side they 
signal the irregularity or contradiction and on the other they try to change the system 
to deal with it. Through this they provoke tensions that maintain the system’s 
functionality and complexity. Social movements are thus social self-observations and 
society’s self-description. This means that social movements observe society or 
different dimensions of society and designate them, creating the possibility for self-
reference and contingency. Thus, I think that from this perspective, we can claim that 
society knows itself through social movements (the self-reference), identifies 
alternatives of action (contingency), adjusts and changes (evolution). 
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Lastly, the reasons for which I chose the environmental movement as an 
example are: 1) Looking at the major topics of discussion in today’s society one 
cannot but notice an abundance of debates regarding issues like global warming and 
climate change, the ozone layer, resource consumption, biodiversity, pollution, 
protection and preservation of wildlife. An increased awareness of nature and 
environment seems to have made its way into the main discourses of society for at 
least three decades. The protection of the environment and the preservation of 
nature, sustainable development, renewable resources are paramount issues in 
present day’s debates. 2) Luhmann’s theory is a theory of distinction between system 
and environment2. In fact, this distinction stays at the center of the entire theory. What 
better choice then, than a movement dealing exactly with the relation between society 
and its environment?  
3) Luhmann (1989) maintains that the environmental movement refers to the 
environment instead of society and, at a first glance, environmentalism seems to fit 
this description. Thus, using environmentalism as an illustration of how his theory can 
help us better understand it is a challenge (because the example turns into a critique 
at the same time) but one worth taking on because, in my view, on the one hand, this 
process will provide us with a clearer image and a more profound knowledge of the 
movement and, on the other, it will highlight the strengths as well as the limits of the 
theory itself.    
                                                          
2 Environment here is used in very abstract terms and simply denotes the outside of the system. For 
society, in systemic terms, environment represents everything that is not communication and thus it is 
both nature and context (Luhmann 1995) 
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If we go back to the research question, “if the field of social movement theory is 
not sufficient to explain collective action, how is the general theory developed by 
Luhmann better suited for investigating, analyzing and explaining social 
movements?”, an argument could be made that, considering how extensive the 
literature within this field is, that “if” can be very controversial. Are the many 
perspectives within the field really not enough? And aren’t already attempts made to 
provide a more integrated view? Therefore, an overview of the field is necessary in 
order to show why it is considered insufficient. 
 
1.1The Field of Social Movement Theory 
    There are many definitions of social movements: collective behavior, 
resource mobilization theory, political process perspective, new social movement 
theory and others. All present different views on what is a social movement. There are 
not only varied perspectives on social movements but there are also varied ways in 
which these perspectives themselves were classified and described. As we will see, 
some of these classifications are based on a periodization in time, some on 
geographical location while others are based on conceptual differences. A short 
outline of some of these classifications is provided in order to show the variety of 
perspectives, the various ways in which they themselves are interpreted and to 
highlight one of the facts that was argued earlier, argument that resides at the root of 
the main thesis, namely, that as the social and historical context changes, so does the 
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theory of social movement. As Roberta Garner suggests, "the story of social 
movement theory can be told only together with the story of social movements 
themselves" (Garner, 1997, p.1).  
An example of a classification based on a temporal periodization is provided by 
Garner (1997). Three chronological periods in the development of social movement 
theory are identified in this taxonomy. The first period, between the 1940's and 
1950's, is characterized as having a negative view on social movements, describing 
them in terms of irrational behavior and making reference to social psychology to 
explain them. The second period, between the 1960's and the 1970's took a more 
positive outlook on social movements and had a tendency to explain them in terms of 
organization, rationality and goals. The third and final period, between the 1980's and 
1990's is characterized by an ambivalence towards social movements "as right wing 
counter-movements displaced progressive movements and intellectual shifts towards 
postmodernism undermined the privileged role of movements in a narrative of 
historical progress" (Buechler 2000, p. 20). 
Charles Tilly (1998) contributes with another example of a classification based 
on a temporal periodization. Three main phases in the history of social movement 
theory are distinguished here as well, starting with the 1960s. The first phase, 
prompted by the rise of movement activity in North America and Western Europe, 
drew on two different perspectives: "1) treatments of collective behavior as un-
institutionalized action driven by mass psychology, which had acquired a 
psychoanalytic edge in analyses of fascism; 2) natural history conceptions of social 
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movements modeled especially on the history of organized labor but, extended to 
other emancipatory movements such as suffrage and feminism" (Tilly 1998, p. 454). 
These perspectives however could not explain the next wave of movement activity 
(i.e. civil rights activism, student protests) and new approaches (such as political 
process, rational-action and resource mobilization) emerged. Although different in 
many respects, these approaches agreed on one thing that the previous perspectives 
ignored: actors could act collectively in coherent ways and ground their actions in 
stable social organizations (Tilly 1998, p. 454).  
With the rise of yet again new collective actors (such as "mobilizations oriented 
towards environment, peace, sexual preference, communitarianism") these 
perspectives proved insufficient as well and the New Social Movements approach 
emerged for providing meaning to the social protest defined by these new actors. 
Even further, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist Eastern 
Bloc and with the rise of nationalist undercurrents in countries that used to be part of 
Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union "interest in the discursive side of collective action" 
rose, and so did analyses based on concepts like frames, narratives, and political 
opportunity structure (Tilly 1998, p. 454-455).   
The understanding of collective action varies not only in time but also 
geographically (although an argument can be made that the differences do not come 
from the geographical positioning but from a different cultural positioning). North 
American scholars, after observing with distress European mass movements like 
Fascism and Stalinism, place emphasis on social problems. European scholars 
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formulated approaches under the influence of the general sociological theories of 
Marx and Weber and, differing from their North American counterparts, they place 
emphasis on social classes (Jenkins 1983; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Tarrow 
1998). On both continents however, the scientific (sociological) interest in social 
movements is rooted in the various “waves of protest activities” that western countries 
started to experience from the mid-sixties (Rucht 1991, p.1). Collective behavior 
theory (which was actually developed in the 1920s by the Chicago School) was first 
used to explain these phenomena but it is soon replaced, primarily in the US, by 
resource mobilization theory. While in North America studies are focused within this 
paradigm of resource mobilization, in Europe a different approach is developed, 
called new social movement theory, putting emphasis on the identity paradigm 
(Cohen and Arato 1994). Conceptual differences between these approaches are 
clearly outlined by Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow:  
“European scholars tend to focus on larger structural issues – the 
structural causes of social movements, their ideologies, and their 
relation to the culture of advanced capitalist society – whereas 
Americans developed their research mainly at the group and 
individual level, looking systematically at the groups that organized 
mass protest, at their forms of action, and at the motivations of 
individuals who joined them” (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988, p. 2-3).  
Mario Diani (1992) and Alberto Melucci (1988), although similar in their 
analysis to Tarrow, draw the conceptual differences between these two approaches in 
different terms. According to them, while resource mobilization theory is more 
concerned with the “how” of social movements, with the actual process of 
mobilization, the new social movements approach is more concerned with the “why” 
and with the causes of mobilization. 
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This short overview of perspectives and taxonomies shows that, as David 
Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi hold: 
“Definitions of social movements are not hard to come by. They are 
readily provided in most textlike treatments of the topic (e.g. Turner 
and Killian 1987; Tarrow 1998; della Porta and Diani 1999), in edited 
volumes of conference proceedings and previously published articles 
and scholarly papers (e.g. McAdam and Snow 1997, Meyer and 
Tarrow 1998, Goodwin and Jasper 2003), and in summary, 
encyclopedia-like essays (e.g. McAdam et al. 1988, Benford et al. 
2000). Although the various definitions of movements may differ in 
terms of what is emphasized or accented, most are based on three or 
more of the following axes: collective or joint action; change oriented 
goals or claims; some extra- or non-institutional collective action; 
some degree of organization; and some degree of temporal 
continuity” (Snow et al. 2004, p.6). 
This overview also shows that as the socio-historical context changed so did 
movements and as movements changed so did the theoretical assessment of social 
movements. Sociology (or at least a part of it) has been concerned with the 
phenomenon of social movements since the nineteen fifties. Various theories tried to 
explain them. From collective behavior to resource mobilization, through political 
processes and framing perspective all the way to the theory of new social 
movements, sociology found ways to explain these phenomena. These various 
perspectives overlap or follow each other both chronologically and conceptually. As 
times changed, the movements changed and as the movements changed the theory 
needed to adapt as well to be able to explain the new phenomena (or is it the new 
form of an old phenomenon?). And therein lays the problem. How comprehensive is a 
theory if it needs to change to fit its object of study?  
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Society is not static, it is fluid, in constant flux and it logically follows that 
everything in it is fluid too, going through different shapes and forms, organizing and 
reorganizing with society itself. Thus when looking at collective action (or anything in 
society for that matter) we need a theory that takes this fluidity into consideration. This 
is not to say that nothing is permanent in society, on the contrary. The structures, 
objects, institutions, the building blocks, systems or sub-systems of society (the term 
changes depending on the theory that is used) stay the same but their shape or form 
changes in order to accommodate the historical, social and cultural context. To put it 
differently, a shelf is a shelf, was a shelf and will be a shelf, no matter the shape, 
form, material or how it was/is/will be constructed. It might be made of wood, plastic 
or metal, screws or nails might be used to keep it together, and it might be built 
manually or by a machine but no matter if it is square, or it fits into a corner it is still a 
shelf and its purpose is to shelf things. That is why I consider that the varied theories 
on social movements are not sufficient to explain them. We need a theory that 
enables us to look beyond the form of an object, to the object itself and its different 
shapes and forms. We also need a theory that looks not only at the social and 
historical context but also looks at these contexts as in a constant state of flux and 
accounts for this flux in its explanations. As it was mentioned before, I consider that 
Niklas Luhmann’s general system theory does that. I argue that we can use his theory 
to better understand and explain both society and social movements. The 
environmental movement or environmentalism will be used as an example for this. 
Therefore an analysis of Luhmann’s theory needs to be introduced. 
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1.2 Society and social movements in a Luhmannian view 
In Luhmann’s view (1993), social movements are very general phenomena for 
which is hard to find a describing or defining concept. They correspond nonetheless 
to a modern phenomenon which means that they exclude peasant, slave and nobility 
uprisings and revolts. The discussion on social movements starts with the rise of the 
socialist movement in the nineteenth century (Luhmann 1993). However, more 
current phenomena cannot be described in the same terms as the socialist 
movement. Thus the concept of new social movement starts to be utilized in the 
academic field to describe and define them. Nevertheless, Luhmann prefers to use 
the concept of protest movements due to the fact that, in his view, “it covers broad 
areas of the phenomenon of the social movement, but can more easily be delimited” 
(Luhmann, 1993, p. 125). Protest is defined as an expression of dissatisfaction and as 
a communication addressed to others in order to resolve the situation that causes this 
dissatisfaction (Luhmann, 1993, p. 125-126).The existence of protest (in any form) is 
not enough however to form a protest movement: 
“We will speak of protest movements only if the protest serves as a 
catalyst of a system of its own. (…) Protest movements can be 
described as autopoietic systems. The protest is the form, the topic is 
the content, and the two of them together set of a process off 
reproducing related communication, thus permitting the system to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant activities (Luhmann, 
1993, p. 126-127). 
According to Luhmann, “a permanent source of potential protest is the fact that 
any determination of a specific future has an effect of social discrimination; that is to 
say, it does not benefit or advantages everyone to the same degree” (Luhmann, 
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1993, p. 129). However, the emergence of protest movements cannot be explained 
only through such a general statement. For a better understanding of how social 
movements emerge, Luhmann performs an analysis of historical situations that 
contributed or acted as triggers in such emergences. This analysis leads to the 
differentiation between: uprisings, revolts and resistance movements in traditional 
societies, the socialist movement and the new protest movements. Also, in this view, 
social movements are one of the procedures through which contradictions can be 
connected to conflicts that are consequential for society. In other words, social 
movements are a way of selecting significant conflicts within society. Thus, the 
concept of social or protest movement is intertwined with that of society which is 
understood as: 
“the all-encompassing social system that includes everything that is 
social and therefore does not admit a social environment. If 
something social emerges, if new kinds of communicative partners or 
themes appear, society grows along with them. They enrich society. 
They cannot be externalized or treated as an environment, for 
everything that is communication is society” (Luhmann 1995, p. 408).  
Society thus refers to “the encompassing social system that includes all 
communications, and constitutes meaningful horizons for further communications” 
(Luhmann, 1990, p.176) This means that society makes communication between 
other social systems possible but it cannot communicate itself due to the fact that it 
includes all communication. All communication being internal to society, external 
communication is excluded. Society still has an environment with which it has 
relations, but these relations are not carried through communication. According to 
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Luhmann, this all-encompassing society “uses the bodies and minds of the human 
beings for interaction with its environment”. (Luhmann, 1990, p.178).  
Much like the concept of social movement however, the concept of society is 
greatly debated in sociology and it has been defined in many different ways. There 
are even theorists who claim that “society” is not a relevant concept in sociological 
analysis anymore. For example, John Urry writes: 
“I argue that the concept of society has been central to sociological 
discourse. I then argue that if there is any agreement on the concept 
of society this is embedded within notions of nation-state, citizenship 
and national society, working through a ‘banal nationalism’. But then I 
show that it is this sense of ‘nation-state-society that contemporary 
mobilities call into question and which suggests that maybe Thatcher 
was right when she said there is no such thing as society” (Urry, 
2000, p5-6). 
Urry contends that sociology is losing its fundamental concept, (that of society) 
and that the new mobilities (of people, images, information) and their social 
consequences need to be studied. However, while Urry considers society grounded in 
the nation state, Luhmann’s definition of society looks above the borders of nation 
states. From his perspective, society is a system that has different subsystems which 
are at the same time dependent and independent on one another. There is no 
“national society” in this approach. Society is split into nation states only for the 
political system. As the all-encompassing social system, society is a “world society”. 
One of the things that distinguishes Luhmann’s view of society as a world system 
from other systemic theories is the fact that he looks at society as “world society” from 
the start. He begins with the concept of “world society” and explains it, instead of 
explaining how society became a “world society”. This definition does not exclude the 
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new “mobilities” that Urry talks about. On the contrary, these can be studied as 
occurrences within the system, or as relations between different subsystems within 
the larger system. 
As well as being a theory of distinction between system and environment, 
Luhmann’s theory is also one of differentiation, which is defined as: 
“the emergence of a particular subsystem of society by which the 
characteristics of system formation, especially autopoietic self-
reproduction, self-organization, structural determination and along all 
these, operational closure itself are realized. In such a case, we are 
not simply dealing with a phenomenon which a determined observer 
can distinguish. Rather, the system distinguishes itself. (…) On the 
basis of its own differentiation, the system can assume itself, its own 
function, its own practice as a point of reference for the specification 
of its own operations” (Luhmann 2000a, p23) 
According to Luhmann there are four different forms of differentiation in the 
history of society: segmentary, center/periphery, stratificatory and functional 
differentiation. Modern society is characterized by functional differentiation which is 
based simply on the function subsystems fulfill in society (Luhmann 2013a, p.12-16). 
The emphasis here is on the fact that these are not different types of societies, but 
different ways in which society was organized throughout history. When he talks of 
different types of movements or different ways of connecting contradictions with 
conflict throughout history, Luhmann takes into consideration the form of 
differentiation within which these movements function. Using such an approach allows 
for the explanation of movements within their socio-historical context and for taking 
into consideration the fluidity of this context in the explanation.  
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Moeller (2006) discusses the fact that Luhmann intended to explore social 
movements further but sickness stopped him. This is where I can contribute by 
proposing a more developed understanding of social movements through the use of 
his theory of society. Social movement theory will be critiqued for its lack of 
integration, or in different words, for its fragmented view of social movements or its 
inability to reconcile the different perspectives within. Luhmann’s general theory will 
be used to point out these inadequacies, thus as an external critique. On the other 
hand, this general theory will be the subject of a sort of immanent or internal critique 
in the sense of: this is the theory, this is where it stops, let’s see what happens when 
we use it and try to take it further. Does it still stand and does it further our 
sociological knowledge? Does it help us understand phenomena (for lack of a better 
word) like social movements better? This immanent critique is done through the 
interpretation of (or the attempt to interpret) the environmental movement through this 
theory or some of its concepts. As in the case of social movements in general, 
environmentalism and the environmental movement were also extensively studied, 
reviewed and analyzed. To begin with, an explanation of what is understood through 
environmentalism and/or the environmental movement is in order.  
 
1.3 Environmental Thought and Movement 
The explanation mentioned above has two parts. One is comprised of 
answering questions such as: are the “environmental” and the "green” movement one 
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and the same? What about the ecologist, animal protection, anti-nuclear or anti-
deforestation movements? As Hay puts it: 
“It is difficult to plot the boundaries and contours of the environmental 
movement with precision. Is the environmental movement to be 
equated with the green movement? Are ‘environmentalism’ ‘ecologist’ 
and ‘green’ synonymous? Are these - all or any of them - political 
philosophies, ethical systems or model-of-living designations? These 
shades of difference are mightily disputed." (Hay 2002, p. 1) 
Accordingly, there are at least two reasons to use these terms interchangeably. 
First, the members of such movements do not worry about those "shades of 
difference" and use the terms interchangeably because they are seen as having the 
same meaning. Second, the movement itself is as diversified as the terms used to 
describe it. In Hay's words:  
“Commentators have been at a loss to define the precise boundaries 
of the environment (or ‘green’ movement); to declaim authoritatively 
that this group (a bird watching society for example) is within, whilst 
this other group (a save-our-playground action group, for example) is 
not. The ‘real thing’, in other words, wavers at the edges” (Hay 2002, 
p.2). 
Eder seems to agree with the fact that these terms can be used 
interchangeably because, according to him, “environmentalism, ecological movement, 
life politics movements” (…) all denote the same problem: the nature – society 
relationship.” (Eder 1993, p. 118). Thus, throughout this thesis, when talking about the 
environmental movement or environmentalism, any movement that addresses issues 
related to the environment or its relations to society is included and terms such as 
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environmental movement, green movement or environmental group will be seen as 
designating the same thing.3 
The-second part of explaining what is meant through environmentalism and/or 
the environmental movement is comprised of answering questions such as: where do 
you place environmental thought and philosophy? Is green theory part of the 
environmental movement or environmentalism? In other words, can you separate 
between activism and theory?  
Although “not all the values and theoretical preoccupations that are much 
debated within green thought have a commensurate currency within green activism, 
just as dilemmas that occupy activists are not necessarily given the same attention 
within the  literature” both theory and activism are components of the 
green/environmental movement (Hay 2002, p. 2). Hence, even if some green theories 
never find their way in the main discourse of activists, and even though some issues 
that activists care about are not much debated theoretically, the two still have a lot of 
points of convergence and are part of the same movement.  
Andrew Jamison, Ron Eyerman, Jacqueline Cramer and Læssøe Jeppe (1990) 
frame the issue in different terms but hold similarly that there is a need for integration 
of theory and the empirical. They talk about a “split” or a differentiation in the way 
social movements are studied/described/talked about and understood. On one side of 
this divide are placed "identity theorists" (such as Alain Touraine and Jürgen 
                                                          
3 The term (concept) environment is used both in abstract systemic terms, as the outside of the system – which 
is different for each system – and to denote nature. 
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Habermas) “who conceptualize social movements in abstract terms and judge 
empirical conflicts as potential sources of new collective identity and as forces for 
fundamental social change" (Jamison et al. 1990, p.1). On the other side of this divide 
we find "resource mobilization theorists who define social movements empirically as 
organizations and groups and concern themselves with their tactical successes and 
failures” (Jamison et al.1990, p.1).  
For the study of environmentalism, this translates into a distinction between 
those authors that look only at theory (at environmental thought, ideology, green 
thinking) and those who look exclusively at “environmental groups and organizations". 
A reintegration of the two sides is needed. This integration can and will lead to a 
better understanding, not only of the movement itself but also of “its actual historical 
project” which is both “projecting a new set of ideas" and “mobilizing support for new 
forms of political activity”, and not only one or the other (Jamison et al. 1990, p. 1-2). 
Thus, environmentalism is seen as having two components, an “intellectual” 
one and an "activist" one (Hay 2002, p.2). To use different terms, and maybe more 
appropriate terms, environmentalism or the environmental movement includes both 
theory (environmental thought, eco-philosophy or green ideology) and organizational 
or mobilizing forms (environmental groups and organizations). The two cannot be 
separated because the theory, or “green thinking” can give birth to organizations and 
protest groups or vice versa, environmental organizations can promote new ideas, 
ideologies and knowledge.  
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Similarly to social movement theory, when it comes to environmentalism, there 
is also a variety of taxonomies and chronologies. The works done by Donald Worster 
in 1977, John Rodman in 1983, Warwick Fox in 1990 and, Andrew Jamison in 1990 
and again in 2001 are just a few examples. Presenting two of them should suffice to 
show how, not only environmentalism but also the way it is interpreted has changed 
over time. 
In one of these taxonomies (Rodman 1983), environmentalism is organized 
into four categories that can also be considered as being four phases because 
environmental thought moves from one to the other progressively towards what Hay 
calls a “satisfactory maturity” (2002, p. 31). The first category is characterized by 
Resource Conservation. This position is associated with the American forester Gifford 
Pinchot and stands for responsible use of resources. The second type of 
environmentalism is associated with Pinchot’s friend turned adversary, John Muir (the 
founder of the Sierra Club) and his position of Wilderness Preservation. The third kind 
of environmentalism is Moral Extensionism which is “the view that humans have 
duties directly to (some) non-human natural entities, and that these rights are 
grounded in the possession by the natural entities of an intrinsically valuable quality 
such as intelligence, sentience or consciousness” (Rodman 1983, p. 86). 
The last phase of environmentalism is called Ecological Sensibility and it is a 
complex set of not only values and perceptions but also attitudes and judgments. This 
type of environmentalism has three components: 1) a theory that recognizes the 
intrinsic value of nature; 2) a metaphysics that considers the importance of both 
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systems and individuals; and 3) an ethics that “includes such duties as 
noninterference with natural processes”, policies that deal with the violation of the 
noninterference principle and “a style of cohabitation that involves the knowledgeable, 
respectful, and restrained use of nature” (Rodman 1983, p. 88). 
A second typology, developed in the works of Fox (1990) is derived from the 
one presented above. The first category is called “Unrestrained Exploitation and 
Expansionism” (Fox (1990)) and refers to the view that the non-human realm has 
value only when and if it is or it can be transformed by humans for economic interests 
and human consumption. Another characteristic of this type of view of environment is 
the idea that resources are unlimited, or what Fox (1990) calls the myth of 
superabundance. The second category, “Resource Conservation and Development” 
is similar to the first one in its view of the natural world as valuable only insofar as it 
can be used by and for humans but differs through the fact that it recognizes that 
resources are not infinite and thus they need to be managed responsibly (Hay 2002, 
p. 33). 
The third category in this taxonomy is “Resource Preservation” and, while still 
anthropocentric at its core, is the most satisfactory out of the three instrumental views 
of nature: “This is a stance which does seek grounds for preservation of the non-
human world (as distinct from its husbanded use) but which stays within the 
framework of assumption that is adopted in the two previous positions: right and 
appropriate action is deemed to be right and appropriate from the stand-point of 
human interest” (Hay 2002, p. 33). 
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After these three anthropocentric types of environmental thought, Fox identifies 
ecocentric forms of environmentalism. These views give intrinsic value to the non-
human world, meaning that nature is considered as having value in itself, independent 
of human use. There are three grounds on which axiological claims are made: 
“sentience (a capacity to feel sensations); having cell-based life; and autopoiesis (a 
capacity for self-renewal)” (Fox 1990, p. 8-11). Beyond these intrinsic value schools of 
thought there is one more category, deep ecology which “involves widening out one’s 
biological or bodily sense of self into a larger, perhaps even cosmological field of 
identification. Deep ecologists denote this extended sense of self as a capital S Self” 
(Fox 1990, p. 11).   
These classifications refer mostly to environmentalism as theory.  Although all 
or most of these positions find a place in different environmental groups and 
organizations, the focus is on ideas, not organizations or groups that promote them. 
Environmentalism in terms of organization is also variously defined. This is why 
Christopher Rootes underlines that “conceptions of the environmental movement are 
as various as those of social movements in general” (Rootes 2004, p. 608). When 
looking at the literature on the environmental movement it becomes evident that 
environmentalism, as a specific movement is often defined or analyzed from one of 
the general perspectives present within social movement theory. For example, the 
cognitive praxis theory (Eyerman and Jamison 2001) is used to define it as follows: 
“For us, a social movement exists when a distinct set of knowledge 
interests is present in the consciousness of activists and reflected in 
organization, when these knowledge interests form the basis not only 
for collective identity but also co-ordination and co-operation between 
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these organizations which identify themselves on their basis. Thus 
we conceive of modern environmentalism first as a potential social 
movement, as constituted in the interplay between the deep structure 
of knowledge interests and the practical world of political strategy, 
worked in actual historical settings” (Jamison et al. 1990, p.3).  
In another example, collective behavior theory is used and, from this 
perspective, environmental social movements are defined as loose networks of 
people and organizations that engage in collective action with the purpose of gaining 
environmental benefits; these organizations vary from “highly informal” to “highly 
organized” and even institutionalized, their “spatial scope” varies from local to global 
and their interest vary from single issues to a “full panoply of global environmental 
concern” (Rootes 1999, p. 2). Attempts are also made to combine two or more 
perspectives in order to obtain a clearer image of environmentalism. In one such 
attempt Mario Diani and Paolo Donati study the environmental movement from the 
perspective of resource mobilization theory and the political processes approach. A 
framework of analysis of environmental groups using concepts from both perspectives 
is built. Environmental social movements are seen as social movement organizations, 
which in turn are political organizations. 
“Most political organizations are shaped by their response to two 
basic functional requirements, resource mobilization and political 
efficacy: on one hand, they must secure through variable 
combinations of money and human power (that is, voluntary action) 
the resources essential to organizational survival and expansion; on 
the other hand, in order to perform effectively in the political process, 
political organizations may select varying combinations of tactics 
disrupting – or at least threatening to disrupt – routinized political 
procedures, and tactics reflecting in contrast their integration in 
institutional politics, and their compliance with the rules of the game” 
(Diani and Donati, 1999, p. 15).     
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Of course, using the general theory to explain the specific is natural, but due to 
the variety of perspectives and the lack of integration of the field, environmentalism is 
studied in a fragmented way, and even though some attempts have been made to 
combine two or more perspectives, some aspects are invariably ignored. Additionally, 
as it was discussed earlier, even more fragmentation results from the split between 
studies that focus on theory and studies which focus on organizations. I believe that 
using the general theory developed by Luhmann enables us to take a deeper and 
more comprehensive look at both environmental groups and environmental theory, 
bringing them together. Also, the use of such a theory would provide us with a 
cohesive assessment of the movement instead of only fragmented glimpses of its 
various features. 
Consequently, I consider that by using Luhmann’s theory we can reconcile the 
split between theoretical and empirical studies, or, in other words, bring the analysis 
of environmental groups together with the analysis of green thought in a more 
comprehensive outlook on the movement as a whole, while also taking into 
consideration the larger changing social context in which the movement exists. 
Moreover, as it was stated previously, environmentalism will be used not only to 
illustrate how Luhmann’s theory can help us better understand social movements but 
also to see what happens when we use it to analyze something outside the theoretical 
field. Does it still stand and does it further our sociological knowledge? This 
investigation is thus, in part, an internal critique to Luhmann’s general theory. 
Moreover, if we recall the research question, “if the field of social movement theory is 
not sufficient to explain collective action, how is the general theory developed by 
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Luhmann better suited for investigating, analyzing and explaining social 
movements??” it also becomes obvious that an external critique to the field of social 
movement theory is intrinsic to this study.  
Therefore, this dissertation uses both external and internal critiques to support 
the main thesis, which is: social movement theory is not sufficient or integrated 
enough to explain collective action and we need a more comprehensive theory in 
order to obtain a better understanding of movements and the way in which they fulfill 
their role of promoters of change in society. I am aware of the fact that other attempts 
have been made to create a more integrated field for the study of collective action. 
The general theory of strategic action fields (Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam 2011) 
is an example of such an attempt. A strategic action field is defined by them as: 
“a meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or 
collective) interact with knowledge of one another under a set of 
common understandings about the purposes of the field, the 
relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the 
field’s rules” (Fligstein & McAdam 2011, p. 2). 
 Collective action is embedded within these strategic action fields (SAFs). 
Collective actors are also themselves made up of SAFs while SAFs also contain 
SAFs within SAFs. For example, an environmental group can form a SAF by itself 
which can be integrated within another SAF if it joins in a network of such groups; 
when this network interacts with governmental bodies, another SAF is formed and so 
on. The boundaries of SAFs are thus not static and they keep fluctuating depending 
on the context. SAFs have three main components, incumbents, challengers and 
governance units and are characterized by a constant tension between the three or 
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by “dynamics of both conflict/change and stability/order” (Fligstein & McAdam 2011, 
p. 4). Moreover, SAFs are interdependent, and when changes or instabilities take 
place within one SAF, other SAFs will be affected as well. Episodes of contention 
arise within SAFs due to the interaction between incumbents and challengers. This is 
a very brief summary but sufficient I believe to draw the conclusion that within this 
perspective all collective action takes place within strategic action fields. These fields 
are organized the same, are related to one another and can be understood only if we 
look at them in relation to one another and not only individually.   
While my intention is more or less the same with that of Fligstein and McAdam, 
to find a comprehensive, integrated theory to explain social change I am choosing a 
different path. Whereas they build a theory around strategic action fields, I consider 
that a communication theory is better at explaining the social, change and social 
movements as promoters of this change, because, as Luhmann does, I hold that 
society is a communication system, not an action one. 
As it was mentioned earlier, the dissertation will make use of both external and 
internal critique, one type for the field of social movement theory and another for the 
general systems theory proposed by Luhmann. An external critique uses different 
theories or views from an outside position to assess the validity and value of a theory, 
field of study or approach. The analysis of different theories is used to justify the 
choice of one theory over the others in this case. The advantage of using this type of 
critique is the fact that in addition to emphasizing the limits of a theory, it also points to 
a solution for overcoming those limits, and it shows what can be used instead. In an 
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internal critique, the theory is criticized through itself and thus the use of other 
theories is not necessary. An in-depth analysis of the theory is needed in this type of 
critique to see if its logic holds. The advantage of using internal critique rests with the 
fact that it can ascertain the core logic of a theory, it can show if it has contradictory 
points and if it has internal coherence. 
Three objectives will be met through the use of these two types of critique. The 
first objective of this study is to show how Luhmann’s theory can fill the gaps in social 
movement theory and help us better understand social movements. An in-depth 
analysis of Luhmann’s general theory and an explanation of the main concepts and 
the relations between them are needed in order to accomplish this objective. The 
purpose of this analysis is not only to familiarize the reader with the theory, but also to 
show the way it brings all elements of the social together in a comprehensive view of 
society. Second, the shortfalls of the theory of social movements will be shown. To 
accomplish this, what are considered the main perspectives and approaches to social 
movements are presented in a detailed overview of the field in order to show how 
social movements are generally analyzed. This review will also show how the focus 
changes from one theory to another and how different facets of social movements are 
analyzed separately instead of together. Where possible, concepts developed in 
Luhmann’s general theory will be used as a critique to the theory of social 
movements. This is where the critique becomes external. On one hand the various 
perspectives will be compared to each other and on the other hand, a theory outside 
the field of social movement theory is used to show how we can better understand 
social movements.  
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The third objective is the use of environmentalism as an illustration of how this 
general theory can be used to better explain and analyze a specific movement. 
Environmentalism will also be overviewed, in an attempt to outline its history and the 
way it changed overtime in relation to the social context. Throughout this overview the 
general theory developed by Luhmann will be used to interpret and analyze these 
changes. The already existing academic literature on the subject will be used not only 
because it is extensive and wide-ranging but also because the interest of this study is 
purely theoretical. This is how and where the critique becomes internal. Luhmann’s 
theory will not be critiqued through the use of other theories or concepts that are on 
its outside, it will be critiqued through its own use. The study of the movement through 
this theory will outline not only how society is changed and how social movements 
change with society, it will also show how much of the theory can be applied, where it 
has limitations and how it can be improved upon to better understand the social. 
1.4 By way of conclusions 
As we have seen, the field of social movement theory is comprised by many 
different paradigms and approaches that are also categorized in different ways. The 
varied classifications highlight the fact that the manner in which social movements are 
analyzed changes depending on the socio-historical and scientific context. The 
multiplicity of perspectives on social movements leads, as it has been noted, to a 
range of different definitions for the environmental movement. In addition, there is 
also a variety of ways in which the evolution of environmentalism is seen. The thesis 
that the general systems theory developed by Luhmann can solve the problems 
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posed by all this diversity has been proposed and a very brief outline of how this 
theory looks at society and social movements has been provided as a first step in 
supporting this thesis. However, in order to support the argument further, a detailed 
overview of this general theory is needed. 
  
 Chapter 2: Luhmann’s Systems Theory: 
Society and Social Movements as Systems 
  
 As it was stated in the previous chapter, one of the main arguments of this 
thesis is that the general systems theory developed by Niklas Luhmann provides us 
with the necessary tools to look dynamically at social movements and understand 
them within the shifting social context. This theory is also going to be used as an 
external critique to the field of social movement theory, which is seen as lacking 
integration and offering a fragmented view of social movements as promoters of 
change in society. In order to support these arguments an in-depth analysis of 
Luhmann’s general theory is needed.  
 Therefore, this chapter will be a detailed presentation of the general systems 
theory developed by Niklas Luhmann and structured in three main sections. The first 
section will explain the main concepts of the theory, the second section will discuss 
the concept of society as a system and the third will examine the notion of social 
movement from a Luhmannian perspective. This is done for three reasons. First, the 
main or basic concepts of the theory need to be presented because they are used to 
explain other, more complex concepts. From my point of view, concepts within 
concepts in Luhmann’s theory create a web that needs to be untangled.  
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Second, answering the question “what is society?” is important, not only 
because society is the context in which social movements function, but because the 
relationship between social movements and society is a very important one if we want 
to understand social change. Third, providing a clarification of the main concepts, an 
explanation of what is understood by society and social movement, and an account of 
how society and social movements are related are all necessary in answering the 
research question. How can we decide if Luhmann’s theory is capable of explaining 
social movements better than the collective action research field if we do not know the 
theory? 
 To know the theory however we first need to know what a system is. After all, 
Luhamnn’s theory is a general systems theory. So what is a system? Niklas Luhmann 
applies the concept of system to an object of research that has certain (and well 
defined) features that allow us to make the distinction between that object and a 
different one. In his view, there are three levels of system formation and analysis: at 
the first level he places systems, at the second level he places machines, organisms, 
social systems and psychic systems and at the third level he places interactions, 
organizations and societies. The three levels are related to one another as it is shown 
in the following diagram:                         
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   Systems 
 
Machines     Organisms   Social Systems     Psychic systems 
 
Interactions     Organizations     Societies4 
“(Luhmann, 1995, p.2) 
Systems can be compared only with systems that are situated at the same 
level. In other words, one can compare machines with organisms, but not organisms 
with organizations. What should also be mentioned is that this schema is a 
conceptual abstraction, which is different from the “self-abstraction of the object”. The 
conceptual abstraction allows comparison while the self-abstraction allows us, as well 
as the system, to apply the same structures within the system itself (Luhmann 1995, 
p. 2-3). 
Luhmann identifies a number of main themes and concepts used in systems 
theoretical analysis: the difference between system and environment, system 
differentiation, causality, the difference between element and relation, conditioning, 
                                                          
4 Notwithstanding this schema Society is seen as the all-encompassing system. This is better 
understood once the main concepts have been presented. 
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complexity, system boundaries, ecology, self-reference, multiple constitution, system 
processes, information and time. I add one more concept to this list, autopoiesis, due 
to the fact that Luhmann’s theory is a theory of autopoietic systems. In what follows 
these concepts will be presented because they are all used in describing and 
explaining society and social movements as social systems.  
 
2.1 Main concepts used in systems theoretical analysis 
2.1.1 Autopoiesis 
The word autopoiesis combines two different ancient Greek words, “auto”, 
which means “self” and “poiesis”, which means “production” (or creation). Luhmann 
borrowed the term from the Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana who used it to 
explain how cells are “a product of their own production” (Moeller 2006, p. 12). 
Autopoiesis means exactly that, self-production. Autopoietic systems, either biological 
or social, produce themselves without any input from the outside. In Luhmann’s words 
autopoietic systems are: 
“systems that are defined as unities as networks of production of 
components that recursively, through their interactions, generate and 
realize the network that produces them and constitute, in the space in 
which they exist, the boundaries of the network as components that 
participate in the realization of the network”. (Luhmann, 1990, p.3) 
Thus, autopoietic systems produce their own components and the relations 
between them. They also set their own boundaries. In turn, these components, the 
relations between them and the boundaries of the system produce the system that 
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produced them. It is a closed circular relationship. Social systems, like organic ones 
are autopoietic systems. One last thing on this topic for now: autopoiesis presupposes 
operational closure. This means two things: one, the system can never operate 
outside its own boundaries and two, the system can produce and reproduce its 
elements/components and operations only and only using its own 
elements/components and operations. Nothing from outside the system can be used. 
Thus, the system must make the difference between itself and the environment. 
2.1.2 The difference between system and environment. 
According to Luhmann, this is the very basis of system theory and it replaces 
the “traditional difference between the whole and its parts”. He explains this distinction 
through George Spencer-Brown’s conceptualization of form. In this view forms are 
“not shapes, but boundaries, markings of differences that oblige us to make clear 
which side we are indicating, and thus which side of the form we are on, our point of 
departure for further operations” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 29)5. If we think of the distinction 
between system and environment from this perspective, we understand that the 
system and the environment are different sides of the same form. This means three 
things: they exist simultaneously, they depend on each other and they cannot exist 
one without the other:  
“Systems are oriented by their environment not just occasionally and 
adaptively, but structurally, and they cannot exist without an 
environment. They constitute and maintain themselves by creating 
and maintaining a difference from their environment, and they use 
their boundaries to regulate this difference” (Luhmann, 1995, p.17).  
                                                          
5 This conceptualization of “form” is very important and should be kept in mind because it is used 
throughout Luhmann’s theory to explain various concepts, for example differentiation and re-entry. 
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This is not only a repetition of what was said above, it also adds a new 
dimension to the distinction. The differentiation from environment is an integral part in 
system formation and maintenance. Systems exist insofar as they make the 
distinction between themselves and the environment and maintain this difference. In 
other words, systems themselves make this distinction, which means that they are not 
only one side of a form, they are themselves forms.  
Furthermore,  
“the environment receives its unity through the system and only in 
relation to the system. It is delimited by open horizons, not by 
boundaries that cannot be crossed; thus it is not itself a system. It is 
different for every system, because every system excludes only itself 
from the environment“(Luhmann, 1995, p.17).  
In other words, the environment becomes significant only in relation to the 
system. Its characteristics, features and effects are marked and designated by the 
system and the system’s relations with it. The environment is what is outside the 
system as the system sees it or places it and thus the environment of each system is 
unique.   
“One of the most important consequences of the system/environment 
paradigm is that one must distinguish between the environment of a system and a 
system in the environment of this system” (Luhmann, 1995, p.17). This is important 
due to the fact that the dependence relations between a system and its environment 
need to be set apart from the relations between different systems. We will come back 
to this after we discuss boundaries, relations and structural coupling.  
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The system/environment distinction also explains partly why Luhmann ‘places’ 
the human being outside the social system of society. He considers that, if we accept 
this distinction, we need to place the human being (in its entirety) either in the system 
or in the environment. It cannot be in both because we cannot split it in different parts 
that we can place in either one or the other. If we do place it within the system, then 
we are forced to build a theory of society as “a theory of the distribution of human 
beings” and that would be in contrast with the concepts of human rights and equality. 
The only choice left in this case is to regard human beings as part of the environment 
of society (Luhmann 2012, p.9). It must be reiterated though that this is a theoretical 
choice. The concepts of communication and of society as a system of communication 
further explain this choice. However, the explanation of these concepts follows later in 
the chapter because other concepts which are used to explain them need to be 
discussed first, such as another distinction, the one between relation and element.     
2.1.3 The difference between element and relation  
This notion of difference between element and relation is related to the fact that 
there are two different ways in which the fragmentation of a system can take place: 
“One aims to form subsystems (or more precisely, internal system/environment 
relations) within the system. The other decomposes systems in elements and 
relations” (Luhmann, 1995, p.21). The formation of subsystems is a theory of system 
differentiation while the decomposition in elements is a theory of system complexity. 
Elements are what constitute a system, just from a different perspective than that of 
sub-systems. To illustrate this, Luhmann uses the example of a house. If the 
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subsystems are the rooms of a house, the elements are the bricks, windows or doors 
(Luhmann, 1995, p.21). However, elements become important only if they are seen in 
relation to one another and when they refer to one another (to use the house example 
further, a door in the hardware store is just a door, it becomes a part of my house 
when I put it in and use it to access my house or a room in my house). Thus, element 
and relation are as dependent on one another as system and environment are.  
In Luhmann’s theoretical approach, just as there are no environments without 
systems (and vice-versa), there are no elements without relations or relations without 
elements within a system. Thus, elements exist only insofar as they are related to one 
another within the system, and relations exist only between elements (or through the 
use of elements). In the house example, I need a switch to turn on the lamp; without 
the switch I cannot use the lamp or if I do not have a lamp, the switch is useless. Also, 
the lamp needs to be plugged in for the switch to turn it on; if lamp and switch are not 
somehow connected, none of them is of any use. Moreover, “the element is 
constituted as a unity only by the system that enlists it as an element to use it in 
relations” (Luhmann, 1995, p.22). Elements are the smallest units of a system (they 
cannot be decomposed further) and they are defined as such (as elements) only by 
the system that employs them as units. In addition to relations between elements 
there are also relations between system and environment as well as system-system 
relations. Those, however, can be better understood after the concepts of boundary 
and self/other reference are explained. Boundary will be explained next while 
self/other reference will need to be explained further in the chapter, after more basic 
concepts, such as observation, are presented.  
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2.1.4 Boundaries 
“Systems have boundaries. This is what distinguishes the concept of 
system from that of structure. Boundaries cannot be conceived 
without something beyond; thus they presuppose the reality of a 
beyond and the possibility of transcendence. In common 
understanding they have the double function of separating and 
connecting system and environment” (Luhmann, 1995, p.28). 
 Boundaries’ double function is explained by Luhmann through both the 
difference between element and relation and that between system and environment. 
Boundaries separate elements but not relations. Once boundaries have been 
determined (or defined) elements have to be attributed to the system or the 
environment. Relations however are still maintained between the two. Thus 
boundaries separate the system from the environment through the designation of 
elements as internal or external to the system and, they are the point of connection 
between them through the maintenance of relations. Systems (or system and 
environment) are connected to each other through boundaries. 
Different types of systems (remember the diagram at the beginning of the 
chapter), however, have different types of boundaries. Living systems (i.e. organisms) 
are limited in space and have organs that act as boundaries and mediators of 
relations with the environment. These organs are spatial boundaries; they live in the 
system and can be seen only from the outside. Social systems, which are meaning 
systems, aren’t limited in space, their boundaries are “purely internal” and they are 
produced by the system through the distinction between self-reference and other-
reference. (Luhmann 2012, p.38-39).  
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Boundaries are therefore mechanisms of selection as well as mechanisms of 
connection. They select elements and create relations. Through the use of 
boundaries, systems can close and open at the same time. They close through the 
separation of elements (as belonging to the system or belonging to the environment) 
and open through the creation of relations. Relations are also selected but by the 
internal organization of the system. The system decides which relations are significant 
and which are not (Luhmann, 1995, p.28-30). Relations, both within the system and 
with the environment are also regulated by the conditioning principle. 
2.1.5 Conditioning 
As we have seen, systems are a network of relations between their elements. 
These relations need to be somehow regulated and this regulation takes the form of 
conditioning. That means that something happens only under certain conditions, or in 
other words, a relation “occurs only when the other also occurs”. The same applies 
when it comes to the “the availability of specific elements” (Luhmann, 1995, p.23). In 
Luhmann’s words: 
“As systems theory knows, conditionings are among the most general 
requirements of all system formation. They establish non-arbitrary 
relationships in the sense that determining certain characteristics 
limits the scope for determining others. In other terms, considering 
how we obtain information about a system, we speak of 
redundancies limiting the variety of the system: where a certain 
characteristic occurs, others are either more or less probable” 
(Luhmann 2012, p. 138). 
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2.1.6 System differentiation 
It was mentioned earlier that there are two different ways in which the 
fragmentation of a system can be understood: through a theory of system 
differentiation (the formation of subsystems) or a theory of complexity (the 
decomposition of a system in elements and relations). System differentiation is: 
“the repetition of system formation within systems. Further 
system/environment differences can be differentiated within systems. 
The entire system then acquires the function of internal environment 
for these subsystems, indeed for each subsystem in its own specific 
way. The system/environment difference is therefore duplicated; the 
entire system multiplies itself as a multiplicity of system/environment 
differences” (Luhmann, 1995, p.18).  
 Thus system differentiation is the formation of systems through the 
differentiation between system and environment within the system itself. Through this 
process, subsystems are produced within the system, the system becomes 
environment and complexity is created. System differentiation allows for further 
explanation of how and why system theory is different from the whole/parts paradigm.  
Luhmann holds that differentiation doesn’t mean that the system breaks down 
into subsystems that work like its parts, the system being basically reduced to 
relations between these parts. If subsystems would be “parts” of the system as a 
“whole”, then the system would just distribute its operations to the subsystems and it 
itself would operate only through these subsystems. Instead, in system differentiation, 
the subsystems are the ones making the distinction between system and 
environment, not the system within which they are forming; subsystems contribute to 
forming the system, true, but they use their own distinctions and operations. The 
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system is reproduced or multiplied through these new system environment 
distinctions but it is not the one coordinating the formation or further operation of its 
subsystems as it would be within a whole/parts paradigm. To further understand 
system differentiation we need to understand the notions of operations and 
observations. 
2.1.7 Observation, self-observation and second order observations (System 
processes)  
Although observations are operations, the two should not be confused with one 
another. While operations are simply “the factual happening of events whose 
reproduction carries out the autopoiesis of the system (…) observations use 
distinctions to describe something (and nothing else)” (Luhmann 2000a, p. 95). Thus 
operations are what a system does or what is formed of, while observations are 
complex operations and also forms, which designate two separate sides, one that is 
observed and one that isn’t observed. In autopoietic systems theory, this means that 
observations mark the difference between system and environment. When this 
difference is introduced in the system we can talk of self-observation. Thus, for 
general systems theory:  
“observation means nothing more than handling distinctions. Only in 
psychic systems does the concept presupposes consciousness (…). 
Other systems must acquire their own possibilities of observation. 
Accordingly, self-observation is the introduction of the 
system/environment distinction within the system, which constitutes 
itself with the help of that distinction; self-observation is thus the 
operative factor in autopoiesis, because for elements to be 
reproduced, it must be guaranteed that they are reproduced as 
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elements of the system and not as anything else” (Luhmann 1995, p. 
37).   
Thus self-observation is a crucial component of autopoietic reproduction. To 
put it differently, Luhmann defines observation “as any kind of operation that makes a 
distinction so as to designate one (but not the other) side” (Luhmann 1998, p. 47). 
Through this distinction, the operation of observation not only makes the distinction 
between the system and its environment possible, it also introduces this distinction 
within the system, thus participating in system differentiation. As a result, through 
observation, autopoietic reproduction is insured and subsystems are formed. When 
this happens, the system has to choose what to observe: the overall system to which 
it belongs, other subsystems (systems in its environment) or itself (self-observation).    
Observations through which the observer (or an observing system) designates 
something, going from “unmarked space” to “marked space” without saying that 
things can be different are first order observations. However, an observing system (or 
an observer) can also observe that these are only its own observations and that there 
are other observations; and thus the question “Who is the observer?” arises. This is 
the level where second order cybernetics comes into play. At this level we can speak 
of second order observations, which are observations of observations of the first order 
(or other observations of the second order) (Luhmann 1998, p. 47). 
For example, this dissertation can be seen as a second order observation 
because I chose to look at perspectives on social movements instead of at social 
movements directly. Looking at a movement and defining its attributes, thus making a 
difference between movements and other systems in society, would have been first 
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order observation. Instead, I choose to look at how others defined movements; these 
others performed the first order observation and I am looking only at their 
observations.    
Second order observations make contingency possible. In this type of 
observation an observer can choose to observe a different observer, the same fact 
that was already observed but at a different time, or any observation. Everything 
becomes contingent because there is the possibility of choosing what to observe. 
Furthermore, observation of the second order reduces complexity by increasing it. It 
increases complexity by offering a choice but at the same time it reduces it because 
only observations are observed (Luhmann 1998, p. 48). But what are contingency and 
complexity?  
2.1.8 Contingency and double contingency     
According to Luhmann, “anything is contingent that is neither necessary nor 
impossible. The concept is therefore defined by the negation of necessity and 
impossibility” (Luhmann 1998, p. 45). This means that things are the way they are 
although they could be different. Objects or systems are placed in the realm of 
possibility; it is not necessary for them to be the way they are now and it is not 
impossible for them to be different. When the fact that there are other possibilities 
becomes known however, we run into the problem of double contingency.  
The concept of double contingency was introduced by Talcott Parsons to 
describe the circular situation in which action or interaction become uncertain due to 
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the fact that alter wants to base its actions on the actions of ego, and ego in turn 
wants to base its actions on the actions of alter. Luhmann solves this dilemma by 
defining double contingency as:  
“describing something given (something experienced, expected, 
remembered, fantasized) in the light of its possibility of being 
otherwise; it describes objects within the horizon of possible 
variations. It presupposes the world as it is given, yet it does not 
describe the possible in general, but what is otherwise possible from 
the view point of reality” (Luhmann 1995, p.106).  
Thus we speak of double contingency when we describe something the way it 
is in the context of it possibly being different. In this case not only other possibilities 
exist, but the fact that they do is known. Alter and ego make decisions based on what 
is, knowing that it could be different and do not remain stuck in calculating 
possibilities. As we will see, for systems, this has the effect of forcing a selection and 
thus creating complexity.  
2.1.9 Complexity 
Complexity is explained by Luhmann with the aid of a distinction in the form of 
a paradox: “complexity is the unity of a manifold. A state of affairs is expressed in two 
versions, as unity and as manifold, and the concept denies that we are dealing with 
different matters” (Luhmann 2012, p. 78). Thus the distinction is between unity and 
manifold, between the one and the many. In other words a complex system is the 
union of the many. This is better explained with the aid of two further distinctions.  
The first such distinction is one we discussed earlier, the difference between 
element and relation. The complexity of a unity is given by the volume of elements 
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and interconnections between these elements. As the number of elements increases, 
so does the number of connections and so does the complexity of the unity. Hence, 
the complexity of a system can be “mapped” by counting the number of elements but 
also by taking into consideration their qualitative characteristics and differences, as 
well as by introducing the notion of time and thus seeing how stable these elements 
and relations actually are.  
The second distinction takes the first one for a fact but  
“stresses that possible relations between elements multiply in 
geometrical progression with the rise in the number of elements and 
thus the growth of the system. Since there are drastic limits to the 
real connectivity of elements, this mathematical law imposes the 
selective interconnection of elements even at very low magnitudes” 
(Luhmann 2012, p. 79).  
This means that elements can be directly connected to one another only up to 
a point and once that point has been reached, the system is forced to make a 
selection. The distinction in this case is that limit (or boundary) up to which any 
element can be connected to any other element in the system. Anything beyond that 
boundary is connected selectively, fact which creates complexity. At this point 
contingency also takes effect.  
Put differently: 
 “We will call an interconnected collection of elements complex when, 
because of immanent constraints in the elements’ connective 
capacity, it is no longer possible at any moment to connect every 
element with every other element. The concept of immanent 
constraint refers to the internal complexity of the elements, which is 
not at the system’s disposal, yet which makes possible their capacity 
for unity” (Luhmann, 1995, p.24). 
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Thus, complexity is creating conditioning for itself: the fact that the relations 
between elements have to be complex to attain unity for higher levels of system 
formation limits the connective capacity of the elements and thus complexity is 
reproduced as a condition that cannot be avoided at higher levels of system 
formation. Complexity from this perspective means being forced to select. To maintain 
itself, a complex system is forced to select a certain number of relations from a 
multitude of relations. This also leads to contingency (Luhmann, 1995, p.24-25).  
For example, to show how Luhmann’s theory can explain social movements 
better than the field of social movement theory, I first need to show how this field 
explains them. There is a multitude of authors within the field, and their works are all 
related to each other (i.e.: through: the field, the perspective, the approach, method of 
study, the concepts used). It is however impossible for me to present all their works 
so I am forced to choose between them. I am forced to choose not only between 
perspectives, but also between authors within each perspective and between works 
from each of these authors. I also have to make my choice based on relations in the 
field but even those require a selection. Do I choose one or the other based on the 
fact that they use the same method of study or because they are part of the same 
perspective? Thus if I choose the works of a certain author because those works (and 
not others) are a good example for other works to which they are related through 
being part of the same perspective I make that choice based on certain relations while 
ignoring others. Therefore, the complexity of the field limits my capacity to present the 
entire field and forces me to make choices based on certain relations. Relations, 
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elements and complexity are also talked about in the context of self-referential 
systems. 
2.1.10 Self-reference and other reference  
“The concept of self-reference designates the unity that an element, a 
process, or a system is for itself. For itself means independent of the 
cut of observation by others. (…) One can call a system self-
referential if it itself constitutes the elements that compose it as 
functional unities and runs reference to this self-constitution through 
all the relations among these elements, continuously reproducing its 
self-constitution in this way. In this case, self-referential systems 
necessarily operate by self-contact; they possess no other form of 
environmental contact than this self-contact (Luhmann, 1995, p.33). 
There are at least three significant statements in the quote above. First, it 
states that a unity is produced, it doesn’t exist a priori and it needs a “relational 
operation” to exist. Second, it states that for a system to be self-referential it needs to 
create its own elements, connect them and maintain itself by always referring back to 
itself. At the level of system formation (or constitution), self-reference is therefore 
another term for autopoiesis. The third statement is that self-referential systems are 
operationally closed systems. Not being able to operate outside their boundaries 
doesn’t mean though that systems have no contact with the environment:  
“The concept of self-referentially closed systems does not contradict 
the system’s openness to the environment. Instead, in the self-
referential mode of operation, closure is a form of broadening 
possible environmental contacts; closure increases, by constituting 
elements more capable of being determined, the complexity of the 
environment that is possible for the system” (Luhmann, 1995, p.37). 
Self-referential systems are thus systems that have the ability to establish 
relations within themselves and to differentiate these relations from relations with the 
environment. They are also capable of creating ways of dealing with the environment 
   
 
59 
 
through their own means. There is also a distinction to be made between system-
environment relations and system-system relations. “In the relationship between 
system and environment, the system operates universalistically, in the form of a 
cross-section of the world. In relations between systems, it operates specifically, in 
certain, contingent modes of observation” (Luhmann 2013a, p. 10). In other words, in 
the relation with the environment the system is looking at an “unmarked” space that 
can’t be clearly indicated. The system only sees itself as separate from the rest. In the 
relation with other systems though, the system sees that there are other units in the 
environment and can observe them and indicate which are relevant for it.  
The discussion about the system-environment distinction and system-
environment or system-system relations is important because it partly explains 
another crucial distinction: that between self -reference and other-reference. As we 
have seen, a fundamental step (the first step) in system formation is making the 
distinction between system and environment. Reintroducing this distinction within the 
system leads to further differentiation. The operation of copying the distinction and 
then using it is called “re-entry”. Luhmann explains re-entry as follows: 
“Paying attention to this condition of the capacity of observing, we 
can see that the system makes the difference between system and 
the environment and copies that difference in the system to be able 
to use it as a distinction. This operation of reinventing the difference 
as a distinction can be conceived as a re-entry of a form into the 
form, or the distinction into the distinguished” (Luhmann 2000b, p. 
37).  
The operation of re-entry is both possible and necessary because systems are 
operationally closed. The boundaries of the system are set by operations and thus 
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operationally produced (remember that operations are what the system does). “By 
happening, they [the operations] determine what belongs to the system and what 
belongs to the environment” (Luhmann 2013a, p. 94). However, because the system 
is autopoietic, and therefore can use only what is already in the system, they need to 
observe the system using the system – environment distinction (Luhmann 2013a, p. 
94). 
The distinction between self-reference and other-reference is such a re-entry. 
This distinction is the way in which the operationally produced boundaries (in other 
words the difference between system and environment) are copied into the system. 
By copying this distinction, the system is able to distinguish itself from what it is 
observing (Luhmann 2000a, p. 10).  
The system uses its boundaries not only to distinguish itself from the 
environment, but also to relate to the environment and other systems, to 
communicate about itself and to observe other systems as well. So self-reference is 
nothing more than looking in while other-reference is nothing else than looking out. 
This capacity to look both in and out also makes it possible for the system to see that 
some events that take place within itself can take place in other systems at the same 
time (and are thus operations within a multitude of systems simultaneously). It is 
crucial though that the system makes the difference between these two types of 
references. 
An example of self/other reference distinction and re-entry would be writing a 
sociological dissertation about the economic system. In this case sociology is a sub-
   
 
61 
 
system (or a part of the scientific system. Doing a literature review of sociological 
theories about the economic functional system would be self-reference because the 
reviewed theories are within the scientific system. Referring directly to the economy 
would be other-reference because the economic system is outside the system of 
science. If I then talk, during the defense for example, about the impact of my 
dissertation I need to make the difference between the impact on the sociological 
field, thus on the scientific system, and the impact on the economic system. And 
finally, by talking about these two types of impact (or two possible impacts) as two 
different things in two different systems, I reintroduce the distinction between the two 
systems and thus use the operation of re-entry. However, this type of distinction could 
be complemented by another perspective, defining knowledge as a capacity for action 
(see Sales, 2012).  
Self and other reference explain the fact that there is a variety of “descriptions 
of the world”. These (descriptions) are always other-reference formulations of specific 
systems. The other-reference always depends on self-reference of course, so each 
system will describe the world differently, as in, the way it sees it (Luhmann 2013a, p. 
94). In the example of the sociological dissertation, the way I describe the economy is 
specific to the field of sociology. The economic system would probably describe itself 
very differently. In other words, each system uses its own schema of elements and 
relations to describe not only itself but also the environment or other systems in the 
environment. Schema here is used in the Kantian understanding, meaning a set of 
rules for the repetition of operations (Kant 1999).         
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 2.1.11 Causality  
This is another concept that depends on understanding system-environment 
relations, boundaries, operations as well as contingency. Luhmann holds that: 
“Operations, as classical concepts such as poiesis or production 
indicate, control and vary only part of the causes necessary to 
reproduce the system. The environment is always involved. 
Moreover, causal determinations always require specific performance 
by an observer. Certain causes have to be attributed to certain 
effects, choosing from an infinity of causal factors. Depending on the 
interests concerned, attribution can vary considerably. (…) If we wish 
to know what causal relations are assumed (selected), we therefore 
have to observe observers, and we must know that every attribution 
is contingent (which does not mean arbitrary or purely fictitious” 
(Luhmann 2012, p. 74). 
Thus, system operations depend on causal conditions from the environment 
and vice versa. Boundaries do not “block causalities” in either direction. Furthermore, 
it is impossible to see all causes and all effects and thus observers are the ones who 
make the causal connection (attribute causes to effects). These attributions vary 
depending on the position of the observer and thus observers need to be observed to 
know how the attribution was made. The entire situation is contingent because 
causes are selected to be linked to effects. This doesn’t mean that the causal relation 
is in fact untrue, the selection is not arbitrary; it is just based on the schema of the 
system to which the observer belongs.  
2.1.12 Ecology  
According to Luhmann, the original sense of the term ecology was that of 
“establishing a livable world”, but mass media merged it with the term “environment” 
thus creating confusion in speech. For system theory, ecology is of interest because 
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“ecological circumstances” have an effect on society. These ecological circumstances 
are the environment of society and as a theory of distinction between system and 
environment, systems theory cannot ignore the environment of the system society. 
Furthermore, Luhmann argues that sociology cannot “limit its attention to an 
intrasocial perspective. Its subject matter is society and everything else that is 
environment from the stand point of society” (Luhmann 2012, p.73-74). Another thing 
that cannot be ignored is the temporal dimension of society.   
2.1.13 Time 
For Luhmann  
“time symbolizes the fact that whenever anything determinate occurs, 
something else also happens, so that no single operation can ever 
gain control over its circumstances. Furthermore, selection itself is a 
temporal concept: it is imminent, is required, is performed, and finally 
is passed” (Luhmann 1995, p. 42).  
Thus time puts pressure on the system to select and imposes conditioning and 
complexity. Time is also seen as being irreversible, fact which leads to it being 
understood as a distinction: the present is ongoing between the past and the future. 
Systems and environments are never at the same level of complexity, which means 
that they are never perfectly synchronized in time. There is thus a need for constant 
adjustments and corrections in relations between the two. These however cannot be 
instantaneous “but take time”. The system has a few mechanisms at its disposal to 
deal with these desynchronizations and to “gain time” to make the necessary 
adjustments. It can “prepare reactions and store them for when they are needed”, it 
can “increase the tempo of its own processes vis-à-vis relevant environmental 
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processes” or it can even “defer reaction without breaking down in the meantime” 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 43-46). One important concept in Luhmann’s theory that depends 
on the notion of time is that of information.     
 
2.1.14 Information 
As with other concepts, understanding information presupposes understanding 
other concepts (besides time as mentioned above), such as complexity, causality and 
elements. This is how Luhmann explains information:  
“Information occurs whenever a selective event (of an external or 
internal kind) works selectively within the system, namely, can select 
the system’s states. This presupposes a capacity for being oriented 
to (simultaneous or successive) differences that appear to be bound 
to a self-referential operational mode of the system. ‘A bit of 
information’, as Bateson says, ‘is definable as a difference which 
makes a difference’. This means that the difference as such begins to 
work if and insofar as can be treated as information in the self-
referential systems” (Luhmann 1995, p. 40). 
Therefore, information is an event that makes a selection within a self-
referential system. It is an event that makes a distinction which is itself a distinction. 
This distinction also forces a selection. It thus presupposes complexity and 
temporality. Events are elements in a system that are “fixed points in time”; they are 
“identified by this temporal appearance and cannot be repeated” (Luhmann 1995, p. 
67). The house example can be used again to explain this.  
If I am inside and someone knocks at the door, I receive an audible signal – 
which is also an information - that someone is outside my door and wants something 
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from within (to come in or to talk to me). It is not the knock in itself or the audible 
signal that matters here, but the message it transmits. Once this happens it cannot be 
changed, it took place and I have to act based on the information I received. Even if a 
second knock comes, it doesn’t change anything in respect to what information I 
already have and the situation is the same as before: I am inside and I know that 
someone is outside and wants something from within. The knock on the door stopped 
being information; it was information only the first time it took place, when it 
introduced something new. This is what is meant by information as an event identified 
by temporal appearance and impossible to repeat.  
The knock on the door is also a distinction, knocking versus not knocking, that 
introduced a difference in the situation: now there is someone at the door who wants 
something from within, whereas before nobody was there (if someone was there and 
he/she didn’t knock then they didn’t want anything from within and I didn’t have any 
knowledge about them being there). This is what is meant by distinction which makes 
a distinction.  
Moreover, now that I know someone is there, I am forced to choose a course 
of action: ignore the knock and the person outside, go open the door, ask through the 
door who is there. This is how the situation becomes contingent and complex. I have 
to select one of many possibilities. I also need to think of causal relations into a self-
referential, operational mode, meaning: I ask myself how the chosen course of action 
will affect me (what happens when I open the door?). 
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  Information is also a component of the process of communication which will 
be discussed in the context of society as a system of communication.  
2.2 Society as a social system 
The three following quotes all explain society as a social system, each one 
adding a new dimension to the concept:  
“Society is the autopoietic social system par excellence. Society 
carries on communication and whatever carries on communication is 
society. Society constitutes the elemental units (communications) out 
of which it is composed and whatever is constituted in this way is 
society, is an aspect of the constitutive process itself” (Luhmann 
1995, p. 408-409).  
Society is thus an autopoietic communication social system. Also: 
“A particularity of social systems is that they orient themselves to 
complexity in the form of meaning. This means that the difference 
between system and environment is mediated exclusively by 
meaning-constituted boundaries” (Luhmann 1995, p. 194). 
Society is thus an autopoietic communication system with meaning constituted 
boundaries and:  
“Sociology must have a concept for the unity of the totality of what is 
social – whether one calls this (depending on the theoretical 
preferences) the totality of social relations, processes, actions, or 
communications. We will use the concept of society for this purpose. 
Accordingly, society is the all-encompassing social system that 
includes everything that is social and therefore does not admit a 
social environment. If something social emerges, if new kinds of 
communicative partners or themes appear, society grows along with 
them. They enrich society. They cannot be externalized or treated as 
an environment, for everything that is communication is society” 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 408). 
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Society is thus an autopoietic communication comprehensive social system 
with meaning constituted boundaries. Therefore to understand the concept of society 
we have to understand the concepts of autopoiesis, communication and meaning. We 
have seen that an autopoietic system is one that produces its own elements in a 
recursive operationally closed network of these same elements. In the case of society 
as a social system elements are communications. Communication is also the 
operation that “carries out” the autopoiesis of the system and differentiates it from the 
environment. If society has meaning-constituted boundaries, and as we have seen, 
boundaries make the distinction system-environment possible, it goes without saying 
that communication and meaning are strongly related. In fact, Luhmann explains the 
concept of communication by taking meaning as the starting point (Luhmann 2012). 
So what is meaning? 
2.2.1 Meaning 
Meaning is the result of the fact that two types of systems evolved together: 
psychic systems and social systems. These two kinds of systems can form and exist 
only together because they are each other’s environment. “Persons cannot emerge 
and continue to exist without social systems, nor can social systems without persons” 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 59). This doesn’t mean that human beings are part of society, just 
that they cannot exist without it, as any other system that cannot exist without its 
environment. Meaning is the result of this co-evolution and “both kinds of systems are 
ordered according to it, and for both it is binding as the indispensable, undeniable 
form of their complexity and self-reference” (Luhmann 1995, p. 59).  
   
 
68 
 
Therefore, as a form, meaning must make a distinction; as a form of 
complexity, it must force a selection and, as self-reference it must produce and relate 
the elements of the system making it possible for the system to refer back to itself. 
Luhmann doesn’t define meaning, but he describes it phenomenologically: 
“Meaning can be described phenomenologically as surplus reference 
accessible from actually given meaning. Meaning is accordingly an 
infinite and hence indeterminable referential complex that can be 
made accessible and reproduced in a determined manner – and I 
attach great importance to the paradoxical formulation. We can 
describe the form of meaning as the difference between actuality and 
potentiality, and can therefore also assert that this and no other 
distinction constitutes meaning” (Luhmann 2012, p. 21).  
There are at least four conclusions to be drawn from this quote. One is that, 
due to the fact that meaning is “a surplus reference accessible from actual given 
meaning”, only meaning can give or constitute meaning. Thus, meaning doesn’t exist 
a priori. It is produced by operations that use meaning and it exists as meaning only 
for operations that use it as such. The second conclusion, drawn from the paradoxical 
formulation of meaning as an indeterminable complex that can be reproduced in a 
determined manner, is that meaning operates like complexity, as the unity of a 
manifold (remember the paradox of complexity: a complex system is the union of the 
many). This is better explained by the distinction between medium and form. 
Luhmann explains this distinction through the use of language as an example.  
The language is the medium while words in sentences are forms. Words in 
sentences are thus temporary forms of the medium language. They are forms 
because they can be connected in various ways and when you connect them one way 
you make the distinction from all the other ways in which they can be connected. 
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They are temporary because they won’t stay connected like that forever, they will 
eventually be connected in other ways, taking different forms. Thus the elements are 
the same, words, but the medium language takes the form of the words in sentences. 
In other words (or in a different form), medium is formed by loosely connected 
elements (in the case of language: words) and it takes forms when these elements 
are more specifically or tightly related (words in a sentence). As a communication 
system, society uses meaning as both medium and form (Luhmann 2012, p. 116-
118). 
The third conclusion to be drawn about meaning, given the fact that it is 
produced by operations that use it and that relations between elements as well as 
distinctions are made through the use of meaning, is that systems that use meaning 
as their medium are autopoietic, self-referential, operationally closed systems. The 
fourth conclusion, drawn from the statement that meaning is an infinite referential 
context, is that meaning systems are necessarily complex systems; a selection has to 
be made, always. And we came back almost full circle, because, as we have seen at 
the beginning of this section, psychic and social systems are the ones that use 
meaning and are ordered and bound in complexity by it. Now that meaning is 
explained, the concept of communication should also become clear. 
2.2.2 Communication 
As it was mentioned earlier, Luhmann takes meaning as the starting point to 
explain it. This is because he doesn’t agree with the “transmission metaphor” that is 
generally used in sender/receiver models of communication. According to him, this 
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metaphor implies three conditions that render it “unusable”. First, it (the metaphor) 
“suggests that the sender gives up something that the receiver then acquires”, when 
in fact nothing is lost in the process of communication. Second, it “locates what is 
essential about communication in the act of transmission”, when in fact 
communication doesn’t take place if it is not “received” or processed. And third, it 
“exaggerates the identity of what is transmitted” when nothing guarantees that the 
information transmitted is the same for both sender and receiver (Luhmann 1995, p. 
139). On the other hand, if one uses the notion of meaning to explain communication 
it becomes evident that it (communication) implies selection because “meaning allows 
no other choice but to choose” (Luhmann 1995, p.140) 
Therefore, communication is a process of selection. This is in fact a three-part 
selection process, or better said, communication incorporates three selections, each 
related to one component of communication. The three components are: information, 
utterance and understanding (or misunderstanding). Information was discussed 
earlier, and now that meaning is explained, we can see that information is that 
through which meaning is produced and reproduced. Utterance is the behavior that 
conveys the information and understanding is the expectation that the conveyed 
information is accepted as such. Communication is a three-part selection process 
because, as we have seen already, information is a selection “from a repertoire of 
possibilities” (repertoire offered by meaning). Utterance is a selection of the behavior 
that will express the information and the third selection is between understanding and 
not understanding, or maybe clearer, a selection of “what” is understood (Luhmann 
1995, p. 140-142).  
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The process of communication is the unity of these three components. 
Communication cannot take place without all three, none of the three can appear on 
its own, and, as with any other process in the general theory of autopoietic systems, 
the process of communication is based on a distinction. The distinction between 
information and its utterance is crucial for communication and it is the basis of the 
third selection, that of understanding. In fact, understanding presupposes “grasping” 
the difference between information and the reason for its utterance (Luhmann 2002, 
p. 157). To use the knock on the door example again, the person outside my door 
selects to let me know he/she is outside (versus not letting me know) because he/she 
wants something from within (otherwise they would not knock). Then he/she selects 
to knock on the door (versus yelling or banging on the door) to convey the information 
that someone is outside and wants something from within. He/she also has the 
expectation that I understand that information as it was intended. The process of 
communication is complete when I understand that someone knocked on my door to 
let me know that he/she is outside for the reason that he/she wants something from 
within. Without me selecting this understanding the process of communication doesn’t 
take place because the information is not conveyed (I could select to believe that a 
tree branch hit my door or that someone knocked just to let me know that he/she is 
taking a walk in my courtyard – as exaggerated as this may sound it is nevertheless a 
possibility).  
These three components also bind communication to a fixed point in time: 
information is identified by its temporal appearance, utterance is also an event or “an 
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act” tied to a point in time and understanding “cannot be repeated, but at best 
recalled” (Luhmann 2012, p. 36). 
According to Luhmann “the general theory of autopoietic systems requires 
precise identification of the operation that carries out the autopoiesis of the system 
and thus demarcates the system from its environment. In the case of social systems, 
this is done through communication” (Luhmann 2012, p. 42). Communication is THE 
operation of the social system because, not only it has all the necessary qualities, it is 
also inherently social or you could say, it is an innately social operation. It is social 
because it presupposes the implication of a multitude (or at least two) conscious or 
psychic systems and thus it cannot be attributed to one individual. It is also 
considered “genuinely social” by Luhmann because, according to him, it stands in 
place of a “common collective consciousness” that cannot be produced in any way 
(Luhmann 2012, p. 42)  
The autopoiesis of the social system is insured through communication 
because communication is a self-referential process, it can be produced only through 
other communications and only through its own elements. As the comprehensive (all 
encompassing) social system, society includes all communication. This also means 
that society is a communicatively closed system, it produces communication through 
communication and it is hence a system that is determined solely by itself. As a 
consequence: 
"society can communicate only within itself, neither with itself nor with 
its environment. It produces its unity through the operational 
performance of communications in recursion to and anticipation of 
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other communications. Operating on the basis of the observation 
schema 'system and environment', it can then communicate within 
itself, about itself, or about its environment, but never with itself and 
never with its environment" (Luhmann 2012, p. 52).    
The fact that this system has meaning constituted boundaries and that it uses 
meaning as both medium and form means these boundaries are forms; they have 
both an inside and an outside. The system is aware of the outside, and this outside 
has a "meaning" for it. This is in fact a repetition or a reinforcement of the thesis that 
the boundaries of the system are constituted by the difference between self and other 
reference and the distinction between system and environment and that these 
distinctions are re-introduced in the system through the operation of re-entry. In other 
words, as the comprehensive meaning communication system, society makes 
communication between other social systems possible but it cannot communicate 
itself due to the fact that it includes all communication. All communication being 
internal to society, external communication is excluded. Society still has an 
environment with which it has relations, but these relations are not carried through 
communication.  
According to Luhmann, this all-encompassing society “uses the bodies and 
minds of the human beings for interaction with its environment” (Luhmann, 1990, 
p.178). This interaction takes place through what Luhmann calls structural coupling. 
This denotes nothing more than a connection between the system and environment 
or the system and another system. It can also be seen as a channel of reciprocal 
irritation. Society however is not connected directly to its physical environment. This 
connection takes place through a series of structural couplings:  
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“The entire physical world, including the physical basis of 
communication itself can affect communication only via operationally 
closed brains, and these brains only through operationally closed 
consciousness systems, and thus only through individuals. (…) 
Consciousness is hence in a privileged position under all the external 
conditions of autopoiesis. It controls the access of the outside world 
to communication” (Luhmann 2012, p. 63). 
  
Therefore society is connected to consciousness, which is connected to the 
brain, which is connected to sensory organs. Only through this series of connections 
can society receive information or be irritated by the environment because society is a 
communication systems and understands only communication. Thus what I see with 
my eyes needs to be interpreted by the brain and translated into language so it can 
become communication in society. 
 In Luhmann’s view, social systems are communication systems and not action 
systems due to the fact that action in itself implies communication or at least the 
communication of a meaning. Furthermore, action systems imply the centrality of the 
actor. However, the understanding of an action does not rest with the actor but with 
those who receive the message of the action. Through an action, the actor 
communicates information that is received and understood. Nevertheless, action is 
not completely excluded because social systems require the attribution of actions in 
order to: 
“move on their own autopoiesis. Not psychological motivation and not 
reasoning or capacity of argumentation constitutes action but the 
attribution as such, that is, the linking of selection and responsibility 
for the narrowing of choice. Only by attributing the responsibility for 
selecting the communication can the process of further 
communication be directed”. (Luhmann, 1990, p.6) 
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 Such a view of society allows us, in Luhmann’s view, to make a distinction 
between different types of societal systems. This distinction is based on different 
modes of differentiation, not on historical conditions and their long term 
consequences. 
2.2.3 Forms of differentiation of society 
 According to Luhmann there are four different forms of differentiation in the 
history of society (it must be mentioned that ‘form’ here is used in the same sense as 
earlier, not as type but as distinction). These forms are based on a further distinction, 
similar/dissimilar, applied to system relations. The first form is the segmentary 
differentiation, from the viewpoint of the similarity of subsystems. This means that 
society was divided into subsystems that were similar (such as families or clans).  The 
second form is differentiation in terms of center and periphery. This form is based on 
dissimilarity, and it actually includes segmentary differentiation. The distinction 
between center and periphery appeared when the center differentiated itself from the 
rest of society (urban center and rural periphery). While the center was dependent on 
this distinction, the periphery was still segmentary differentiated and could have lived 
without the center.  
Third is “stratificatory differentiation” from the viewpoint of “dissimilarity in 
rank”. These are the stratified societies with strata like aristocracy or nobility as the 
“upper class” and “the people” (laborers, working classes) as the “lower class”. The 
fourth form of differentiation is functional differentiation from the viewpoint of both 
similarity and dissimilarity of subsystems. Modern society is characterized by this form 
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of differentiation which is based simply on the function subsystems fulfill in society 
(Luhmann 1982, 2013a).  
These forms of differentiation lead to two different types of societal systems: 
traditional and modern. Traditional societies are seen as stratified societies. Luhmann 
argues that all societies that developed a high culture attained a level of differentiation 
that allowed them to build hierarchical systems. These societies evolved in different 
regions and based themselves on land or cities. Thus, we can say that there were 
different societies that were aware of each other and used the notion of frontier 
(however unclear) to make the difference between themselves and others. Modern 
society on the other hand, realized a different kind of system differentiation, based on 
specific functions: 
“Starting from special conditions in medieval Europe, where there 
existed a relatively high degree of differentiation of religion, politics, 
and economy, European society has evolved into a functionally 
differentiated system. This means that function, not rank, is the 
principle of system building”. (Luhmann, 1990, p.177) 
In other words, modern society is differentiated in the political, economic, 
scientific, educational (and so on) functional systems and their environments. All 
these systems have a primary function and each of them belongs to the environment 
of the others. Through this differentiation, modern society became a new type of 
system that brought with it a high level of complexity. These functional systems are 
connected to each other and interact through structural couplings. Thus they are able 
to “irritate” each other and sent communications towards one another.  
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In Luhmann’s view, territorial frontiers cannot integrate or limit these 
subsystems. He argues that the only subsystem that still uses these frontiers is the 
political system but for the simple reason that using them optimizes its own function. 
Science, economy, culture, are spread all over the world (Luhmann, 1990, p.178). As 
a consequence of this type of differentiation (functional differentiation) modern society 
became a global system: 
“Under modern conditions, and as a consequence of functional 
differentiation, only one societal system can exist. Its communicative 
network spreads over the globe. It includes all human (i.e. 
meaningful) communication. Modern society is, therefore, a world 
society in a double sense. It provides one world for one system; and 
it integrates all world horizons as horizons of one communicative 
system”. (Luhmann, 1990, p.178)  
        Therefore, local societies are subsystems of the global society which integrates 
everything. The integration does not mean the leveling of standards but “the limitation 
of the degrees of freedoms of subsystems” (Luhmann, 2000c, p. 220). There is a 
difference between positive and negative integration. Positive integration means there 
is a relationship between the subsystems, a “loose coupling” that limits the freedoms 
of both subsystems. The negative integration means that there are some “loose 
couplings” that prevent the functional differentiation in some parts of the world 
(subsystems of the world society) or there are couplings that function one way, they 
limit the freedoms of only one subsystem but they do not limit the freedoms of the 
other subsystem involved in the relationship (Luhmann, 2000c, p. 221).  
As we have seen so far society is an autopoietic communication and meaning 
system that includes all other social systems and all communication. It is a complex 
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system that functions based on the rules (for a lack of a better word) of double 
contingency, this (double contingency) being guaranteed by the use of meaning. 
According to Luhmann an autopoietic system also needs an immune system in order 
to maintain its autopoiesis on the basis of unstable elements. This immune system is 
activated by contradictions. Society’s immune system is the legal system. The role of 
the legal system is to offer non-violent resolutions to conflicts, to keep communication 
open. All this is important for the explanation of the concept of social movements.  
 
2.3 Social Movements in Systemic Terms  
In Luhmann’s theory, social movements, or as we will see, protest movements, 
are one of the ways in which society selects significant or consequential 
contradictions in society and connects them to conflicts. Conflicts appear when there 
is a contradiction in communication or when a contradiction is communicated; 
contradictions serve the function of activating society’s immune system and, social 
movements connect contradictions to conflicts. Therefore, before explaining the 
concept of social movement a discussion of the concepts contradiction, immune 
system and conflict is needed.  
2.3.1 Contradiction  
“Contradictions are commonly thought of as logical mistakes, as 
offenses against rules of logic, and as something to be avoided. 
Knowledge must be reformulated until it no longer contains any 
contradictions. Logic was intended to control this process, was 
differentiated for this function, and could then be refined as a system 
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of methods for control. This occurred in the working context of 
science. Science promoted the idea that reality as it can be known 
must be assumed to be free of contradiction. If the world of objects 
was contradictory in the logical sense, then any random statement 
and no knowledge about it could be possible. Correspondingly, there 
are no problems in reality. Problems are unclarified relations between 
knowledge and ignorance, and they can be solved, if at all, only by 
changing these relations” (Luhmann, 1995, p.357-358). 
 This “logic” however can be applied to the world of objects only, because the 
social is not and cannot be free of contradictions. If it would be, we would not have 
drunken driving, different political systems or wars. Logic thus excludes the social 
from the “environment of science”. If the social contains contradictions, then a theory 
of it has to account for them. So what are contradictions in this situation? Obviously 
we cannot use the “logical” definition because we would only try to find what is wrong 
with our knowledge that it doesn’t fit reality, thus a different definition is needed. 
 From the perspective of the theory of social systems, and more precisely when 
considering society an autopoietic communication and meaning system, 
contradictions can be explained through autopoiesis, observation, meaning, and 
communication. First, as Luhmann maintains, the difference between autopoiesis and 
observation must be pointed out because contradictions function differently 
depending at which level (that of autopoiesis or that of observation) they occur:  
“In the context of autopoietic operations (which must always carry on 
if observation is to be possible at all), contradictions shape a specific 
form, which selects connective operations. One reacts to a 
contradiction differently from something that is not experienced as a 
contradiction but one reacts. (…) The situation presents itself all 
together differently to an observer. For him, and only for him, 
contradiction means undecidability. He cannot continue the 
observation because he cannot furnish the distinction with mutually 
exclusive designations. Contradiction puts a stop to observation, and 
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this is even more true of observing observation. But precisely this can 
be sufficient grounds for doing something” (Luhmann 1995, p. 359-
360). 
   Consequently, contradictions have two functions, or as Luhmann puts it, a 
double function in autopoietic systems. On the one hand they block the operation of 
observation and on the other, they trigger connective operations. When speaking of 
autopoiesis here, Luhmann refers to the system’s capacity to reproduce itself and its 
elements as an operation different from observation which deals with designations. 
However, the two operations do not cancel each other; rather they work together in 
autopoietic systems. The double function of contradiction refers to the fact that on one 
hand the contradiction is observed and, on the other, it forces a decision and a 
reaction on the part of the observer. Thus, on one side it triggers the observation and 
on the other it forces the observer to decide on a type of reaction (or on a direction). 
Through this, or more clearly through the reaction of the observer in the face of 
contradiction new operations are produced, thus creating more elements in the 
system and ensuring the reproduction of the system’s elements and of relations 
between them, thus assuring autopoiesis itself. 
 Secondly, if we think of meaning, and remember that it is an infinite referential 
context (in the sense that it refers to everything possible) we can draw the conclusion 
that contradiction always exists as a possibility in society. According to Luhmann 
“every meaning is capable of contradiction or of being developed into one. (…) 
Contradiction is an aspect of the self-reference of meaning because every meaning 
includes its own negation as a possibility” (Luhmann 1995, p. 362). 
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 And third, because society is a communication system, contradictions can only 
be communications. There are two types of “communicative contradictions”; one 
refers to the communication of rejection and one to the “utterer’s communicative 
intentions”. In the first case the contradiction appears between two communications 
and it is situated in the difference or distinction between “alter” and “ego”. In the 
second case communication contradicts itself (Luhmann 1995, p. 367). Because 
contradictions are communications they are not “an intrusion from the outside”, they 
are within the social system of society and an aspect of its self-reference. 
  
2.3.2 Society’s immune system 
        Due to the fact that social systems are communication systems their unity is 
created through communication. Contradictions surface through being communicated 
and destabilize the system, provoke movement in a system and through this 
movement they create instability. However, this is not an issue because complex 
systems need a high level of instability “to enable on-going reaction to themselves 
and their environment” (Luhmann 1995, p. 367). Also, as we know, autopoiesis (and 
all systems, including the social systems are autopoietic) insures the self-reproduction 
of the system. This self-reproduction is based on unstable elements and is a 
precondition of evolution (and without it the system will cease to exist). Thus 
contradictions are needed by social systems (and consequently by society) because 
they insure “self-reproduction under difficult circumstances” (Luhmann 1995, p. 385). 
They do this by activating society’s immune system: 
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“Because contradictions enable but do not compel the elimination of 
deviation, they have qualities that promote the development of an 
immune system. An immune system must be compatible with self-
reproduction under changing conditions. It is not simply a mechanism 
for correcting deviations and re-establishing the status quo ante; it 
must manage this function selectively, namely, must be able also to 
accept useful changes. It does not serve to preserve unconditionally 
the structures under attack, but also presupposes structures and 
limits of possibility for its own functioning and especially for 
recognizing contradictions” (Luhmann 1995, p. 369). 
 This immune system functions based on the system’s capacity to learn which 
is in turn based on memory. When something happens the system knows how to 
react if the same thing happened once before. It doesn’t need to re-analyze 
everything and thus can act quickly and efficiently. If it is a first time occurrence then it 
can be committed to memory so the system knows what it is and how to react to it if it 
happens again (Luhmann 1995, p. 369-370). Contradictions function like an alarm 
system within the system. This means not only that they activate the immune system 
but they are also a way, “the only way” in fact, in which “society (meaning the totality 
of social systems) can warn itself of its effects” (Luhmann 1995, p. 388).  
 As it was remarked earlier in this this chapter, the immune system of society is 
the legal system and its role is to offer non-violent resolutions to conflict and to keep 
communication open (Luhmann 1995, p. 375). But how does conflict emerge in the 
social system of society?  
 2.3.3 Conflict 
According to Luhmann we can  
“speak of conflict when a communication is contradicted, or when a 
contradiction is communicated. A conflict is the operative 
   
 
83 
 
autonomization of a contradiction through communication. Thus a 
conflict exists when expectations are communicated and the 
nonacceptance of the communication is communicated in return” 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 388). 
 Thus conflict in social systems is based on contradictions. For a conflict to 
appear, the communication of a different view, image or demand is not enough. 
These have to be rejected. There are always two poles (alter and ego) that 
communicate to each other and answer to each other. Conflict is not a failure of 
communication between the two. On the contrary, it helps continue communication by 
saying no. Conflict is also a meaning form because it presupposes two contradictory 
communications, hence two sides, and it is also a system in itself that functions 
according to the model of double contingency.           
        In Luhmann’s view, conflicts are social systems “formed out of occasions that 
are given in other systems but that do not assume the status of subsystems and 
instead exist parasitically” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 389). As a system, conflict contains 
double contingency on both sides, or as Luhmann calls it, a negative version of 
double contingency which is implied by and which also implies the statement: “I will 
not do what you want if you do not do what I want” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 389). This has 
two effects or consequences: one is that what happens next is completely open and 
the second is that the system acquires self-reference because “ego sees that what 
hurts alter benefits ego because ego assumes that alter sees that what hurts ego 
benefits alter. The same holds for alter” (Luhmann 1995, p. 389-390). 
 As a communication system conflict is also a social system and therefore 
autopoietic, which indicates that it is reproducing itself. This signifies that once it is 
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formed it will continue to exist. Such a system can end only with intervention from 
outside the system, from its environment. Luhmann uses the example of one party in 
the conflict being killed (and thus becoming unable to continue the conflict) to 
illustrate this. Also, 
“If one imagines conflict as a system, two different forms of 
conditioning, which simultaneously increase the system’s internal 
complexity and make behavior difficult present themselves. The first 
is the prohibition of specific means; the second amounts to increasing 
insecurity within the system” (Luhmann 1995, p. 395). 
 “Restricting means” is used mainly to defend against damage in the system but 
it also has the effect of making the system more complex and prolongs its existence. 
The use of force is used as an example for this. While barring its use will avoid 
significant physical damage, not restricting its use can lead to a quick end to the 
conflict or only the fear of its possible use could deter the conflict from appearing 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 395). “Increasing insecurity” occurs when third parties are 
included in the system. While one knows that only disadvantage can be expected 
from an opponent, the third party and its intentions are unknown. This third party can 
influence the conflict and so its resolution becomes unsure and the situation more 
complex: “reintroducing insecurity concerning expectations into the conflict provides 
the system with special possibilities for forming structure, new contingencies, and new 
chances to make selections” (Luhmann 1995, p. 369).   
 Both ways of conditioning help in continuing communication and lower the 
chance of open violent conflict. “Saying no in the process of communication, rejecting 
demands and proposing innovations that will probably be rejected are all made 
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easier” (Luhmann 1995, p.396). This benefits the immune system and society overall. 
One can say that contradictions are essential to understanding conflict: 
“Conflicts are operationalized contradictions that have become 
communication. They enable the conditioning of the immunizing 
events. They draw attention to problems and thus allow adequate 
sensitivity to the future as early as possible, while temporally 
extending the synthesis of contradictions” (Luhmann 1995, p. 394). 
 Luhmann argues that there are two main ways in which contradictions can be 
connected to conflicts or two procedures through which significant or consequential 
conflicts for society are selected. The first procedure, the traditional one, is linked to 
somewhat stable domains of conflict and the second one, the modern procedure, is 
linked to more unstable domains of conflict (Luhmann 1995, p.397). The traditional 
procedure is characteristic to stratified societies that did not noticeably differentiate 
between economy, politics, and law. In this type6 of society the immune system, 
meaning the legal system or the law, was used to reinforce positions of power and to 
concentrate the power to change in the hands of those at the top. This system started 
to change in the transition to modern society and to functional differentiation, making 
room for the modern procedure of selecting conflicts, namely the social movement. 
 Although there were some forms of “movements” in the early history of society, 
social movements as such, in systemic terms, as self-observations of the social 
system of society, appeared only in the late eighteen century. Luhmann finds that the 
term social movement doesn’t convey enough from a theoretical point of view so he 
chooses to explain this phenomenon through three other different concepts, more 
                                                          
6 One should remember that the four forms of differentiation of society lead to two different types of 
societal systems: traditional and modern. Traditional societies are seen as stratified societies and 
modern society is functionally differentiated. 
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specifically: “the loosening of internal bindings”, “the specification of contributions” 
and, “the accumulation of effects” (Luhmann 1995, p. 398). 
 The first thing to note about the loosening of internal bindings is that binding 
means “something that gives duration to relatively chance events (formerly birth, 
today one’s choice) and is retained as a premise of one’s behavior” (Luhmann 1995, 
p.  399). Thus a loosening of these binding means that an individual is free to choose 
his/her own way of living. Bindings still exist of course, but more and more and also 
more of them are chosen, not ascribed. Statuses also change from being “ascribed” 
to being “acquired” and a shift that allows for a more rigorous “specification of 
contributions” takes place in the sense that “qualities that enable performances are 
replaced by performances that presuppose qualities” (Luhmann 1995, p. 399) (i.e. 
you do not obtain a profession because you were born in a family that gives you 
access to that profession, but the profession requires someone with “this and that” 
qualification). 
 Both loosening of internal bindings and the specification of individual 
contributions lead to more insecurity and greater complexity of society through a 
greater involvement of individuals in “social adjustment”. Nevertheless, these two 
processes alone are not enough to provoke a significant change in society and this is 
where the accumulation of effects enters the discussion: “unexpected aggregations 
emerge which, beyond specified thresholds, trigger their own effects: mood swings, 
changes in what one calls collective mentality, and possibly social movements 
capable of recruiting action” (Luhmann 1995, p. 399). 
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 These accumulations of effects fluctuate, they appear and disappear suddenly 
and quickly. Some of them however, do become prominent and reach the level of 
self-reference. When that happens society describes them as movements or 
processes. It does this through the operations of self-observation and self-reference 
because these manifestations are part of it, are within it and they need to be 
differentiated somehow from other occurrences. This description is then reintroduced 
within the occurrence (remember the operation of re-entry) and thus becomes part of 
its self-reference. That is when one can talk of a:  
“revolutionary movement, a nationalist movement, a women’s 
movement, a youth movement, an emancipatory movement, a 
religious revival – left, right, red, black, green or whatever – and this 
is clearly more than, above all, more significant than, the mere 
accumulation of effects on the basis of a coincidence of key events, 
identical interpretations, resistance, public incitement, meetings, 
conventions, and so forth” (Luhmann 1995, p. 400).        
In other words, as society becomes more complex it creates and also reacts to 
effects of this complexity that are not controlled by the “existing structures of 
expectation but emerge fully and of themselves” (Luhmann 1995, p. 398). Such a 
phenomenon becomes a social movement if it has a theory rich enough to help it 
overcome this initial “unexpected aggregation”. “A theory of the movement makes it 
possible to distinguish the context of action that describes itself in this way from mere 
unrest, upheaval, and random violent episodes” (Luhmann 1995, p. 401). Thus, a 
social movement needs to describe itself as a movement, in other words it needs self-
observation and self-reference. This enables it to identify correctly its goals, the 
resistance and its adversaries in the present, to provide direction for collective action 
and also to refer to past events as history and use them to increase meaning. This will 
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be elaborated further but first a few more clarifications are needed, such as why 
Luhmann prefers the designation of protest movement instead of social movement 
and how he differentiates these modern ways of connecting contradiction to conflict 
from the traditional ones. 
 
2.3.4 Protest Movements 
In Luhmann’s view social movements are very general phenomena for which it 
is hard to find a describing or defining concept. He argues that they are a modern 
phenomenon which means that they exclude peasant, slave and nobility uprisings 
and revolts. For him the discussion on social movements starts with the socialist 
movement in the nineteenth century and he holds that more current phenomena 
cannot be described in the same terms as the socialist movement. Thus the concept 
of new social movements starts to be utilized in the academic field to describe and 
define them. However, Luhmann prefers to use the concept of protest movements 
due to the fact that, in his view, “it covers broad areas of the phenomenon of the 
social movement, but can more easily be delimited” (Luhmann, 1993, p. 125). 
“A permanent source of potential protest is [the fact] that any determination of 
a specific future has an effect of social discrimination; that is to say, it does not benefit 
or advantages everyone to the same degree” (Luhmann, 1993, p. 129). The 
emergence of protest movements cannot be explained only through such a general 
statement though. For a better understanding of how protest movements emerge, 
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Luhmann makes an analysis of historical situations that contributed or acted as 
triggers in their appearance. This analysis leads to the differentiation between: 1) 
uprisings, revolts and resistance movements in traditional societies which were 
related to normative expectations; 2) the socialist movement which was related to the 
unequal distribution of goods and 3) the new protest movements which are related to 
the risky behavior of others.  
In the first phase, in traditional societies “many uprisings, revolts, and 
resistance movements can be traced back to conflicts that are kindled by normative 
expectations. Without a clear distinction between law and morality, the question is 
one of right and wrong”. (Luhmann, 1993, p.130) Thus conflicts are a matter of what 
is the right thing to do (as opposed to what is legal/illegal or conforming to the rules or 
against the rules). There are two different sides to this kind of conflict. On one side, 
the two parties involved in conflict have different views on what is right and wrong 
while on the other side only one of these two conflicting parties actually has the right 
of making the distinction between right and wrong.  
In an example of one type of conflict in traditional societies, on the first side of 
conflict the parties involved belong to two different social “strata”: one party is 
represented by the agricultural laborers (and small farmers) while the other party is 
represented by the nobility, landowners, and office holders from which the dominant 
strata was comprised. The stratum of agricultural laborers and small farmers expect 
the landowners to secure their living at a “traditional determined” level. “Changes very 
rapidly develop into a threat to subsistence. Claims to protection and assistance are 
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then self-evident, regardless of the concrete causes for the problem becoming acute 
– such as bad harvests, wars or the advance of the money economy” (Luhmann 
1993, p. 130).  
The other side of the conflict is constituted by the fact that the dominant strata 
reserved for themselves the right to decide questions of right and wrong. They also 
reserved only for themselves the right to resistance. Thus if a ruler was perceived as 
doing something “wrong” the dominant strata had a right to act and react, to change 
the ruler, but only they had this right. This was possible not only due to the fact that 
only the dominant strata could decide what is right and wrong but also due to the fact 
that the law had a religious and moral basis, it was founded on notions such as divine 
right and natural law. Nevertheless, exactly this basis led to the development of a 
concept of law “attuned not to the making of the law, not to will and consent, but to the 
possibility of recognition and error” (Luhmann, 1993, p 131).  
During the sixteen and seventeen centuries, after “the explosive advent of 
printing” and the religious wars, the notions of divine right and natural law were 
replaced by concepts such as “loix fondamentales”. These are positive legal notions 
that confer authority to the law itself, not to the dominant strata or the sovereign and 
are “compatible with prohibition of all resistance against established law” (Luhmann, 
1993, p 132). However resistance is still triggered and made possible through the shift 
from concepts like “unlawfulness” to “unconstitutionality”. According to Luhmann the 
last large-scale movement triggered by legal questions and the notion of law was the 
American independence movement. 
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Once law becomes purely positive a shift in the occasion for conflict takes 
place and the basis for claims and protest becomes a “general postulate for equality”. 
This in fact only meant that inequality could not be justified by morals and the divine 
but it needed a lawful legitimization. It is in this context that the socialist movement 
emerges. Thus, one can argue that a change in the historical conditions leads to a 
change in the nature of movements. As the historical context changes, the grounds 
for protest also change: 
“In the case of a conflict of norms, the infringement and thus the 
initiative for protest depends on who imposes his expectations in the 
form of law. In the case of  unequal distribution it is a matter of who is 
successful in accumulating scarce goods or services and who has 
must as a result go without” (Luhmann 1993, p 133).  
Protest cannot be described in terms of struggle for law in this case due to the 
fact that the distribution of goods takes place through contract and thus in compliance 
with the law. It must also be added that, according to Luhmann, at the end of the 
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth there were two important 
shifts, the two being obviously connected and emerging together. One, that was 
already mentioned, was the shift in the occasion and object of protest and the second 
was a shift in the concept of society itself:  
“society was no longer a civil society – a legal institution of those 
participating in it as citizens – and it was certainly no longer a 
contract. It was now more of an economic order that grounded 
privilege and discrimination in the satisfaction of needs, to be exact in 
the attainment of maximum economic well-being” (Luhmann, 1993, p 
134).  
However, Luhmann claims, this description was exaggerated and unrealistic 
due to the fact that it completely disregarded the political domain and it was soon 
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replaced by the distinction between the state and society. The distinction gained 
authority at the middle of the nineteenth century and provided the grounds on which 
the socialist protest movement developed. In Luhmann’s view, although forms of 
protest against norms or the utilization of scarce goods still exist, they lost their 
central significance. Mainly two factors led to this loss of importance: the development 
of the welfare state and the abolition of the free labor market. 
“The really new aspect of protest movements today is, however, not 
to be found in the scattered remnants of a once powerful call for 
legality and economic solidarity, but in a new type of protest: in the 
rejection of situations in which one could become the victim of the 
risky behavior of others” (Luhmann, 1993, p 136). 
In order to understand “protest movements today” we need to go back to a 
more theoretical explanation of protest movements in the context of systems theory. 
First of all, the question “what is protest?” should be answered. Luhmann defines 
protests as:  
“communications addressed to others calling on their sense of 
responsibility. They criticize practices or states of affairs without 
offering to take the place of those whose job is to ensure order. (…) It 
is rather an expression of dissatisfaction; a demonstration of hurts 
and disadvantages suffered, not infrequently of wishful thinking” 
(Luhmann, 1993, p. 125-126).  
A few general characteristics of protest are outlined in this definition. First and 
foremost, protest is communication. It is thus part of society. It presupposes two 
participants, or two sides: one that protests and one that has to react to the protest. 
These participants never switch sides because that is not the purpose of the protest. 
Those that protest announce to others that things need to be changed, and those 
others need to make that change, not those who protest. Consequently the protest 
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will collapse if there aren’t two participants or if the one who protests moves on the 
other side. Hence another crucial characteristic is outlined: protest is a form. Protest 
as a form for protest movements can be better understood through the use of the 
notion of “code” which can be defined as:   
“a guiding distinction by which a system identifies itself and its own 
relationship to the world. (…) code is to be understood as a strictly 
binary schematism that knows only two positions or ‘values’, 
excluding everything else in the sense of a tertium non datur. (…) 
Binary codes are distinctions of a special type. They are not merely 
significations that distinguish themselves by isolating something they 
have defined against the unmarked state. Nonetheless they are not 
qualitative pairs – like heaven and earth, man and woman, or city and 
country – which hold out a prospect of equivalent possibilities of 
specification (=possibilities of connection) on both sides. They 
instead fix the system in an asymmetry that is commonly presented 
as a distinction between a positive and a negative value (such as 
good/bad, true/false, correct/incorrect, having/not having property)” 
(Luhmann 2013b, p. 45).   
 In short, each system has its own code, its own way of determining what 
elements belong to it and what elements are outside of it, in the environment. One 
has to restrict himself/herself to the code of the system he/she is part of. This is called 
the “value of neutrality”. Also, the code of each system has positive and negative 
values (true/false, payment/nonpayment, legal/illegal). Thus the code is a double 
sided form. It imposes two boundaries, one on the outside, separating the system 
from the environment, and one on the inside, making the distinction between positive 
and negative values.  
 For the protest movement, protest as a form, functions (at least partly) in the 
same way a code functions for a functional system. It sets an inside, those who 
protest, and an outside, those who they protest against. The protest movement is thus 
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one side of the form protest, and it is trying to convince the outside side to act the 
way, or do what the inside wants. It does this through different tactics, such as 
employing “alarming communications” or the “deployment of bodies” (Luhmann 
2013a, p. 158). The issue with this is, as Luhmann sees it, that the protest movement 
itself doesn’t assume any responsibility for the wanted change. It presupposes that 
the outside will act and initiate the change, in other words, it will do what is 
demanded. We already saw that the two sides can never change places. In 
theoretical terms this means that the protest movement is incapable of re-entry; it 
cannot incorporate the distinction between inside and outside within itself:  
“The protest movement – as becomes apparent when it is the subject 
of second-order observation – is bound to the form of protest. It 
presupposes another side against which it can protest, and cannot 
itself be or become this other side without the protest and with it this 
specific form of societal self-observation being snuffed out. Like a 
watchdog it has an urgent need to restore order or at least to prevent 
deterioration. And like a watchdog it has a choice only between 
barking and biting” (Luhmann 1993, p. 143).  
The new protest movements, Luhmann holds, appeared due to the fact that 
protest has become an established form in modern society and can easily move from 
topic to topic. Through the study of general forms in society (i.e. inequality, stability, 
danger) “an infinite reservoir of topics” is created and this guarantees that society has 
“the permanent possibility of being able to describe itself by means of protest against 
itself” (Luhmann, 1993, p 137). Form here is used as always by Luhmann, in the 
sense of distinction, not type. So when he talks about stability, inequality, danger as 
forms he refers to the fact that there is also a different side to them, that of equality, 
instability and safety. From this reservoir of topics, the new protest movements adopt 
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topics that are related to their own interests, which seem to always be the rejection of 
the risky behavior of others. 
Topics, similarly to protest as a form, also function as “programs of a code” for 
protest movements: 
“They make clear why one finds oneself as protester on the one side 
of the form. They serve for self-placement in the form. They must 
therefore be controversial; they must be protests that allow protesters 
to show sufficiently drastically what should change and why” 
(Luhmann 2013a, p. 160). 
Protest movements as observers of society live by choosing topics for protest. 
They however, Luhmann holds, observe society on the basis of its consequences. 
The socialist movement for example observed society based on the consequences of 
industrialization. That is in fact the first movement to observe society this way. As long 
as it was the only one to do so, it was also capable of offering a theory that could 
explain both society and the grounds for protest (Luhmann 2013a, p. 161). 
Nevertheless, functionally differentiated society offers a multitude of topics for protest 
that are “heterogeneous and remain so when grouped under broad headings such as 
environment, war, women’s issues, regional particularities, Third World, excessive 
immigration” (Luhmann 2013a, p 160). Due to the fact that more consequences of 
modern society became visible, this multitude of topics for protest also became visible 
and this in turn led to the emergence of a multitude of protest movements. It thus 
became impossible to theorize society on the same grounds the socialist movement 
did. In that respect, Luhmann considers that: 
“Society has become the background topic of topics, the medium of 
ever-new occasions for protest. An appropriate theory of society 
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would now have to describe society as a functionally differentiated 
system with innumerable (and in detail no longer attractive) grounds 
for protest” (Luhmann 2013, p. 161). 
Although there are many grounds for protest, the mere existence of protest and 
of a topic is not enough to form a protest movement: 
“We will speak of protest movements only if the protest serves as 
catalyst in the formation of a system of its own. Protest then, as it 
were, recruits its own supporters. How it all really started is difficult to 
establish afterwards, but the system can if necessary recount a 
founding myth, preserve the memory of the heroes of the founding 
years, commemorate the occasion, and then frequently deplore the 
present comparative loss of commitment and lack of willingness to 
make sacrifices” (Luhmann 1993, p. 126). 
Looked at from this perspective, protest movements are autopoietic systems. 
They produce and reproduce their own elements and the connections between them. 
The form of this system is the protest and its content is the topic (i.e. women’s issues, 
equality, justice). The fact that the system is autopoietic also means that it is formed 
and structured on the basis of internal and not external factors. Therefore it is closed 
in regards to its form, the protest, but it is also open with regards to its topic. The 
form, the protest, makes the distinction between the system and its environment but 
the topic regards both sides and it is henceforth part of what relates the system to the 
environment, making both self and other reference possible for the system. Hence, 
both the form of protest and the topic for protest insure autopoiesis for the protest 
movement.  
Autopoiesis is also insured through the fact that protest based on a topic is the 
creation of the protest movement. How does this happen? Society either disregards a 
topic, either doesn’t even know about it and through this ignorance provides the 
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protest movement with the grounds for protest. The movement builds (or constructs) 
the topic, looks for a “matching background” in society and creates a controversy 
(contradiction) where none existed before (Luhmann 2013, p. 161-162).  
There are however a few more conditions that need to be fulfilled before the 
protest becomes a movement and an autopoietic system. A protest needs to lead to a 
goal-oriented mobilization if it is to become an autopoietic system; choosing a topic 
and building a controversy (and thus a contradiction) on it is not enough. According to 
Luhmann, choosing a goal or fixing on one will radicalize the movement but this 
radicalization is a condition for its continued existence. Another condition for protest to 
become a movement is that it needs to lead to action. Actions are observable 
elements in the system that can be ascribed to communications of the movement. 
Self-description as a movement is another condition for the movement to become an 
autopoietic system.  
Therefore, protest movements as autopoietic systems take on the form of 
protest, choose a topic for protest and create a controversy around it, set a goal and 
describe themselves as movements. All of the above make it possible for the 
movement to observe itself and consequently to organize and grow:   
“As a movement the occurrence has lateral support; by being 
directed to a goal, it can determine what can connect onto this goal 
and what must be abandoned. Furthermore, self-description as a 
movement make it possible to read earlier events as history and to 
use this to increase meaning, be that as success or as failure. All this 
together makes possible self-referential systems of a special type 
that, equipped with greater capacity for contradiction and conflict, can 
assume functions with society’s immune system” (Luhmann 1995, 
p.401-402). 
   
 
98 
 
  A key remark is present in the quote above: protest movements are a special 
type of self-referential systems. They are social systems because they are 
communication systems. Nevertheless, as it was pointed out in the schema 
introduced at the beginning of the chapter, there are three types of social systems: 
interactions, organizations and societies. The fact that protest movements are not 
included in this schema does not mean that these elements are not important. In fact 
they are “a special sort” of social systems. Both interactions and organizations are 
ways of dealing with double contingency. A very short explanation for each should 
suffice.  
Interactions form when “face to face” communication, or the presence of 
people are needed to solve the problem of double contingency. In the context of 
interactions “communication itself is satisfied with the assumption that perceivable 
participants perceive that they are perceived” (Luhmann 2013a, p. 133). Thus protest 
movements presuppose interactions, incorporate them but are more than that.  
Organizations presuppose a higher level of systemic development than 
interactions and deal with double contingency by inferring that everyone can act as 
they wish “but not as a member of an organization. Upon entering an organization, 
one’s hands are tied, and one runs the risk of losing membership in it if one is 
persistently awkward” (Luhmann 2013a, p. 142). And once again, protest movements 
presuppose organization, just as they presuppose interactions, but are more than 
that. When talking of protest movement: 
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“We are dealing with a sort of autopoietic system that operates 
neither on the principle of presence (interaction) nor on that of 
membership (organization). And the internal differentiation of protest 
movements can also not assume the undifferentiated nature or the 
simple role asymmetry of interaction systems, because such 
movements are too large; nor can they behave as position 
hierarchies like organizations, for the personnel situation is too 
unstable” (Luhmann 2013a, p. 164)  
Unlike interactions and organizations, social movements are differentiated 
internally into center and periphery. The center is represented by a committed core 
and by followers that can be mobilized for various actions and the periphery, while it 
probably includes some of the followers, is comprised by presumed “sympathizers” 
(also presumably in large numbers), fact which lets the movement assume that it 
represents “general societal interests”. This type of organization is compatible with the 
fluctuations in personnel, followers and sympathizers characterizing protest 
movements (Luhmann 2013a, p. 164).  
The same center/periphery differentiation can be observed when looking at the 
external situation of protest movements. The periphery protests against the center 
which is expected not only to listen to the protest but also to take it into consideration 
when it takes decisions. However, because modern society doesn’t have a center, or 
a “macrosocietal” center anymore, protest movements can take place only in  relation 
with or within functional systems that do have centers, such as the political system 
(and to a lesser extent within some religions) (Luhmann 2013a, p. 157-158).  
According to Luhmann protest movements constitute a paradox that takes the 
form of protest by society against society (Luhmann 2013a, p. 154-155). The form of 
protest gives the protest movement unity as a system but this form also shows that 
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the protest movement and its participants pursue political influence but “they do not 
do so in normal ways”. The way in which they do pursue this influence shows that the 
issue at hand is considered to be urgent and profound and thus it cannot be dealt with 
using the normal ways. Furthermore, “although protest communication takes place 
within society –otherwise it would not be communication – it proceeds as if it were 
from without. (…) It expresses itself from a sense of responsibility for society but 
against it” (Luhmann 2013a, p. 157). And there it is, the same paradox again – protest 
by society against society. This paradox is not necessarily a bad thing though 
because it can be used by society as a way of observing itself, as a way of 
constructing another reality or another representation of itself:  
“Society, like every system (and we could even say like the world) 
needs an internal boundary to be able to think about itself. It cannot 
be observed and described from without. The only possibility is that 
of an imaginary projection with which a self-description can claim for 
itself a fictitious external standpoint. In so doing it has to accept the 
paradox of the unity of inside and outside, and find a form that annuls 
this paradox, that is to say, replaces it and thus conceals it by 
drawing a distinction. This is precisely what is achieved by the form of 
protest against something that others ought to do better” (Luhmann 
1993, p. 140). 
This means that by being the all-encompassing communication system that 
includes all communication, society can never experience “reality as resistance of the 
environment” and it can only know it as “resistance of communication to 
communication”. Although social movements do not know the environment better than 
other systems in society (or at least there is no evidence that they do) they create the 
illusion that they do and thus the illusion of resistance from the outside, which then is 
translated into resistance of communication to communication. Thus protest 
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movements “provide society with a reality that it could not otherwise construct” 
(Luhmann 2013a, p. 165) and society needs this “reality” to complete the operation of 
self-observation. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
We have seen so far that within the general systems theory developed by 
Luhmann, social systems are autopoietic systems that use communication as their 
mode of autopoietic reproduction. The elements of social systems are 
communications that are created and recreated by a network of communications and 
they exist only within such a network. Social systems are also observing systems that 
make the distinction between themselves and the environment, also perceiving and 
observing other systems within their environment. They also reintroduce this 
distinction back into themselves, fact which leads to system differentiation. 
We also saw that Luhmann makes a difference between different social 
systems: societies, organizations and interactions. However, notwithstanding this 
schema, Luhmann sees society as the comprehensive social system which includes 
all communication. Furthermore, also in noncompliance with the initial schema, 
protest movements can be seen as another social system, in addition to the three 
already mentioned. The role of this additional social system is to alert society’s 
immune system to contradictions in society, to link these contradictions to significant 
conflicts. They also function as self-observations of society.  
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The purpose of this chapter was to offer a detailed presentation of Luhmann’s 
theory in order to support the second part of my main argument, which claims that this 
general systems theory can supplement the field of social movements theory by 
providing us with the necessary tools to look dynamically at social movements and 
understand them within the shifting social context. I think that this in-depth 
presentation showed that by looking at social movements from within the 
communication systems theory proposed by Luhmann we can understand how and 
why movements form, how they are organized, what their role is in society and 
through what processes they fulfil this role. I also believe that through the lens of this 
theory we can also see not only how social movements change society, but also how 
they are in turn changed by it, and we can follow the dynamic relations between the 
two.  
The concepts presented here are used in the following chapters as an integral 
part of this argument. This was a needed first step towards answering the research 
question: if the field of social movement theory is not sufficient to explain collective 
action, how is the general theory developed by Luhmann better suited for 
investigating, analyzing and explaining social movements? Without knowledge of the 
theory the question cannot be answered.  
 
  
 Chapter 3: Perspectives on Social 
Movements 
 
What is a social movement? How and why does it come to be? Why do people 
join social movements? Who are the people that join? What is a social movement’s 
role in society? How does it accomplish that role? What are its relations with society? 
These are just a few of the questions sociology tried and still tries to answer when it 
comes to social movements. As the taxonomies presented in chapter one showed, 
ever since the 1950’s and the 1960’s a multitude of theories have been formulated 
and tried to answer some of these questions. Collective behavior, resource 
mobilization, framing and new social movements are merely a few examples of 
perspectives within the field of social movement theory. These varied approaches and 
perspectives are not necessarily competing theories. They are complementary in 
many ways. In some regards they follow each other chronologically (although some of 
them overlap in time) as well as ideologically as an advancement of knowledge. This 
of course doesn't mean that they followed each other smoothly, that there aren't 
sources of contention or important differences. 
These diverse approaches offer many different definitions and analyses of 
social movements. However, they also all converge on one important point: one of the 
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goals, and in my view the most important goal, of social movements is social change. 
This is what brings these perspectives together within one field, they all have the 
same object of study, and no matter how they name it (i.e. social movement, social 
movement organization, collective action or protest movement) it all represents one 
thing: a mechanism via which social change takes place.  
Despite this, I consider that the field of social movement theory is giving us 
only a fragmented picture of this mechanism. In my view there are at least two main 
reasons for which this happens. One of these reasons rests in the fact that the theory 
changes its concepts when the form of its object of study changes. This refers both to 
a literal change of the concepts and to a change in what is understood through the 
concepts. As we have seen in the first chapter, it is largely believed (Garner 1997; 
Tarrow 1998, Tilly 1998, Buechler 2000) that social movements have changed over 
time and as they changed, the theories had to change as well to account for these 
changes. This is why I consider that we need a theory capable of providing us with 
the necessary tools to look dynamically at social movements and understand them 
within the shifting social context, thus a theory that looks at social movements in their 
time instead of at the movements of its time (in other words, a theory that looks at 
movements within their historical context and not only at movements that are 
contemporary to the theory).    
The other reason for which we have a fragmented view of social movements 
rests in the field’s inability to reconcile the different perspectives within. These 
differences come, on the one hand, as it was mentioned above, from a change in the 
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historical context, and on the other hand from the fact that the various approaches 
don’t all ask the same questions, even though some questions overlap. Asking 
different questions leads to looking at different things. Thus it is not only a matter of 
giving a different answer to the same question, but also a matter of looking at the 
object of study from a different angle. Therefore, all these varied perspectives and 
approaches within the theory of social movements cover and capture important facets 
and angles of collective action. However, they do so in disparate ways, looking at one 
side and ignoring the other. We thus need a theory that is able to look at all facets of 
movements at the same time and additionally, is able to look beyond the form of the 
object at the object itself.  
To support the reasoning voiced in the previous two paragraphs, in this 
chapter, the main perspectives and approaches to social movements are presented in 
a detailed overview of the field. The perspectives that will be presented are: collective 
behavior, resource mobilization, political processes, framing and new social 
movement theory. These approaches were chosen due to the fact that it is generally 
considered that they represent the main perspectives within the field (Rucht 1991, 
Diani 1992, Garner 1997, Tarrow 1998, Tilly 1998, Buechler 2000, Hamel et al. 2012). 
In addition to these, two more approaches will be analyzed, social movements as 
cognitive praxis and the functional analysis formulated by Klaus Eder. These last two 
were chosen due to the fact that I see them as unifying approaches, trying to bridge 
some of the gaps present in the field, and thus close to the objective of this 
dissertation. 
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The review will show how social movements are generally analyzed, how the 
focus changes from one theory to another and how different facets of the social 
movement are analyzed separately instead of together. A thorough analysis of the 
field of social movement theory is needed in my view in order to answer the research 
question, if this field is not sufficient to explain collective action, how is the general 
theory developed by Luhmann better suited for investigating, analyzing and explaining 
social movements? Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to show that indeed, the 
field of social movement theory is not sufficient or integrated enough to explain 
collective action and we need a more comprehensive theory in order to obtain a better 
understanding of movements and the way in which they fulfill their role of promoters 
of change in society. As presented in the short outline above, this enquiry starts with 
the collective behavior approach.  
 
3.1 Collective Behavior Perspective  
According to Ralph Turner collective behavior is not a theory but a perspective 
that offers a framework in which theories can be applied to questions (Turner 1981, 
p.8). This perspective contains six main themes. First, theorizing social movements 
as sociological phenomena and forms of collective behavior means looking for the 
collaboration features shared by all movements, or at least by several of them, no 
matter the realms of their action. This means that a "student of collective behavior" 
will look at specific movements (such as political reform movements, revolutionary 
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movements, religious or secular self-help movements) searching for what they have 
in common. Second, social movements are "instances of intentional collaboration to 
promote or resist change, when the collaborators find established institutional 
direction and mechanisms inappropriate or insufficient for their purposes" (Turner 
1981, p. 4). Third, social movements aren't stable phenomena; their capacity to 
change is high due to the fact that they are not restricted by institutional structure and 
their leadership is not formally defined, depending more on action and public views. 
(Turner 1981, p. 3-4).  
Fourth, social movements are shaped by their interactions with the established 
social structure ("institutional regime"), counter movements, communities and interest 
groups, interactions which are mediated by the publics. Fifth, "collective behaviorists 
assume that human beings both in and out of movements are a heterogeneous lot of 
human beings. A movement grows in numbers because it attracts and holds 
adherents with diverse motives, goals and conceptions of the movement" (Turner 
1981, p.6). Sixth and lastly, social movements construct and reconstruct both 
collective and individual views of reality; in fact this is seen as one of the most 
important "products" of social movements, these alternate ways of seeing both "self 
and larger systems of social relationships" (Turner 1981, p. 6).   
Thus, any theory or conceptualization of social movements from the collective 
behavior perspective makes these basic assumptions: social movements, no matter 
their realm of action, share features of collaboration, their members are intentionally 
collaborating to reach their purposes (which are always related to social change), they 
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are unpredictable, their character is shaped by their interaction with their environment, 
they have a heterogeneous membership and they change the way people see reality. 
As an example of an approach to social movements that makes these assumptions 
we can use the theory formulated by Turner and Killian. From this approach social 
movements are defined as: 
 "a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a 
change in the society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a 
movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and 
with leadership whose position is determined more by the informal 
response of the members than by formal procedures for legitimizing 
authority" (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 246).  
As it can be noticed, most, if not all basic assumptions mentioned above are 
present in this definition. According to this approach, once it established what a social 
movement is, a study of collective action from the collective behavior perspective 
needs to ask three questions: when do social movements occur, when are they 
deemed successful and when will they act one way as opposed to another? “Crowd 
behaviors” or informal groups are not to be considered social movements. To be a 
movement a crowd or a group needs to promote or resist change, to have a sustained 
activity, a strategy and group identity. Thus, a social movement emerges when a 
crowd meets these conditions. We can also say that a social movement is “incipient” 
when individuals in a crowd or an informal group supplement their informal meetings 
with “some organization to promote their convictions more effectively and to insure a 
more sustained activity” (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 246). 
Most social movements go through a phase of crowd behavior, and just like a 
crowd, they do depend on the contributions of many types of people who act 
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differently for different reasons and, again like a crowd, movements need a “central 
norm” that can justify action for this diversity. One of the main conditions for the 
emergence of a social movement is the existence of such a norm, and according to 
Turner and Killian, one common element for most, if not all movements is the 
specification within this norm that things as they are “are unjust”.  
Other conditions for the emergence of a social movement are: membership in 
a self-conscious group (like class awareness), pride and autonomy, external 
legitimation and support, intellectuals and a definition of injustice, selection of a 
comparison group and “righteous indignation”. (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 261-268). 
All these conditions are related to the sense of injustice.   
There are four main emphases in Turner and Killian’s approach to social 
movements:  
“movements are in a state of flux, their character changing from day 
to day, and conditions strengthening a movement at one time having 
an opposite effect at another time. Second, the course and character 
of a movement are shaped by the constant dynamic of value 
orientations, power orientations and participation orientations within 
the movement. Third, the course and character are shaped by 
external relations, including the way it is defined by external publics 
and the kinds of support and opposition it encounters. Fourth, social 
movements mean normative transformations” (Turner and Killian, 
1987, p. 252).  
Keeping in mind the six main themes of the collective behavior perspective 
identified at the beginning of this section, we notice that, at least in part, these 
emphases relate to them. These themes and emphases can also be found in what 
are considered some of the necessary aspects of a movement, which are: “a program 
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for the reform of society” (corresponds with resisting or promoting change), 
“establishment of power relations favorable to the movement” (corresponds with 
interactions with the established social structure, counter movements, communities 
and interest groups) and third, the promotion of membership gratification (Turner and 
Killian 1987, p. 256). This last aspect is related to the success of a social movement 
and measuring success is not a simple matter considering that “success” can be 
defined in various ways. A social movement can be successful if: it gathered a large 
number of adherents, or if it achieved its goals and purposes, or if it achieved one or 
two goals out of many, or if some of its values were “borrowed” by a stronger 
movement or party.  
In respect to value, power and participation orientations, they are present 
within all social movements and they represent tendencies which are in constant 
tension. Depending on what orientation is prevalent, a movement can be one of three 
types: value oriented, power oriented or participation oriented movement. These are 
of course ideal types. Value orientation is related to the values a movement wants to 
promote (this being the goal) but also to the ideology of a movement:  
“A value is any category of objects that is felt to have worth, which 
ought to be protected and promoted rather than treated with 
indifference [and], (…) for intellectual adherents, the ideology 
supplies a foundation from which to evaluate goals and, in part, 
select strategies and tactics for promoting the movement goals. For 
most adherents, ideology supplies a vague but comfortable 
assurance of the rightness and effectiveness of the movement and a 
set of resources to employ in promoting the movement among the 
unpersuaded and in defending the movement from its enemies” 
(Turner and Killian 1987, p.269-270). 
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Power orientations refer to a movement’s ability to influence society and 
promote its values. Without the power to bring about changes a movement’s values 
and ideologies remain “daydreams of a small band of devotees” (Turner and Killian 
1987, p. 290). There are a few main power objectives such as: influencing the 
authorities to make the desired changes in a society/community, seeking/taking 
control of that society/community to implement the desired changes and seeking 
separation from that society to live without their interference. Turner and Killian call 
these objectives concessions, control and separation (Turner and Killian 1987, p. 
290).  
Participation orientations have to do with member satisfaction or gratification. 
While the reason for the very existence of a social movement resides in its value 
orientation and the means of protecting or promoting these values reside in its power 
orientation, the movement itself is formed by people and thus the only way to stay 
alive is to have member participation. According to Turner and Killian, while there are 
members who derive gratification from movement participation because they believe 
in the values of the movement, participation for the sake of participation gratifies 
certain types of people (“the participation prone”) and “every movement is shaped in 
part by the demand for gratification unrelated to the movement’s stated objectives” 
(Turner and Killian 1987, p. 361).  
These various orientations (value, power, and participation) define, shape and 
change the nature of social movements from within. Movements are shaped however 
not only by internal factors but by external factors as well. They are in constant 
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interaction with society and communities. Movement activity sparks reactions in their 
surrounding world and these reactions in turn have an effect on the movement itself. 
Movements constantly reassess their goals, strategies and activities depending on 
the types of reactions they receive.  
There are two ends of a spectrum on which a social movement can be placed 
and they are given by the distinction between reform and revolutionary movements:  
“The revolutionary movement is said to challenge the fundamental 
values of a society, whereas the reform movement seeks 
modifications within the existing value scheme. The reform 
movement advocates a change that will implement the existing value 
scheme more adequately than present conditions but the 
revolutionary movement urges replacement of the existing value 
scheme” (Turner and Killian 1987, p. 257).  
Of course, most, if not all movements fall somewhere in between, the 
distinction being useful more in terms of consequences, types of opposition and 
means of action available to the movement, based on the reactions it solicits from the 
public. Combining the way social movements are seen from the exterior, their 
characteristics, their means of action (legitimate or illegitimate) and adding this 
combination to a “classic distinction between reform and revolutionary movements” 
(1987, p. 257) leads Turner and Killian to formulating another typology of social 
movements. They contend that there are four types of movements: 1) respectable-
nonfactional (they use legitimate means, they don’t spark any interest or opposition), 
2) respectable-factional (also use legitimate means but they have opposition from 
competing movements), 3) peculiar (they have limited access to legitimate means and 
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they spark ridicule) and 4) revolutionary (mostly use illegitimate means and spark 
violent suppression). 
As it can be seen, the approach formulated by Turner and Killian follows 
exactly the themes identified at the beginning of this section as staying at the base of 
the collective behavior perspective. It assumes that social movements from various 
realms of action share features of collaboration and that the members of movements 
are intentionally collaborating to pursue common objectives. It also considers 
movements unpredictable and shaped by their interaction with their environment. It 
sees their membership as heterogeneous and assumes that movements change the 
way people see reality.  
The questions asked here are mainly: what are social movements and for what 
reasons do they emerge? It is clear that social movements are seen as forms of 
collective behavior that emerge in order to bring about or stop social change. 
Accordingly, any form of collective action with loose organization can be a social 
movement as long as it promotes some kind of change in society. A revolution or a 
revolt, a sustained gathering or organized meetings for an election can all be seen as 
social movements from this perspective. Social strain theory, also referred to as value 
added theory (Neil Smelser 1971), likewise a theory that makes use of the framework 
supplied by the collective behavior perspective, attempts to give a more structured 
response than that to the questions of what are social movements and how do they 
emerge.  
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Within this approach the notion of collective behavior is used to denote 
“classes of events” such as collective outbursts and collective movements and is 
defined broadly as “mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action” 
(Smelser, 1971, p. 8). A behavior reveals however being a “collective behavior” only if 
it meets three other conditions: 1) the beliefs that lead to mobilization need to be 
concerned with “the existence of extraordinary forces which are at work in the 
universe” (Smelser, 1971, p. 8) such as threats and conspiracies; 2) an assessment 
of the consequences of a successful redefinition of social action is needed and, 3) 
collective behavior is not institutionalized behavior. Thus, this theory, unlike the one 
formulated by Turner and Killian links social movements, or collective behavior to 
‘social action’ that is relying on four basic components: 
“(1) the generalized ends, or values, which provide the broadest 
guides to purposive social behavior; (2) the regulatory rules 
governing the pursuit of these goals, rules which are to be found in 
norms; (3) the mobilization of individual energy to achieve the defined 
ends within the normative framework (...); (4) the available situational 
facilities which the actor utilizes as means” (Smelser, 1971, p. 24 - 
25).   
Values are very general elements and act as a guide for human behavior. 
Norms are more specific and involve “regulatory principles” for the fulfilment of values. 
Both values and norms only give general rules for social action. The third component 
is what dictates all of the following: the form or organization of action, who is 
responsible for ensuring that the “valued ends” will be reached, the concrete roles and 
organizations of those responsible with pursuing those ends and the rewards for 
successfully reaching those ends. This third component includes families, churches, 
government agencies, political parties, associations, businesses, or, as Smelser puts 
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it, “what sociologists call social organization or social structure” (1971, p. 27-28). The 
fourth and final component, the situational facilities, includes tools and skills, 
knowledge of the environment and the opportunities and limitations it puts on the 
attainment of goals (Smelser, 1971, p. 27-28).  
These components of social action are related to collective behavior in two 
ways. First, the emergence of collective behavior and its type are determined by a set 
of factors. There are different “determinants” for collective behavior but in general 
“episodes of collective behavior” appear because something is wrong. For example, 
people panic because they feel in extreme danger or they join a revolutionary 
movement because they feel injustice under the current social organization. These 
determinants are grouped under one heading: structural strain. Structural strain is 
defined as “impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate 
functioning of the components of action” (Smelser, 1971, p. 48). Collective behavior 
cannot occur without structural strain. There are of course different types of strain, 
depending on the affected component of action or, differently put, there can be strain 
on different components of action:  
“Value strain poses the issue of commitment, normative strain 
concerns the integration of human interaction, strain on mobilization 
concerns the balance between motivated activity and its rewards; 
strain on facilities concerns the adequacy of knowledge and skills” 
(Smelser, 1971, p. 64-65).  
Smelser uses the “logic of value added process” to organize the determinants 
of collective behavior. This logic is borrowed from the field of economics and it means 
that any product (and in this case any form of collective behavior) goes through a 
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series of stages until it reaches its final finished form. Each of these stages adds 
value to the end product but more than that, each and every stage needs to happen 
and they also need to happen in a certain order (Smelser, 1971, p. 13-14) (i.e. the 
icing on a cake adds value to it but also the icing cannot be added to the cake until all 
the layers have been assembled; moreover, the cake cannot be sold without the 
icing). The important determinants for collective behavior (organized according to the 
value added logic) are: (1) structural conduciveness, (2) structural strain, (3) growth 
and spread of a generalized belief, (4) precipitating factors, (5) mobilization of 
participants for action and (6) the operation of social control (Smelser, 1971, p. 15-17)  
The second way in which collective behavior is related to the components of 
action concerns the fact that collective behavior must try to redefine social action and 
it does that by targeting one of the four components (values, norms, social structures 
and situational facilities). Depending on the component it targets, collective behavior 
can take different forms. These forms are presented by Smelser in the form of a 
typology and they are: a) the value-oriented movement, b) the norm-oriented 
movement, c) the hostile outburst and d) the craze and the panic (Smelser, 1971, p. 
9).  
The panic is defined as a mobilization based on “hysterical beliefs”. During a 
panic people try to preserve their life, property, power from what they perceive as a 
serious threat and by renouncing “established patterns of social interaction” (Smelser, 
1971, p. 131). The craze is mobilization based on a “positive wish fulfillment belief” 
and it ranges from the superficial (a fad, fashion items) to serious (elections) as well 
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as from close proximity to large distances (Smelser, 1971, p. 171). The hostile 
outburst is mobilization based on a hostile belief. To fit the definition “participants in 
an outburst must be bent on attacking someone considered responsible for a 
disturbing state of affairs” (Smelser, 1971, p. 226).  
The norm oriented movement is mobilization based on the generalized belief 
that a certain norm needs to be protected, restored, changed or created. Participants 
in such a movement can try to change the norm by themselves or they can try to 
persuade authorities to do so. This type of collective behavior can target any type of 
norm in order to try to change it (i.e. economic, political, and religious) and these 
types of movements can be varied (i.e. conservative, progressive, revolutionary or 
reactionary). However, a distinction is made between movements that target a very 
specific norm and movements with more general programs. The latter are considered 
to be general social movements, not crystallized enough to lead to mobilization but 
specific norm oriented movements “emanate from them” (Smelser, 1971, p.273). 
Examples of such general movements include: the labor movement, the peace 
movement, the humanitarian movement, and feminism. (Smelser, 1971, p.270-274).  
Lastly, value oriented movements are mobilizations based on the generalized 
belief that a value needs to be restored, protected, changed or created. “Such a belief 
necessarily involves all the components of action, that is, it envisions a reconstitution 
of values, a redefinition of norms, a reorganization of the motivation of individuals, 
and a redefinition of situational facilities” (Smelser, 1971, p. 313).   
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This is a more structured analysis of collective behavior (in comparison with 
the perspective formulated by Turner and Killian 1972), in the sense that the 
emergence of collective action is connected to broader social structures. In this view 
collective behavior is seen as the result of strain on the components of action and 
appearing under strict conditions. Also, although value-oriented and norm-oriented 
movements, hostile outbursts, crazes and panics are all placed under the heading of 
‘collective behavior’ the difference between them is marked and analyzed. Similarly 
with the approach formulated by Turner and Killian however, it is primarily concerned 
with defining collective behavior and explaining how “strain” or grievances lead to 
collective action. It is not concerned with how it is organized and how it goes about 
fulfilling its purpose.  
Therefore, the collective behavior perspective as a whole provides only a 
fraction of the information needed to understand social movements and their relation 
with the social because it disregards other important questions that need to be asked 
(i.e. how are they organized?). I believe that this is the case due to the fact that the 
focus is on the collective behavior (as the name of the perspective evidently 
suggests) and on action, making mobilization the starting point for analysis. To put it 
in systemic terms, the perspective focuses on conflict mainly. Yes, it looks for the 
cause of the conflict, the contradiction that is connected to it, and thus looks for the 
topic of the movement (the reason for which it emerges) but it doesn’t go further. It 
doesn’t explain the steps taken so that the protest becomes a system and its relations 
to other systems in society. 
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As other critics point out however, as a perspective, collective behavior has the 
merit that it interpreted collective action as meaningful action for the first time and 
indicated the fact that actors could act collectively in coherent ways and form social 
organizations that are stable. This perspective also revealed that these social 
organizations can be a driving force for beneficial change in society. (Tilly 1998; della 
Porta and Diani 1999). On the other hand, critics underline the fact that the collective 
behavior paradigm puts under the “umbrella” of social movements very different social 
phenomena (Jenkins 1983; della Porta and Diani 1999; Tarrow 1998). For example, 
Craig Jenkins reveals that any form of collective action with a bare minimum 
organization and geared towards social change (or resistance to change) including 
religious sects or cults as well as movements seeking political change can be called a 
social movement from this perspective (Jenkins 1983).  
According to McCarthy and Zald, although different in many respects, the 
theories within this perspective have in common the fact that they assume that 
“shared grievances and generalized beliefs (loose ideologies) about the causes and 
possible means of reducing grievances are important preconditions for the 
emergence of a social movement in a collectivity” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1214). 
Collective behaviorists are seen as concentrating heavily on the psychology of the 
“mass of potential movement supporters within a collectivity” to the detriment of 
analysis of processes through which people and organizations from outside that 
collectivity become involved (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).  
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In addition to that, McCarthy and Zald consider that sociologists, through their 
“emphasis upon structural strain, generalized belief, and deprivation, largely have 
ignored the ongoing problems and strategic dilemmas of social movements” (1977, p. 
1212). In order to correct these issues within the field of social movement theory, they 
advance a perspective that puts emphasis on both social support and constraint. This 
approach, often referred to as resource mobilization theory, examines resources that 
need to be mobilized by social movements, their relations with other groups, 
dependences and tactics utilized for their control or incorporation in society (McCarthy 
and Zald, 1977, p. 1212-1213).  
 
3.2 Resource Mobilization Theory 
Thus, resource mobilization perspective developed as a response to what was 
perceived as a lack of proper analysis of collective action. Like Turner and Killian did 
for collective behavior theory, McCarthy and Zald introduced a central hypothesis for 
explaining the emergence and development of collective action:  
“We are willing to assume (Turner and Killian [1972] call the 
assumption extreme)‘…that there is always enough discontent in any 
society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the 
movement is effectively organized and has  at its disposal the power 
and resources of some established elite group’ (p. 251). For some 
purposes we go even further: grievances and discontent may be 
defined, created and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and 
organizations. (…) The resource mobilization perspective adopts as 
one of its underlying problems Olson’s (1965) challenge: since social 
movements deliver collective goods, few individuals will ‘on their own’ 
bear the cost of working to obtain them. Explaining collective 
behavior requires detailed attention to the selection of incentives, 
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cost-reducing mechanisms and structures, and career benefits that 
lead to collective behavior” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1215-1216). 
It is assumed thus that there are always issues in society able to give birth to 
collective behavior but organization, resources and the use of these resources by 
entrepreneurs should stay at the heart of analysis when it comes to social 
movements. The theory developed by McCarthy and Zald gives a very broad 
definition to social movements per se which is complemented by a series of other 
definitions for various analytical concepts that are employed in the study of 
movements. In this view a social movement is nothing more than a set of beliefs in a 
population that shows an intention/preference to change certain things in society. A 
countermovement is a set of beliefs in a population that is opposing a social 
movement: 
 “A social movement organization is a complex, or formal, 
organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social 
movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those 
goals (...) All social movement organizations that have as their main 
goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement 
constitute a social movement industry” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 
1218-1219).  
There is also a social movement sector that includes all social movement 
industries in a society. Therefore a social movement is simply a set of beliefs oriented 
towards social change; a social movement organization whose goals are aligned with 
those beliefs is responsible for gathering the resources needed for bringing about that 
change. A multitude of social movement organizations can have their goals aligned 
with the beliefs of a social movement and if that is the case then these form a social 
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movement industry. Finally, these industries function/operate within the social 
movement sector.   
To be effective in their task of gathering resources, social movement 
organizations need to make a few distinctions when it comes to the individuals, 
organizations and institutions of society. One of these distinctions is between 
adherents and constituents. Adherents are those who agree with the goals or beliefs 
of a social movement and constituents are those who are providing resources to the 
social movement organization. Resource mobilization has two tasks when it comes to 
adherents and constituents. One is to transform adherents into constituents (and keep 
constituents involved) and the second is to transform non-adherents into adherents. 
In addition to these two categories, there are also bystander publics (those who are 
not adherents but also do not oppose the social movement or its organizations and 
could become adherents or vice versa) and adversaries or challengers.  
Another distinction is made based on the pool of resources these individuals or 
organizations have at their disposal. Thus, there are mass adherents and constituents 
(those who do not control many resources - time and labor mostly) and elites (those 
whose resource pool is larger). The last distinction is made between potential 
beneficiaries (those who although are not adherents or constituents can benefit from 
the attainment of the goals of a social movement organization) and conscience 
adherents or conscience constituents (those who adhere to or support a social 
movement or social movement organization without having any benefit from the 
attainment of their goals). All these categories of actors can have an influence on the 
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type and style of resource mobilization strategies employed by social movement 
organizations. 
Over time, the resource mobilization paradigm was refined and its knowledge 
of collective action was deepened. One of the core concepts that benefited from this 
deeper understanding is the concept of resources. In 2004 McCarthy and Bob 
Edwards summarize the various types of resources and hold that there are: moral, 
cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources. Among the moral 
resources we can count legitimacy, celebrity, sympathetic support and solidarity 
(Edwards & McCarthy, p. 125). Cultural resources are mostly knowledge about things 
such as: how to organize a protest or hold a meeting or news conference, how to form 
an organization, or even basic things like surfing the web. 
Social-organizational resources are a bit more complex and “include both 
intentional and appropriable organizations” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 127). An 
intentional organization is formed specifically to advance a social movement’s goals 
while “appropriable social organizations” already exist for other purposes but can be 
used by social movements to access other types of resources. There are also three 
different forms of social organizational resources: infrastructures (which are non-
proprietary resources, anyone can access them), social networks and formal 
organizations (access to both and to the resources they can provide can be 
controlled) (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 127). Human resources include labor, 
experience, skills, expertise and leadership while material resources “combine what 
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economists would call financial and physical capital, including monetary resources, 
property, office space, equipment and supplies” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 128). 
Resources, no matter their type, can be fully fungible, fully idiosyncratic or 
anywhere in between (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 128). This means that they can 
be used in any context and situation or they are dependent on the context. Money are 
the most fungible resource due to the fact that, no matter the context, it can be 
transformed in almost any resource that might be needed. Expertise is an example of 
a context dependable resource (what would you do with an accountant when you 
need a community organizer?).     
Social movements can access resources mainly through four mechanisms: 
aggregation from constituents, self-production, appropriation/co-optation, and 
patronage. Aggregation refers to collecting resources held by individuals and 
transforming them into “collective” resources that can be used by movement’s actors. 
Self-production include mechanisms through which social movement organizations 
add value to resources that they have at their disposal. Appropriation refers to the use 
of resources aggregated or produced by other groups while co-optation refers to the 
borrowing of such resources. Patronage refers to mechanism through which other 
individuals, groups or organizations provide resources to social movements (Edwards 
& McCarthy, 2004, p. 134-135).  
Resources are distributed (or redistributed) to social movements by both state 
and non-state actors. State agencies provide social movement organizations with 
resources such as monetary, technical assistance, legitimacy and tax-exempt status 
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and even access to decision making processes. However, social movement 
organizations need to meet specific criteria and follow certain guidelines to gain 
access to such resources. Foundations are non-state (usually philanthropic) actors 
that can provide resources to social movements, generally in the form of grants. 
Obtaining such a grant can also give legitimacy and prestige to a social movement. 
Religious organizations can offer moral, cultural and social-organizational resources. 
Although mostly seen as self-interest, corporations and businesses also sometimes 
provide resources to social movements. Social movement organizations themselves 
help each other, through offering/providing mostly cultural resources (Edwards & 
McCarthy, 2004, p. 120-121). 
Edwards and McCarthy consider that “putting resources at the center of the 
analysis of social movement processes re-emphasizes the inextricable links between 
broader social stratification processes and the ability of social groups to mobilize 
effectively for ongoing collective action” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 142). Also, 
social mobilization theory is, according to them, aiming to understand better how 
groups can overcome the unequal distribution of resources considering that “core 
areas” (both within and between states) benefit from more resources than the 
periphery (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p.118-119).   
This approach doesn’t only put resources at the center of analysis, it looks at 
everything through a language of resources in the same way in which the previous 
approach, formulated by Turner and Killian, uses the language of organization. Not all 
approaches within resource mobilization theory regard movements solely through the 
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lens of resources or entrepreneurial organizations however. Craig Jenkins 
summarizes different approaches to social movements within this perspective along a 
few lines: social movement formation, processes of mobilization, social movement 
organization and politics.  
In terms of social movement formation, resource mobilization presents a 
couple of approaches. On one side, conflicts of interest present into social institutions 
are seen as giving birth to constant grievances; movements however do not form 
necessarily due to these grievances but because of changes in group access to 
resources, organization and opportunities for collective action (Jenkins, 1983, p.530). 
On the other side it is contended that significant in social movement formation are 
grievances generated by “major threats to the interest of cohesive and moderately 
resourceful groups”. (Jenkins, 1983, p. 531).  
Thus, even though it remains true that grievances can lead to the formation of 
social movements, the emergence of such movements is strongly based on the 
preexistence of groups sufficiently organized that have both the interest and the 
resources to act on these grievances (Jenkins, 1983, p. 531). The emergence of civil 
rights movements due to the urbanization of the southern black populations, and the 
rise of ethnic separatist movements in Western Europe due to the declining status 
inequalities are used by Jenkins as examples of collective action born out of 
grievances. Furthermore, the formation of movements is linked to improvement in the 
status of aggrieved groups, not because of grievances created by the “revolution of 
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rising expectations” but because these changes reduce the costs of mobilization and 
improve the likelihood of success (Jenkins, 1983, p. 532).   
From the resource mobilization perspective, mobilization can be defined as: 
“the process by which a group secures collective control over the 
resources needed for collective action. The major issues, therefore, 
are the resources controlled by the group prior to mobilization efforts, 
the processes by which the group pools resources and directs these 
towards social change, and the extent to which outsiders increase the 
pool of resources” (Jenkins, 1983, p. 532-533).  
In regard to the organization of social movements, Jenkins mentions two 
opposite poles within the perspective: the centralized bureaucratic model (Gamson 
1975, McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977) and the decentralized informal model (Gerlach 
and Hine 1970) and that most movements are placed on a continuum between the 
two forms of organization. The centralized bureaucratic model holds that a formalized 
structure with a clear role and labor division maximizes mobilization by formulating 
clear goals and minimizes internal conflicts and strengthens “combat readiness”  by 
centralizing the decision making process. The opposite pole, the decentralized 
informal model, holds that  
“decentralized movements with a minimum division of labor and 
integrated by informal networks and an overarching ideology are 
more effective. A segmented, decentralized structure maximizes 
mobilization by providing extensive interpersonal bonds that generate 
solidarity and reinforce ideological commitments”. (Jenkins, 1983, p. 
539).     
Finally, in regards to the politics of social movements, according to resource 
mobilization theory, collective action is influenced and “shaped by the larger political 
environment” and depends not only on internal strategies but also on the support or 
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opposition coming from political elites, interest groups and other social movement 
organizations. Some differences in views here come from how success is measured 
or defined.  For Gamson (1980), for example, success is measured through two 
different dimensions: first, the attainment of goals proposed by the social movement 
organization and second the acceptance of the social movement organization as a 
“valid representative of a legitimate set of interests” by its main opponents (Jenkins, 
1983, p. 543). Others, such as Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that success for “poor 
people’s movements” comes simply from mass defiance.  
Resource mobilization theory, according to Tarrow, came about in the 1960s 
from a growing conviction that grievances are not enough to explain mobilization and 
its proponents were influenced by the trend in academy during that period to look at 
economics as the “master of social sciences” (Tarrow 1998, p. 15). In fact, McCarthy 
and Zald were criticized mainly for their use of the “language of economics”, for 
ignoring ideology, commitment, values and for defining social movement 
organizations in such a way that it is difficult to distinguish them from interest groups. 
However, resource mobilization perspective is also responsible for showing the need 
for a “multi factored approach” to the study of social movements and their formation 
(Jenkins 1983, p. 532). It also points out that collective action is “the outcome of 
complex processes of interaction mediated by certain networks of belonging” (Melucci 
1996, p. 18) and not that of irrational behavior.  
This approach focuses on social movement organizations and the way in which 
they gather resources in order to attain their goals. It doesn’t look at social 
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movements per se, which are defined within it simply as sets of beliefs. Although it 
recognizes that grievances exist and that they are related to social movement 
organizations, it sees the organization in itself more important than grievances in the 
process of mobilization and resources more important in the process of formation of 
such organizations. Also, by focusing on resource gathering and on how the 
movement is organized, the perspective ignores the exact processes through which 
the movement is trying to achieve its goals. Having resources or being able to gather 
resources doesn’t automatically mean that change will be enforced. Thus, similarly 
with collective behavior perspective, resource mobilization focuses on one facet of 
social movements while neglecting others.  
In different terms, according to this approach, there are always contradictions 
in society and the possibility of conflicts. What leads to the emergence of social 
movement organizations is not the presence of these contradictions but the existence 
of a system already in place and ready to connect the contradictions to conflicts. This 
system is the movement and the resources (in their different forms and variedly 
connected) are its elements. The issue with this is the fact that it is assumed that the 
system exists a priori. By focusing on how the system is organized and on how its 
elements are related to one another the exact way the system is formed and achieves 
its goals, the way the system functions within society and how it is connected to other 
systems are all overlooked.  
Thus while collective behavior perspective assumes that grievances alone are 
enough to explain collective mobilization and views collective action or mobilization as 
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outside of the realm of normal “everyday life” (Tarrow 1998), resource mobilization 
theory focuses on organization and, exactly what the name suggests, resource 
mobilization. Consequently, both mostly overlook how social movements relate with 
other systems of society or the view on these relations is one sided. The political 
processes approach attempts to solve this issue.  
 
3.3 Political process approach 
From this perspective, social movements are interactions between different 
parties; they are a conversation between power holders and claim makers in a public 
space and thus with an audience:   
“a sustained series of interactions between power holders and 
persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency 
lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons 
make publicly visible demands for change in the distribution or 
exercise of power and back those demands with public 
demonstrations of support” (Tilly, 1984, p. 306).  
There are two mistaken ideas that are promulgated by movement activists 
“more or less deliberately”, Tilly argues. First, it is believed (or held) that social 
movements are “solidaristic, coherent groups” when in fact they are “clusters of 
performance”. The second mistaken idea is the belief that social movements have life 
histories similar to the life histories of individuals. In fact, Tilly says, social movements 
didn’t always exist and they develop together with two other clusters of performance, 
namely electoral campaigns and interest-group politics. (Tilly, 1999, p. 256).     
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Social movements are compared in this instance to electoral campaigns. One 
of the differences between the two is the fact that a movement “demands the righting 
of a wrong” that affects a specified population while an electoral campaign demands 
votes. The population specified by the social movement can be as small as an 
individual or as big as the whole of humanity or even all life on Earth. Another 
difference is the fact that an electoral campaign “pays off chiefly in votes that finally 
result from it, [while] a social movement pays off in effective transmission of the 
message that its program’s supporters are WUNC: 1) worthy, 2) unified, 3) numerous, 
and 4) committed“ (2002, p. 88).  These characteristics can compensate for each 
other (i.e. respectability can offset small numbers). However, this goes both ways and 
“a public demonstration of unworthiness” can discredit the entire movement (Tilly, 
2002, p. 88). 
If we look at social movements as “means-end actions”, Tilly suggests, one 
single action will not achieve the completion of a movement’s goals by itself. 
However, a combination of different actions, which are mostly symbolic, indirect and 
cumulative, will have a result. The strength of a movement resides in its capacity to 
threaten with actions like withdrawal of support for public authorities, direct action 
such as open rebellion, or offers of support to opposing parties. Furthermore, “social 
movements take place as conversations: not as solo performances, but as 
interactions among parties” (Tilly, 2002, p. 88). These parties embody the multitude of 
populations that constitute a social movement. Thus a social movement is a sustained 
interaction between:  
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“the power holders who are the objects of claims, the minimum claim 
being to tolerate the movement’s existence; participants, who range 
from minor contributors to leaders and are often connected by social 
movement organizations; and a subject population on whose behalf 
participants are making or supporting claims” (Tilly 1999, p. 257).  
These populations can overlap or they can be distinct. There are also many 
other third-parties that can interfere with movement interactions, actors such as allies 
or enemies, authorities (and their response to claims) and multiple audiences.     
From a political processes perspective, a social movement’s success depends 
on two types of “mystification” (which correspond with the two mistaken ideas 
mentioned earlier). First, WUNC (the notion that its members/supporters are worthy, 
unified, numerous, and committed) is the image that the social movement wants to 
create but this image does not necessarily correspond to reality; people participating 
are not always worthy, unified, numerous and committed. For this reason the 
coordinators of such movements have to make coalitions, to negotiate which of the 
many agendas present in their numbers will be given a voice in their collective action 
and to hide these negotiations and struggles from the public.  
Second, the movement needs to present itself as a unified group with a history 
outside the claim-making process. This is the reason why, in Tilly’s view, feminists 
identify with “women’s age-old” struggles for rights and environmentalists talk about 
humankind as their community. These types of mystification address a variety of 
audiences (such as supporters, adversaries, authorities or publics) and they are used 
by social movements to “prove” their worthiness not only as adversaries but as 
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organizations that need and deserve to be taken seriously as well as claimants with a 
right to be heard. (Tilly 2002, p. 89-90).  
As the perspective evolves further, social movements are placed within the 
context of “contentious politics” that are defined as:  
“interactions in which actors make claims that bear on someone 
else’s interests, leading to coordinating efforts on behalf of shared 
interests or programs, in which governments are as targets, the 
objects of claims, or third parties” (Tilly & Tarrow 2007, p. 202). 
Within this context, social movements are defined as “sustained campaigns of 
claim making, using repeated performances that advertise that claim, based on 
organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities” (Tilly 
& Tarrow 2007, p. 202). Therefore, a social movement is divided into two distinctive 
elements: social movement campaigns and social movement bases. Tilly’s earlier 
works contained both elements but they were not delineated as well and separated as 
precisely. A social movement campaign is a: 
“sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population 
living under the jurisdiction of these power holders by means of 
concerted public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment, using such means as public meetings, demonstrations, 
petitions, and press releases” [and a social movement base] 
“consists of movement organizations, networks, participants, and the 
accumulated cultural artifacts, memories, and traditions that 
contribute to social movement campaigns” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 
p.114).  
Thus this perspective evolves even further, to a broader outlook on collective 
action within the field of contentious politics, utilizing different approaches, for 
instance resource mobilization and framing perspective in order to explain social 
movements. The focus nevertheless continues to be on contentious politics, social 
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movements being a form of this, or a “crystallization” of contention (Tilly 2008). 
Consequently, it is argued that: 
“people engage in contentious politics when patterns of political 
opportunities and constraints change and then, by strategically 
employing a repertoire of collective action, create new opportunities, 
which are used by others in widening cycles of contention” (Tarrow 
1998, p.19). 
When he speaks of political opportunities here, Tarrow refers to characteristics 
of the political structures (i.e. institutions, regimes), that enable or encourage people 
to engage in political struggle and, when he speaks of constraints, he refers to the 
capacity of the authorities to discourage political struggle. Social movements are 
formed when political struggles take place around “broad cleavages in society” and 
when they form stable networks capable of “sustained interactions” (Tarrow 1998, 
p.23, Tarrow 2005). More precisely, according to Tarrow: 
“Contention crystallizes into social movement when it taps embedded 
social networks and connective structures and produces collective 
action frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention with 
powerful opponents. By mounting familiar forms of contention, 
movements become focal points that transform external opportunities 
into resources. Repertoires of contention, social networks, and the 
cultural frames lower the cost of bringing people into collective action, 
induce confidence that they are not alone, and give broader meaning 
to their claims” (Tarrow 1998, p.23).  
Therefore social movements have a few tools at their disposal to bring about 
political change; these tools are enumerated at the end of the above quote: 
contentious repertoires, social networks and frames. Contentious repertoires are sets 
of known ways in which political actors make claims on other political actors (Tilly & 
Tarrow 2007, Tarrow 2012) – i.e. protests, petitions, press releases. By framing 
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specific issues, social movements generalize grievances and also provide grounds for 
identity construction, for defining “us” and “them”.  
Movements are certainly not the only ones engaging in framing processes. 
Namely, they have to compete with media and the state, who also frame issues to 
their advantage. When it comes to framing, social movements and the state (which is 
seen as the adversary) engage in a struggle over meaning. The coordination of 
collective action, and here both triggering and maintaining or sustaining collective 
action are included, depends on this struggle over meaning because collective action 
frames “justify, dignify and animate” it (Tarrow 1998, p. 21).  
As it can be observed the political processes approach focuses on the 
strategies employed by movements and their actors in the relations with their 
opponents in order to purse their goals. Compared to the previous attempts, this 
perspective offers a more complex image of social movements on account of its 
analysis of both the movement itself and its relations to the outside. To put this in 
systemic terms, similarly to collective behavior it recognizes the fact that there are 
contradictions in society that are linked to conflicts and thus lead to social movement 
formation. Furthermore, comparable to resource mobilization theory, it assumes that 
these contradictions always exist in society, that resources are needed to sustain the 
movement and that already existing systems are activated with the opportunity to 
connect contradictions to conflicts. It however goes further than resource mobilization 
and collective behavior through the fact that it analyzes the operations of the system, 
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all those processes used by the movement to promote its goals. Even more, it 
analyzes the structural couplings between systems, the way they interact.  
However, even though this analysis of movements is more intricate than the 
previous ones, it still disregards certain aspects of the movement, and, to use an 
already commonplace expression when it comes to the theory of social movements, it 
focuses on the how of social movements and it neglects the why. In different words, it 
studies what the movement does but it doesn’t analyze why it does it. If the role of a 
social movement is to alert the immune system of society, as Luhmann holds (and I 
agree with him), and to activate its memory, then answering “the why” is just as 
important as “the how” and “the what”.  
Nevertheless, this perspective also starts to point out to the complexity of the 
situations in which social movements function and to the fact that they are involved in 
struggles over meaning. Showing that their members are WUNC (worthy, unified, 
numerous, and committed) is an example of how the situation is complex because it 
shows that movements need to choose what elements to put forward and what 
connections to make in order to promote the image that they are indeed WUNC. The 
framing processes are a clear example of struggle over meaning. These framing 
processes are studied in more depth by the framing perspective on social 
movements. 
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3.4 Framing perspective   
According to Robert Benford and David Snow this perspective has at its core 
“the struggle over the production of mobilizing and counter mobilizing ideas and 
meanings” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 613). Movements are not seen simply as carries 
of ideas and meanings that already existed in some form in society or that are 
produced by other events, but as producers of such ideas themselves.  
The concept of frame is borrowed from Ervin Goffman (1974) for whom it 
signified “schema of interpretation” that are used by individuals to place and label 
events in their lives or in the world in general (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 614). Social 
movement theory uses a more specific concept of collective action frames: 
“Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and 
thereby function to organize experience and guide action. Collective 
action frames also perform this interpretative function by simplifying 
and condensing aspects of the ‘world out there’, but in ways that are 
intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner 
bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists. Thus, collective 
action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that 
inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of social 
movement organizations” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 614).  
Social movement organizations, as producers of meanings and ideas, have 
three “core framing tasks”: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational 
framing. Diagnostic framing refers to two processes. One is the process through 
which social movements adherents identify and negotiate a “shared understanding” of 
a specific situation which they find problematic and in need to be changed. The 
second process is that of attribution of blame or fault for this problematic condition or 
situation. Prognostic framing refers to the process through which social movements 
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formulate solutions to the problem or “alternate sets of arrangements” as well as to 
the process of formulating strategies for the application of these solutions. 
Motivational framing refers to social movements “urging others to act in concert to 
affect change”, to offering a “call to arms” to apply the alternate sets of arrangements 
that the movement proposes (Benford & Snow 2000, p.615-617). 
In their overview of the framing perspective, Benford and Snow also identify a 
set of “variable features” of collective action frames: problem identification, flexibility 
and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity, interpretative scope and influence, and degree 
of resonance. Problem identification and locus of attribution is “the most obvious way 
in which collective frames vary” and it refers to “the issues addressed and the 
corresponding direction of attribution” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 618). Flexibility and 
rigidity refers to variations “in the degree to which they [collective action frames] are 
relatively exclusive, rigid, inelastic and restricted or relatively inclusive, open, elastic 
and elaborate in terms of the number of themes or ideas they incorporate and 
articulate” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 618). The variation in interpretative scope and 
influence refers to the fact that collective action frames can represent the interests of 
a small or particular group, can cover a small set of problems or they can be broad 
enough to cover the activities of a multitude of various social movements. 
The fourth way in which collective action frames vary, namely resonance, 
combines two factors: credibility of the frame and its salience. To be credible, a frame 
needs to meet three criteria: it needs to be consistent (are there differences between 
what a social movement organization says and what it does?), it needs to be 
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empirically verifiable (not only in terms of “is it true?” but also in terms of “does it 
mean what they say it does?”, in other words is the diagnostic correct?) and the 
“frame articulators” need to be themselves credible (i.e. have a certain status or 
expertise). The salience of the collective action frame refers to how important the 
values and beliefs of the social movement organization are to the “targets of 
mobilization” (Benford & Snow 2000, p.  620-621).  
The processes involved in “frame development, generation and elaboration” by 
social movement organizations can borrow diverse forms (discursive, strategic and 
contested). Some of these processes refer to how frames are developed while others 
refer to how they are diffused: 
“Discursive processes refer to the talks and conversations – the 
speech acts – and written communications of movement members 
that occur primarily in the context of, or in relation to, movement 
activities. Collective action frames are generated by two basic, 
interactive discursive processes: frame articulation and frame 
amplification or punctuation” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 623). 
Frame articulation refers to how events, information or experiences are “put 
together” to create a certain image, to provide a new point of view of reality. Frame 
amplification processes refer to how some issues, values or beliefs are accentuated 
or highlighted to seem more pressing or important than others. These in turn can be 
used to symbolize the entire frame or the movement itself. 
Strategic processes are goal oriented and are used for specific purposes, i.e. 
member recruitment and resource mobilization. There are at least four such 
processes, called “basic alignment processes”: frame bridging, frame amplification, 
   
 
140 
 
frame extension and frame transformation (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 624). Frame 
bridging refers to linking previously unconnected but related frames that regard the 
same issue. It can take place between movements and individuals but also between 
diverse movements. Frame amplification regards the “idealization, embellishment, 
clarification or invigoration of existing values or beliefs” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 
624). Frame extension occurs when a social movement organization presents its 
frames and values as going beyond its own interests to include concerns of possible 
new members or adherents; and finally, frame transformation “refers to changing old 
understanding and meanings and/or generating new ones” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 
625). 
Contested processes refers to the fact that the development of frames itself is 
a contested process. There is a multitude of actors in the “collective arena” and they 
all try to present their own “version of reality” and their own frames. Thus frames and 
those who construct them are always challenged. There are at least three types of 
challenges: “[first], counter-framing by movement opponents, bystanders and the 
media; [second], frame disputes within the movements and [third], the dialectic 
between frames and events” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 625). 
Frame diffusion processes are those processes through which frames spread 
from one movement to another, or from one culture to another. Benford and Snow 
identify two such processes as strategic selection or adaptation and strategic fitting or 
accommodation: 
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“Strategic selection encompasses situations in which there is 
intentional cross-cultural borrowing, with the adopter or importer 
assuming the role of an active agent in the process, strategically 
selecting and adapting the borrowed item to the new host context or 
culture. Strategic fitting encompasses situations in which there is 
intentional cross-cultural promotion, with the transmitter actively 
engaged in tailoring and fitting the objects or practices of diffusion to 
the host culture” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 627).  
And so, “framing is a dynamic, ongoing process” that is affected by the social 
and cultural contexts in which it takes place. There are a number of factors, for 
example political and cultural opportunities and constraints or the openness of the 
targeted audiences that affect deeply how frames are constructed (Benford & Snow 
2000, Benford 1997).  
It is apparent that this approach is a continuation of the resource mobilization 
theory and the political processes approach. Nevertheless it also adds a new 
dimension to social movements by seeing them as producers of ideas that use sets of 
beliefs and meanings to inspire and legitimate their activities. While political 
processes approach identified framing processes as important operations performed 
by movements as well, it didn’t go as deep in analyzing them and it didn’t place them 
at the center of collective action as the framing perspective does.  
If we interpret movements as presented by this perspective in luhmannian 
terms we can take an additional step in understanding their role in society. Again, as 
for the political processes approach, the focus is on operations but this time we can 
go further and say that movements perform the operation of observation. Remember 
that one of the core framing tasks is diagnostic, which includes two processes: the 
identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or fault for this problem (to 
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social, economic or political factors or to someone). Thus viewed this way, social 
movements observe society and notice a contradiction. They do not stop only at 
marking this contradiction however, they also mark who is responsible for it, thus 
placing themselves on one side of a form. Engaging in further framing processes, 
hence creating different images of situations and various meanings for events – and 
thus descriptions of society – movements continue the process of communication in 
society, create complexity and conditions for contingency but most of all provide 
society with that other reality that it needs to complete the operation of self-reference.  
Nonetheless, by placing so much emphasis on framing and the struggles for 
meaning, other aspects of the movement are hidden from view. Aspects like 
organization and relations with other systems of society are ignored and once more 
we have a truncated understanding of social movements. The focus is again on what 
movements do and the question why do movements form remains unanswered. This 
is what the new social movement perspective tries to answer.                                                              
 
3.5 New Social Movements Theory 
This designation refers both to a perspective and to types of social movements 
that emerge, as Claus Offe (1997) believes, with a new political paradigm. By political 
paradigm he means a model of addressing the political that answers questions like: 
what are the main values and themes of collective action, who are the actors and how 
do they become collective actors and what are the procedures, strategies and 
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institutional forms through which the conflict takes place? (Offe 1997, p. 100). The old 
paradigm, which took effect after the Second World War and was prevalent until the 
nineteen seventies organized social life based on a binary code, private and public. 
The main political questions revolved around three themes: economic growth, 
resource distribution and security (which referred to economic security offered by the 
welfare state, military security and social control). The main values were, 
correspondingly “liberté et sécurité de la consommation privée et du progrès matériel” 
(Offe 1997, p. 106). In this context: 
“Le postulat sociologique implicite qui sous-tendait les accords 
constitutionnels de l’État-providence libéral était que les modèles de 
vie « privés », centrés sur la famille, le travail et la consommation, 
absorberaient les énergies et les aspirations de la plupart des gens, 
et que la participation à la vie publique ainsi que les conflits 
concernant celle-ci n’auraient en conséquence qu’une importance 
marginale dans la vie de la grande majorité des citoyens” (Offe 1997, 
p. 101).  
The new social movements however bring about a new political paradigm that 
puts into question the public/private binary code by bringing forth issues that are 
neither public nor private. The “action world” is divided into three spheres: private, 
institutionalized politics and non-institutionalized politics (Offe 1997, p. 105). 
Questions in this new paradigm revolved around themes like the human body and 
human rights, peace, environment while values such as autonomy and personal 
identity become central for the new social movements. The values in themselves are 
not new but they are given more importance and a sense of urgency.  
In terms of collective action characteristic to each paradigm, while in the old 
paradigm the actors were socio-economic groups acting as groups according to their 
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group interests and the struggles in which they were engaged revolved around 
resource distribution, the new social movements are also formed by socio-economic 
groups but they don’t act in the interests of this group but as and in the interests of 
collectivities concerned with values that go beyond the group interests (Offe 1997, p. 
6).     
According to Bob Edwards and John McCarthy (2004), and in line with Offe’s 
assessment, these new social movements and the sociological theory that carries the 
same name emerged together with the rise of a new middle class in Europe. Having 
distinctive social and cultural commitments as well as enough economic resources, 
this new social class was the driving force behind the new social movements. New 
social movements theory studies the “social change preference” of this progressively 
important population (Edwards and McCarthy 2004, p.119-120). In contrast with 
resource mobilization theory and the political process perspective, which focus on 
how social movements are formed and the factors that lead to their appearance, the 
new social movements approach focuses on why they are formed and tries to relate 
them to structural and cultural changes (Diani, 1992, p. 7).  
As with the other perspectives, there are various approaches to social 
movements within the new social movement theory. One of these approaches, 
formulated by Alain Touraine incorporates social movements into a sociology of 
action, tries to go as close as possible to the actor itself and wants to “avoid analysis 
of the transformation of the world that are too general” (Touraine 2002, p. 90). Three 
main themes stay at the heart of this viewpoint.  
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First, “society is a hierarchized set of systems of action, i.e. of social relations 
between actors who may have conflicting interests but who belong to the same social 
sphere and therefore share certain cultural orientations” (Touraine 1981, p. 25). As 
such, society has two central elements: its historicity, that is, a capacity to produce 
and reproduce its own models of functioning, and relations between classes through 
which these models become practices.  
Second, social movements are “the collective action of actors at the highest 
level – the class actors – fighting for the social control of historicity, i.e. control of the 
great cultural orientations by which a society’s environmental relationships are 
normatively organized” (Touraine 1981, p. 26). Thus social movements fight for 
control over the models by which society functions. And third,  
“the functioning of a society is dominated by its historicity and by its 
class relations, and therefore by its social movements. But its 
change, in particular its transition from one societal type to another, 
requires another order of analysis, in which the state occupies central 
place” (Touraine 1981, p. 26).  
Therefore, social movements struggle for changes on how society functions 
but they cannot affect the change of society from one form/type to another. They are 
defined as “the organized collective behavior of a class actor struggling against his 
class adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community” (Touraine 
1981, p. 77). This definition encompasses three dimensions. First, it presents social 
movements not only as conflictual behaviors but also “culturally oriented” behaviors; 
second, fighting for control over historicity shows that social movements do not fight 
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the state and thus they are not political actors and third, they do not create a “more 
modern or advanced society” (Touraine 1981, p. 80).    
In later writings, social movements are defined by Touraine as:  
“organized conflicts or as conflicts between organized actors over the 
social use of common cultural values. For example, both the working 
class and the entrepreneurs accept industrial progress and 
rationalization but conceive it in different social terms. They share the 
same values but disagree about the social use of these resources 
and cultural orientations. The point is to concentrate the study onto 
social conflict and social initiatives within a given social situation, 
such as industrial society or, today, information society” (Touraine, p. 
90, 2002).   
Looked at from this point of view, social movements are not conflicts that arise 
necessarily from one side defending its interests (although that can be part of it) but 
conflicts that arise from different views of the same social value. The conflict does not 
arise over the social value in itself, it arises over the use of that value. Social 
movements are therefore differentiated from historical movements. While social 
movements are collective actions that appear and take place within a societal type, 
historical movements are “forms of actions or reactions as parts of a process of 
historical change” (Touraine, p. 91, 2002).  
Moreover, while social movements are limited to a type of society, historical 
movements are part of the process of transition from one type of society to another 
(i.e. social movements within industrial society versus reactions and actions in a 
process of industrialization). Also, social movements can be understood only when 
placed in their historical context due to the fact that they depend on how society 
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describes itself at the moment the movement is formed and during the movement’s 
existence. Thus, different social movements exist in different types of society. 
In even later writings (although not that much later), Touraine recommends we 
no longer use the notion of social movements unless it refers to phenomena that have 
been studied already, have a long historical tradition and have been named social 
movements already. Although it seems very much different from his previous views, it 
really is not that far away, considering that he continues his argument by stating that 
the idea of social movement should be saved for “a collective action that challenges a 
mode of generalized domination” (Touraine 2004, p. 718). What matters when looking 
at movements is the central conflict within a society and as we live in what many call 
the information society, the central conflict in today’s world is the “social use of 
information” (Touraine 2004, p. 721). And here lies the difficulty in continuing to use 
the notion of social movements.  
In all types of societies the central conflict was around the dominant use of 
resources created by that society, be they material or cultural/symbolic. In the 
information society it is hard, if not impossible to find “forms of organization or 
production that directly convey social domination” (Touraine 2004, p. 721). This is 
why, Touraine claims, the notion of social movement should be replaced by that of 
cultural movement; this would show the shift in conflicts towards the symbolic field. 
According to him, the only social movements per se at the beginning of the twenty 
first century are those questioning the use of knowledge/information in education, 
health and other areas of social life (Touraine 2004, p. 721-724).  
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As it can be noticed, from this point of view collective action is strictly linked to 
the type of society in which it takes place. Furthermore, each type of society is 
considered to have one central conflict and movements are strictly attached to that 
conflict. The difference between historical movements and social movements marks 
the difference between movements that act within a certain type of society and 
movements that attempt to change that type of society. What seems to be crucial in 
this approach is knowing the type of society a movement acts in and the central 
conflict to which it can be linked. This is not however central for all approaches within 
the new social movements paradigm. The theory formulated by Alberto Melucci for 
example, puts collective identity at the center of collective action. The analysis of 
social movements is placed here within a general theory of society. 
 Society is seen as a world system, in which cultures and local societies are 
just subsystems, or “internal dimensions” of the same very complex system in which 
non-institutional forms of action became increasingly autonomous. In that respect, 
social movements revealed to be special discrete elements of reality in the sense they 
may or may not be connected to other movements. In addition, one should not forget, 
as Melucci underlined: “a social movement refers to just one specific form of collective 
action among many others that combine orientations and fields of different kinds” 
(Melucci 1996, p.30). In this respect “social movements can be distinguished 
according to the field of their action” (Melucci 1996, p. 34) and they should be studied 
as analytical categories instead of empirical generalizations. In this view, social 
movements are systems of action (because “every form of collective action is a 
system of action”, Melucci 1996, p. 39) that have three dimensions: they “invoke 
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solidarity, make manifest a conflict and entail a breach of the limits of compatibility of 
the system within which the action takes place” (Melucci 1996, p.28).  
They also have a number of common features: heterogeneity and little 
negotiability of the goals, indifference in obtaining power, they challenge the 
separation between the public and the private spheres, “solidarity as an objective” 
and “the quest for participation and direct action” (Melucci 1996, p.103). These 
features are characteristic for the forms of contemporary social movements. In regard 
to their content, Melucci identifies “regressive Utopianism (…), primacy given to 
nature, (…) [and] the role of the individual” (Melucci 1996 p. 104-105) as the common 
features of the contemporary social movements.   
The regressive utopianism refers to the fact that the contemporary social 
movements speak of their identity in a quasi-religious manner. Also, their goals and 
their moral commitment to causes such as making the social better, show the belief in 
an all-encompassing principle that transcends the social. The primacy given to nature 
refers to the fact that the contemporary social movements define the concept of 
nature as “needs” or as “raw material” and use it to resist control. Nature is seen as a 
thing that belongs to the individual but that is not completely separated from the social 
and thus, it can be used to manipulate the social (or the power apparatuses). “The 
role of the individual” refers to the fact that contemporary social movements perceive 
the individual, his needs and his experiences as having collective importance:  
“The problems of the individual have become collective problems 
precisely because they involve, on the one hand, the manipulation of 
individual identity by the power structure, and the cultural 
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representation of needs as an individual concern on the others” 
(Melucci 1996 p. 105).   
According to Melucci, movements claim (through their actions) that the 
individual aspect of social life needs to be addressed as the level at which social 
action originates as well as the level at which new forms of control are exercised. In 
the contemporary modern society, marked by complexity, social movements create a 
space in which the “dilemmas” of complex systems arise. These dilemmas concern 
three different aspects. The first one refers to the fact that the system needs to 
change constantly but at the same time it needs a “stable normative and prescriptive 
nucleus” (Melucci 1996, p. 217). The second aspect refers to the fact that complex 
systems show a high degree of fragmentation while at the same time they have an 
inclination towards concentration. The third aspect has to do with the fact that there is 
a tendency toward the extension of citizenship and participation at the same time with 
an increased necessity for bureaucratic planning of social life (Melucci 1996 p. 217). 
Social movements bring to light all these contradictions.   
There are three important factors related to the actor’s participation in social 
movements. First, actors need a network of affiliation on which collective identity is 
based (participation in collective action does not take place through isolated 
individuals). Second, an adversary needs to be identified. Without this identification 
participation and mobilization are impossible. Third, the initial networks of affiliation 
are combined creating a new identity. All these factors work together building a new 
social group or a new action system in which relations are reconfigured and elements 
gain new meanings. In this context the mobilizing factors behind social movements 
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are: “a collective identity, the identification of the adversary, the definition of a 
purpose, an object at stake in the conflict” (Melucci, 1996, p. 292).  
According to Melucci,  
“movements in complex societies are disenchanted prophets. The 
charmed universe of the heroes has definitively dissolved under the 
impact of an era taking cognizance of itself as a planetary system 
riven by molecular change, as a system which constantly generates 
tensions and then in turn adapts to them by striving to control them. 
(…) Contemporary movements are prophets of the present. (…) They 
announce the commencement of change: not, however a change in 
the distant future but one that is already a presence” (Melucci 1996: 
p.1).    
Through this, social movements “permettent à la société de prendre en charge 
ses propre actions” (Melucci 1997, p. 13). In this sense, social movements are not 
only an illustration of complexity, and an announcer of change but also participants in 
this change.   
Thus, this approach, as the previous one, formulated by Touraine, draws 
strong links between collective action and change. Also, both approaches look at 
collective behavior through the lens of a theory of action and both place movements 
in their historical and cultural context. This connection between context and 
movements is characteristic for the new social movement paradigm. In fact, as we 
saw, this perspective studies movements at a macro level, looking at how society 
provides the context for the development of social movements.  
Therefore the new social movement approach provides us with an 
understanding of collective action within the fluid, changing historical and cultural 
context. However, by focusing on why movements are formed and on the connections 
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at a macro level, the approach ignores the other facets of collective action, facets 
already discussed when the other perspectives were presented. It can be argued that 
the angle of approach here is the complete opposite to the one used by collective 
behavior, resource mobilization, political processes and framing perspectives. While 
new social movement theory looks at how society generates collective action and is 
changed by it, the other perspectives look at what collective action does to fulfill its 
goals of social change. To put it differently, it is a top to bottom or bottom to top kind 
of difference between these approaches. I believe that we need to look at movements 
from both angles if we want to understand them better. Ron Eyerman and Andrew 
Jamison (1991) formulate an approach that attempts to bring together both these 
angles by looking at social movements through the lens of a theory of knowledge.  
 
3.6 Unifying approaches  
In order to understand social movements from this perspective, a definition of 
knowledge is needed. “By knowledge, [Eyerman and Jamison] mean both the 
worldview assumptions, the ideas about the world that are shared by participants in 
social movements, as well as the specific topics or issues that movements are 
created around” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 3).  
Hence, the knowledge talked about here is not the “formalized knowledge” of 
the academia or of scientific knowledge, but the “the broader cognitive praxis that 
informs all social activity” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 49). This is a broad 
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definition of knowledge, and intentionally so because social movements are also seen 
as mediators between these types of knowledge (everyday knowledge and 
academic/scientific or “professional knowledge”). One of the roles of social 
movements is transforming everyday knowledge into professional knowledge or 
providing different contexts for the interpretation of professional knowledge (Eyerman 
and Jamison 1991, p. 52). Furthermore, not only they transform knowledge but they 
also create, combine and recombine different types of knowledge. In fact, Jamison 
and Eyerman think that:  
“much, if not all new knowledge emanates from the cognitive praxis 
of social movements, new ideas both in and out of science are the 
often unconscious results of new knowledge interests of social 
movements” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 59).  
Studying social movements as cognitive praxis presupposes accepting two 
assumptions. On one hand, as we have seen above, it is assumed that social 
movements are producers of knowledge and, on the other hand, that knowledge is 
produced through collective processes. Accordingly, studying social movements from 
this perspective means trying to understand the “symbolic, or expressive, significance 
of social movements” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 43). This cognitive praxis of 
social movements is considered to be “the social action from where new knowledge 
originates” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 43-48). Knowledge, according to 
Eyerman and Jamison, is not produced by “individual genius” or within the confines of 
a structured system of “Research and Development”. Knowledge is produced through 
social interactions that take place at three different levels: within movements, between 
movements and, between movements and their opponents. 
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Interactions within movements are the discussions between activists on 
strategies, tactics, slogans, thus the debates on “planning the future” but also on 
“reflecting on past actions”. Interactions between movements take place on two levels 
themselves; on one level there are the direct interactions between “new” and “old” 
movements, where they compete against each other for and in the same time and 
space; on another level they compete over traditions, values and interests that are 
constantly recombined, reinvented and reformulated. The third type of interactions, 
between movements and their opponents, takes place in various arenas in the form of 
debates, confrontations and dialogs. What is a social movement in this perspective 
then? A social movement  
“is not one organization or one particular special interest group. It is 
more like a cognitive territory, a new conceptual space that is filled by 
a dynamic interaction between different groups and organizations. It 
is through tensions between different organizations over defining and 
acting in that conceptual space that the (temporary) identity of a 
social movement is formed” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 55).  
At least three characteristics of social movements can be drawn from this 
interpretation. First, a social movement does not simply equate an organization/group 
but it is a collection of ideas, concepts or beliefs that are debated or contested by 
various organizations or groups. Second, a movement’s identity is built through these 
debates and tensions between groups and third, social movements are transitory.  
There are also three conditions that need to be satisfied before a social 
movement can emerge: political opportunity, an articulated theme and the 
transformation of individual issues into public issues. Therefore, the existence of a 
social issue is not enough for a social movement to emerge. There also needs to be 
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an opportunity to express that issue, to discuss it and to disseminate knowledge 
about it. Also, this problem or social tension needs to be clearly formulated within a 
conceptual space and individuals need to be willing to get involved. This doesn’t 
mean that any social issue can bring about the birth of a social movement; only those 
movements that “conceptualize fundamental contradictions or tensions in society”, 
that bring about historical change or even “redefine history” are considered to be 
social movements (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p.56). 
The longevity and success of a social movement are strongly interconnected. 
How long a movement lasts depends on how long it is taken seriously by society, on 
how committed are its members, on the response of other political institutions and on, 
and maybe this is the most important point, “the willingness and capacity of the entire 
social formation to absorb, incorporate, or reject the message of the movement” 
(Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 57). A movement doesn’t live forever though, it is 
temporary by its nature. Once its message has been incorporated or discarded by 
society, the movement doesn’t have a role or a goal anymore so it dissipates, or 
“withers away”.  
Therefore, the success of a movement depends on two things: one, the way its 
message is received and second, having enough time to articulate this message. In 
Eyerman and Jamison’s terms:  
“the success of a social movement depends on the effective diffusion 
of its knowledge production; but diffusion depends upon being 
sufficient time and space for a movement identity to be articulated. 
Some movements are successful in one way while being failures in 
the other” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 64).   
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Social movements have three main roles. The first role has to do with 
“translating scientific ideas into social and political beliefs, [the second is a] historical 
function as social laboratories [and third, they have] provided societal, or cultural 
critiques of dominant techno-economic paradigms, and in their critiques new 
paradigms have found sources of inspiration” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 92-93). 
Consequently, to understand these roles and collective action itself, Eyerman and 
Jamison consider that we need to look at social movements through a “dialectical 
theory of history” meaning that we need to acknowledge the fact that the historical 
context in which movements emerge conditions them but at the same time it is itself 
affected by the cognitive praxis of movements (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 62).  
As it was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, this approach is seen as 
close to the object of this dissertation due to the fact that it tries to offer a more 
integrated view of social movements and to place them in the shifting cultural and 
historical context. It does indeed look at social movements from various angles by 
taking into consideration in its analysis both their internal and external struggles. It 
looks at how and why movements form and how they impact society as well as how 
they are impacted in turn.  
Looked at from within a communication theory of society it is very intriguing 
because it places movements at the center of communication. Their interactions or 
struggles can be placed within the distinctions between information, utterance and 
understanding and communication as a three part selection process could be used to 
explain these interactions and struggles. Social movements in this context would be 
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seen as producers of meaning that choose what information to transmit, how to 
transmit it and how it should be understood. The interactions and struggles would be 
around how this information and its utterance are understood and taken as well as 
around meaning as an infinite pool of possibilities. Nonetheless, the fact that this 
analysis is done through the lens of a theory of knowledge and not a theory of society 
narrows its scope and social movements appear to be the only producers of meaning 
and the sole partners in communication.  
Similarly to this approach, Klaus Eder (1993) attempts to formulate a theory 
which is broader in scope in order to alleviate some of the issues encountered so far 
within the field of social movement theory (namely the lack of integration, looking at 
movements only from one angle, studying one facet instead of the many, facts which 
lead to a fragmented view of social movements).  
This perspective differentiates between paradigms within the theory of social 
movements, talking about micro and macro analysis. Social movement research in 
this view is not linked to macro-sociological theory anymore, for mainly two reasons. 
On one side, Eder claims, scholars focus on micro-sociology and overemphasize the 
role of activists or movement supporters, thus reducing movements to “their 
manifestations” and on the other side “social movement analysis has become part of 
organizational analysis, treating social movements like a business enterprise” (Eder 
1993, p. 4). One result of these tendencies is the fact that movement analysis is 
focused on either the emergence of social movements or, on the “inner dynamic of 
   
 
158 
 
the production and reproduction of social movements” while their role in the socio-
historical and cultural context is mostly ignored (Eder 1993, p. 4). 
He proposes that we use functional analysis to explain social movements at a 
macro-level, or more precisely, when looking at social movements to take into 
account the macro-cultural context within which they function. This doesn’t mean 
completely giving up the micro-analysis of how they emerge and reproduce, but 
instead use it as a tool in explaining this macro-context that he calls the public space, 
context in which movements are constructed and in which they perform the function of 
constructing collective actors. Looking at social movements from this perspective 
permits us to understand resources and attitudes as “means available to stabilize 
these social constructions” (Eder 1993, p. 4). The proposal is thus to build on the “two 
dominating traditions” while adding a new venue of research that looks at the 
dependence of collective actors on the institutional context of their time (Eder 1993, p. 
4-5).  
From this perspective, social movements have the role of accelerating the 
communication of issues in society, this function transcending their existence as 
mobilizations. There are two fundamental dimensions to social movements: a cultural 
one and normative/moral one, meaning that “social movements move society by 
providing an alternative cultural model and a moral order that contributes to 
institutionalizing it, in that sequence” (Eder 1993, p. 114).  
According to Eder, social movements are a modern phenomenon that came 
into existence in the seventeen century. “Pre-modern societies” knew only social 
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protest which was directed by domination processes and that was institutionally 
bound, meaning that the cultural context was a given and disputes could take place 
only at a “social level”. Social movements differ from such social protests through the 
fact that they challenge cultural orientations and they provide alternative cultural 
models. Social movements are only those forms of protest “directly and intentionally 
related to modernization from the seventeen century on” (Eder 1993, p. 107-108). 
Consequently, not any type of mobilization can be classified as a social movement; to 
be one, a collective mobilization has to have as a goal the modernization of society; 
change cannot be accidental, it needs to be intentional. From this point of view only 
two social movements existed so far: the movement for political emancipation and the 
labor movement. Both of these  
“challenged cultural traditions and provided a normative direction to 
social development. Both sought to redirect social evolution and have 
created a new society although they have not succeeded in 
transforming state structures” (Eder 1993, p. 108).    
The question is then, is there a movement now that is trying to change society? 
Are new social movements capable of becoming historical actors and play an 
important role in modernizing society? According to Eder, the new social movements 
fall within one of two types: cultural or political movements. Cultural movements 
“oppose present social life”, include movements such as feminist or anti-industrial 
movements and look for a different relation with nature. Political movements 
challenge “modern state domination” and include movements such as the anti-
bureaucratic and housing movements (Eder 1993, p. 101). The movements of the 
past had an “extra-social reference”, the movement for political emancipation 
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provided “a moral order based on a legal order” and the labor movement a “moral 
order based on negative liberties” but for the new social movements the moral order 
is grounded in “collective needs and wants” (Eder 1993, p. 115):  
“A new society emerges within which social movements develop who 
try to oppose those who administer needs and wants, while 
defending ‘their’ needs. These movements are characterized by a 
different cultural orientation of social development; by a new type of 
antagonistic social relations between technocracy and its clients and 
by a new collective identity that cuts across traditional lines and is 
ultimately based on the equal consideration of every particularity” 
(Eder 1993, p. 115-116). 
Are these movements crystalizing into “the new social movement”? Eder thinks 
that yes, a new social movement is emerging to replace the labor movement, and this 
movement has at its core our relationship to nature. This movement has the potential 
of unifying under one theme demands as varied as gender, animal protection, 
environment and even the non-organic world: 
“Therefore, instead of continuing to talk of new social movements, the 
time has come to give these new social movements a name. Any 
term from environmentalism, ecological movement, life politics 
movements might serve as a possible candidate for name giving. 
They all denote the same problem: the nature-society relationship, or 
the question of nature” (Eder 1993, p. 118).  
Although this approach attempts to bring together the micro and the macro 
studies of social movements, I believe that it doesn’t really step out of the new social 
movement perspective. This is not in itself a problem of course, however, while it 
discusses movements within their historical and cultural context, I consider that it has 
the same limits as the approach formulated by Touraine. By identifying one single 
central movement for a type of society, it disregards all other grounds for conflict that 
are present within that context. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, there are many approaches to social 
movements. These diverse approaches offer many different definitions and analyses 
of social movements but, as we have also seen, they also all come together around a 
few points. They all see social movements as instances of collective action, as more 
or less organized mobilizations and invariably, they all agree that collective action has 
as a main goal social change. Therefore, no matter how they name their object of 
study, social movement, social movement organization, cultural or historical 
movement, collective action or collective behavior, protest movement, all these 
perspectives have the same object of study: a mechanism via which social change 
takes place. As it was mentioned in the first chapter, this is the main reason for which 
the field of social movement theory was chosen for study in this thesis. I believe that a 
better comprehension of collective action is important for improving our knowledge 
about society in general. If society is in constant change then understanding one of 
the mechanisms through which this change takes place is paramount for 
understanding society itself. 
Although different paths were taken within the field, I believe that social 
movement theory shows us the importance of this mechanism of social change and 
thus it provides us with a better understanding of society. For example, the collective 
behavior perspective was among the first instances in which collective action was 
interpreted and studied as meaningful action and it pointed to the fact that actors 
could act collectively in coherent ways. It also revealed that these social organizations 
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can be a driving force for beneficial change in society. On the other hand, resource 
mobilization shows that a more structured study of these meaningful actions is 
needed in order to understand them and the way they function.  
Further down the path, political processes approach offers a more intricate 
image of social movements on account of its analysis of both the movement itself and 
its relations to society while the framing perspective adds a new dimension to our 
understanding of social movements by showing us how they function as producers of 
ideas and how they use sets of beliefs and meanings to inspire and legitimate their 
activities. The new social movements approach puts light on the reasons for which 
movements form and on how they are connected to the larger historical and cultural 
context. And, as we have seen with the approaches formulated by Eyerman and 
Jamison and Eder, there are also perspectives that try to bring together previous 
paradigms in order to improve our knowledge of social movements exactly by trying to 
look at more facets of the movements at the same time.  
Notwithstanding all this, I consider that the field of social movement theory is 
giving us only a fragmented depiction of social movements and a reason for this is the 
lack of integration of the various perspectives within. All these varied perspectives 
and approaches cover and capture important facets and angles of collective action. 
However, they do so in disparate ways, looking at one side and ignoring the other. I 
believe that the review of these perspectives throughout this chapter illustrated this 
point. We have seen that in the instance of collective behavior the definition of a 
social movement is so general that any form of collective mobilization can fit within 
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and by focusing on action and mobilization, the organization of the movement is 
ignored. On the other hand, we noticed that resource mobilization theory focuses on 
social movement organizations and on the way in which they gather resources in 
order to attain their goals but it ignores the exact reasons for which movements 
emerge.  
We have also seen that the political processes approach focuses on the 
strategies employed by movements in their relations with their opponents in order to 
purse their goals, but similarly to resource mobilization, it studies what the movement 
does but it doesn’t analyze why it does it. The review also showed that by placing so 
much emphasis on framing and the struggles for meaning, the framing perspective 
disregards other aspects of the movement, aspects like organization and relations 
and connections with other parts of society. As it was noticed, pointing out to these 
connections between context and movements is characteristic for the new social 
movement paradigm but again, the view we receive is only partial, because while 
focusing on these connections, the approach ignores the other facets of collective 
action that regard the ways in which the movement fulfils its goals. The unifying 
approaches presented also use a narrow scope to look at social movements, the 
theory of knowledge in one case, and the new social movements approach in the 
other.  
The main objective of this chapter was to support the first part of the main 
thesis, namely, that that social movement theory is not sufficient or integrated enough 
to explain collective action and that we need a more comprehensive theory in order to 
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obtain a better understanding of movements and the way in which they fulfill their role 
of promoters of change in society. I believe that the review of the field of the theory of 
social movements showed how the focus of the analysis changes from one theory to 
another and how different facets of the social movement are analyzed separately 
instead of together.  
  
 Chapter 4: Environmental Thought and 
Movement 
 
“Doubt as to the moral progress of humanity has always had good grounds. Today 
the strongest bastion of faith in progress – namely, the superiority of human kind over 
nature, its increasing dominance and control of nature – has begun to falter. The 
current ecological crisis is not just a contingent event that befalls the world from time 
to time. It is no longer just misfortune. Instead it calls the superiority model into 
question, and this expands the ecological crisis into a crisis of society itself (Eder 
1996, p.33-34).  
 
As I think it is evident by now, social movements are multifaceted phenomena. 
The multitude of definitions for social movements presented in the previous chapter is 
pointing towards that. Although they disagree at times, these are not conflicting 
theories, definitions and explanations. Each approach is an illustration of the social 
movements of its time or of the form social movements took at that time. And therein 
lays one problem. How comprehensive is a theory if it needs to change itself to fit the 
form of its object of study? Another problem lays in the fact that these theories also 
focus on different aspects of movements: some look at how they organize, what 
resources they need and use or how they “act” while others look at why social 
movements emerge, what is their role or why people join. If we are to understand 
social movements, these are all aspects that need to be studied together. As it was 
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mentioned in the previous chapters, I believe that a better comprehension of 
collective action is important for improving our knowledge about society in general. 
If society is in constant change then understanding one of the mechanisms 
through which this change takes place is paramount for understanding society itself. 
As we have seen, although there are many varied definitions and analyses of social 
movements, they all converge on one important point: social movements bring or at 
the very least attempt to bring social change. So how do you define something that is 
changing without becoming so abstract that anything can and will fit your definition? If 
a concept is too abstract there is a risk of becoming too general and of ignoring the 
particular. The answer to this problem may lay in the analysis of those changes and 
the context that triggers them (or in which they are taking place). I think that an 
approach based on Niklas Luhmann’s system theory can help us with such an 
analysis. In my view we can use his general theory (or at least parts of it) to better 
understand and explain both society and social movements.  
In what follows, an analysis of environmentalism will be used as an illustration 
of how this general theory can be employed to better explain and analyze a specific 
movement. Consequently, environmentalism will be overviewed, in an attempt to 
outline its history and the way it changed overtime in relation to the social context. 
The already existing academic literature on the subject will be used not only because 
it is extensive and wide-ranging but also because the interest of this study is purely 
theoretical. The general theory developed by Luhmann will be used throughout this 
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overview in order to interpret and analyze these changes and to show how, by using it 
as an analytical tool, we can obtain an integrated perspective of social movements.   
Even though the interest is theoretical, I think that this endeavor has value 
beyond the academic discussion by contributing to a better understanding of the 
world we live in today. As Florence Rudolf asserts, a number of occurrences in the 
natural world (i.e. storms of unseen strength, inundations where there weren’t any 
before) emphasize the fact that disruptions in the environment intensify. These 
disruptions in the natural world have an impact on the social world (Rudolf 2003). If 
one looks at the current major topics of discussion one cannot but notice an 
abundance of debates regarding issues like global warming and climate change, the 
ozone layer, resource consumption, biodiversity, pollution, protection and 
preservation of wildlife. The protection of the environment and the preservation of 
nature, sustainable development, renewable resources are paramount issues in 
present day’s public debates. Some of these issues have been present in the public 
sphere for at least three decades. All these concerns have to do with society’s relation 
to its environment. Knowing how society sees this relation and how it is trying to 
change it is important in understanding society itself. A crucial point is expressed 
here. This enquiry is not about the society-environment relation itself, but about how a 
specific social phenomenon, namely the environmental movement, sees this relation 
and how it uses its vision to change society.    
As it was mentioned in chapter one, when talking about the environmental 
movement or environmentalism, any movement that addresses issues related to the 
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environment or its relations to society is included. Terms such as environmental 
organization, green movement or environmental group will be considered synonyms. 
Also, environmentalism is seen as having two components, theory (environmental 
thought, eco-philosophy or green ideology) and organizational or mobilizing forms 
(environmental groups and organizations). Although often studied separately, as we 
have seen in chapter one, I consider that the two should be studied together due to 
the fact that the theory can give birth to organizations and protest groups or vice 
versa, environmental organizations can promote new ideas, ideologies and 
knowledge. 
Similarly to social movement theory, when it comes to environmentalism, there 
is also a variety of taxonomies and chronologies. Two of them were presented in the 
first chapter (Rodman 1983 and Fox 1990). Other examples include Eder (1996), 
Jamison (2001), and Worster (2013). This chapter will draw on these chronologies 
(and others such as Van Der Heijden 1999, Rootes 2004 and 2013) for the history of 
environmentalism and on the general systems theory developed by Luhmann for its 
analysis. Although many authors present this history as going through different and/or 
separate phases, I choose to present it as a seamless evolution through time for two 
reasons. First, although there are many overlaps and similarities, it doesn’t seem to 
be a complete consensus in the literature on how many phases there are, on when 
one phase ends and another begins, nor on what is characteristic for each phase. 
Secondly, these chronologies are utilized in order to structure the presentation of 
environmentalism according to a specific way of interpreting it (and I believe that is 
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why the differences in periodization and characterization appear). As I am taking a 
different approach, my chapter will be structured differently.  
The objective here is showing how we can better understand the 
environmental movement through the use of a specific theory, not presenting the 
history of environmentalism. As a result the structure will be dictated by the theory. If 
we follow this theory, certain conditions need to be met in order for a protest 
movement to emerge. The general social conditions for such an emergence are: a 
loosening of internal bindings and the specification of contributions as results of 
functional differentiation, effects accumulation, their unexpected aggregation and the 
emergence of a theory able to describe phenomena as social movements. These 
general conditions will not be discussed here but they will be taken as a given and as 
a starting point. Consequently, I consider that the emergence of environmentalism as 
a movement was made possible by those general social conditions brought on by 
functional differentiation, namely: increased freedom in choosing how to live and what 
to do, a move from ascribed to acquired statuses and the possibility of sudden 
changes in collective mindsets.   
What will be discussed are the more specific conditions for the emergence of a 
protest movement, namely: finding a topic for protest and creating a controversy 
around it (thus pointing to a contradiction in society), bringing the form protest and the 
topic together in forming an autopoietic system that is capable of goal oriented 
mobilization and action (which finds its way in society by its ascribed meaning) and 
self-description as a movement. Such a system is differentiated both internally and 
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externally, can assume functions within the immune system of society and provide 
society with a type of self-description that no other system can provide by observing 
society as if it is on the outside. In other words, this chapter will analyze how and why 
environmentalism emerged/formed as a protest movement, how it is organized, what 
role it fulfills and how it interacts with society, all by using the general systems theory 
as proposed by Luhmann as an analytical tool.  
Do we have a better knowledge of the environmental movement once we 
looked at it through the lens of this theory? Answering this question is the purpose of 
this chapter. As the specific conditions are consecutive steps in the formation of a 
movement they will also guide the structure of the chapter. Thus the interrogation 
starts with the question: does the environmental movement meet these specific 
conditions, followed by a discussion of its organization, functioning and role in society. 
The first condition for the formation of a protest movement is having a topic for 
protest. 
 
4.1 Finding a topic for protest  
While at a first glace it might seem that environmentalism finds its topic for 
protest in the environment and not within society, an in-depth look at the theory and 
thought behind it, reveals that the topic is in fact within. We can reason, from inside 
the systems general theory formulated by Luhmann, that for a theme to become a 
topic for protest it needs to be linked to a contradiction. As society is a communication 
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system, the contradiction can only be inside society in the form of communication. 
Thus, I believe that environmentalism points out the contradiction between how this 
relation is seen as being and how it is considered that it should be. Environmental 
thought underlines this contradiction well and it starts to call attention to it at the end 
of the eighteenth century with the rise of romanticism (Hay 2002).    
The first “ecological impulse" as Peter Hay (2002) calls it, starts to be 
articulated as a result of the impact of industrialization on nature. The main factor that 
led to this articulation was the way in which the industrial revolution created a 
differentiation between humankind and other nature: 
“As the full force of the political, economic and social consequences 
of the Enlightenment became apparent in the crude, dislocative early 
years of the industrial revolution, romanticisms came into being as 
appalled reaction. It reached back to an earlier, pre-industrial time 
that was not beset with the social and physical disruptions the 
romantics found so disturbing into their own day, and which allowed 
for human sensitivity and individual spiritual fulfillment  in a way in 
which the new hurly-burly world of industrial and  political ferment did 
not” (Hay 2002, p.5). 
Romanticism is generally criticized for two reasons. One is the fact that it is a 
reaction, that instead of standing for something, it is against something else. The 
second critique comes from the fact that Enlightenment was/is seen as the era when 
science and reason (as well as their application) came into their own; when viewed 
from this perspective romanticism's reaction was seen as against Enlightenment and 
therefore against modern science. This reaction was not against all science however, 
and Romanticisms did end up standing for something.  
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The romantics didn't criticize science per se; what they criticized was science’s 
technological application in nature under the impressions or view that the human 
being was outside and above nature and that it can dominate and manipulate the 
environment for its own interests. What it ended up standing for, was the view that 
science and technology can be developed and used in harmony with nature and that 
the human being is part of “the unity which is nature, it doesn't stand apart and above 
it (Hay 2002, p. 5-9). 
This view seems to be very distant from Luhmann who places the distinction 
between system and environment at the heart of his theory and sees them as 
separated by very clear boundaries. Society is a communication system and 
everything that is not communication, thus nature as well, is in the environment of 
society. I would argue however that in fact the two positions are not as distant as it 
seems at a first look. It must be recalled that for Luhmann the human being is not in 
society but in its environment and that the existence of human beings is the condition 
for the continuous existence of society as a communication system. He also never 
places system above the environment in a hierarchical or domination type of scheme. 
Thus the view that society and its environment need to have harmonious relations 
and that the human being is part of nature fits within Luhmann’s theory. 
The romantics weren't the first or the only ones to react to industrialization and 
its perceived negative effects. In 1810s England had to deal with the Luddite revolts in 
which, in the name of the folk character Ned Ludd, textile craftsmen attacked the 
machines that were perceived as making them redundant. In the 1820s, also in 
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England, farm workers revolted (again under the leadership of a fabled character, 
Captain Swing) against threshing machines that were seen as posing a danger for 
their livelihood (Jamison 2001, location 800). These revolts didn't have an 
environmental topic but they did question the new modes of production that were also 
new ways of interacting with nature. Although these revolts and romanticism were 
both reactions to industrialization there is an important difference between them. 
While romanticism reacted to and criticized the impact that industrialization had on 
nature, and thus on the environment, the revolts were a reaction to the way 
industrialization impacted the livelihood of craftsmen and farmers, and thus society. 
Accordingly, these revolts were closer in topic to the socialist movement than to 
romanticism because they both look within, to the impact of society on society while 
romanticism looks also without, to the impact of society on the environment. Thus 
these reactions to industrialization can be seen as both self-observation and other-
observation. 
Romanticism was an extensive socio-cultural movement with varied forms, 
reactions and manifestations; when it comes to its view on nature or the environment, 
probably the most representative view (and the closest to present-day 
environmentalism) is the one presented by Henry David Thoreau (Worster 2013, 
Nash 1982, Hay 2002, Jamison 2001). Thoreau lived self-sufficiently for two years in 
a hut he built himself on the edge of Walden Pond. He then wrote about his 
experiences and the human/nature relation. His writings are interpreted differently by 
different theorists. On the one hand Thoreau is seen as an "Arcadian" and an 
"Ecocentrist" which means, in short, that he sees nature as a “vast community of 
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equals” and in need to be accommodated, not dominated (Worster 2013). On the 
other hand, it is said that nature for Thoreau is a source of strength and inspiration for 
humans and immersion in wilderness had a “beneficial effect on thought” (Nash 1982, 
p.89). 
The observations in writing or the revolts of the nineteenth’s century are not 
sufficient to form a protest movement however, or at least not yet. These are 
important to mention however because they represent the beginning in the rise of 
environmentalism. To put it differently, and using Luhmann’s theory as an analytical 
tool, society started to notice a contradiction between how it relates to its environment 
and how it should relate to it. This represents the first sign that a topic for protest 
starts to emerge and thus helps us understand, at least partly for now, why and how 
environmentalist forms as a social movement.    
Furthermore, concepts that are still used today, such as food chains and 
equilibrium were fashioned at that time. Additionally, views present in contemporary 
debates on how this relationship between society and its environment should be can 
be traced to even earlier times. According to Donald Worster the science of ecology 
was one of the innovations of the eighteenth century's Age of Reason and two main 
environmental traditions were developed during the Enlightenment: the Arcadian 
stance and the Imperialist view. The first tradition can be traced to the writings of 
Gilbert White, “the parson-naturalist of Selborne. This Arcadian view advocated a 
simple, humble life for man with the aim of restoring him to a peaceful coexistence 
with other organisms" (Worster 2013, location 162). 
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The Imperial position found its inspiration in the writings of Francis Bacon, who 
saw science as capable of transforming the world into a paradise where man 
dominates over everything else, and where through an “Active Science” humans 
remake nature for their own benefit (Worster 2013, location 620-627). Some of the 
most influential scientists of this tradition were Carl Linnaeus in Sweden and Georges 
Buffon in France. Under their influence, in this tradition: 
“Nature became a system of component parts to be tended, or 
operated, like a machine so that its productive utilization for human 
benefit could be made more effective and extensive. Motivated by a 
deeply felt Christian theology, as well as by an inordinate interest in 
non-human beings, Linnaeus elaborated an economy of nature in 
which man was to exploit God's creations as efficiently as possible” 
(Jamison 2001, location 1102). 
The Arcadians, although likewise interested in the pursuit of scientific progress 
and modernization, understood nature differently; they had a more holistic view of 
science (Jamison 2001, location 1122). For them, every creature had a freedom of 
will and all nature had to be studied as “a single integrated unity” (Worster 2013, 
location 428). 
According to Worster and Jamison these two traditions had a very strong 
impact on how environmentalism developed all the way to today. However, Jamison 
considers that, although capable of capturing controversies and contradictions 
present even today in environmentalism, Worster's split of environmental thought into 
the two traditions, Arcadian and Imperial, is incomplete. As any dualism, this 
dichotomy fails to capture all the in-between positions, and, most importantly, it 
ignores a third “source of inspiration” for the environmental movement, found in the 
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identification of new social problems such as “industrial waste and pollution, 
automobility, energy use, and, perhaps most importantly, occupational health and 
safety, the environmental hazards of work. [In Jamison's terminology,] “what was at 
work was the mobilization of a third tradition – a tradition of human ecology – that had 
come with the development of the  social sciences at the end of the nineteenth 
century” (Jamison 2001, location 1144-1149).  
These three traditions (Arcadian, Imperialist and Human Ecology) represent 
three different ways of interpreting both how the relation between society and its 
environment is and how it should be. The Arcadian view, present in romanticism (the 
two often being linked to one another) considers the human-being part of nature and 
advocates for harmonious relations between the two; the Imperial view sees a relation 
of domination between society and the environment, and the human ecology looks at 
how the effects of society on its environment reflect back to society. From a 
luhmannian perspective, the different traditions represent different self and other-
observations of society. Their existence increases complexity for the system and 
creates conditions for contingency. The society-environment relation is placed in the 
realm of various possibilities, several options for its unfolding becoming available. 
They also reinforce the fact that this relation marks a contradiction in the system. 
Thus looking at environmentalism from within this perspective we also start to 
understand not only why it emerges but also some of the roles it fulfills in society 
(pointing out a contradiction, providing a type of self-observation and increasing 
complexity).     
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Once these views were crystalized, observing society and the society-
environment relation from within these traditions is continued through the 
conservationist movement of the late nineteenth century. The influences of two of the 
traditions (Arcadian and Imperial) on the society-environment relation and the manner 
in which it is observed can be clearly seen in the two different “streams of thought” 
present within the movement. On one side we find John Muir who follows in the 
footsteps of the romantics and the Arcadian tradition, while on the other side we find 
Gifford Pinchot, a professional forester and politician who follows the Imperial 
tradition. 
Muir and Pinchot actually started as friends but had a “falling out” while 
preparing a Forestry Commission Survey on woodland that needed protection. “For 
Muir, this meant preservation, in perpetuity from commercial exploitation [while for 
Pinchot, it meant] wise management” (Hay 2002, p. 14). Muir believed that man was 
only a part of "one unit of creation” and has the same value as everything else; nature 
for him was “an organic whole held together by ‘an essential love, overlying, 
underlying, pervading all things” (Worster 2013, location 425). He thus considered 
that nature needs to be preserved for itself, not for further human use. 
Pinchot on the other hand, believed in resource “use in perpetuity” and 
pioneered concepts such as "sustainable yield” (Hay 2002, p. 14). For him, 
conservation meant “the fundamental material policy in human civilization" and "the 
development and use of the Earth and all its resources for the enduring good of men” 
(Pinchot in Worster 2013, location 4352). Thus Pinchot's position was very utilitarian; 
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although he believed in conservation, he saw it as a rational use and development of 
resources so that the future wellbeing of humankind is insured. The differences 
between the two mark the differences between two types of conservationism, one 
being focused on preserving “particularly valuable, or striking, landscapes from further 
exploitation” while the other focused on resource management and efficient use of 
resources (Jamison 2001, location 1212).  
These two different ways of looking at the relation between society and nature 
(preservationism and conservationism) are important in the history of the 
environmental movement because they represent the prevalent environmental 
positions until around the 1930s-1940s, when the third paradigm, the human ecology 
(as Jamison names it) starts to crystalize as a natural continuation of the Arcadian 
and Imperial traditions. This new ecological stance differed from the old not only 
through the issues it focused on but also through the way it approached the 
interaction between nature and society (Jamison 2001, location 1216). While close to 
the Arcadian view in the sense that it saw man as part of a greater unity, this new 
form of environmentalism went further by talking about and developing new ethical 
principles.  
Maybe the most prominent and influential author to embrace this new 
consciousness was Aldo Leopold, a forester who was more interested in wildlife than 
in forests. Leopold was at first a disciple of Pinchot. His book, “Game Management”, 
published in 1933 outlined how wild animals, such as deer or quail, can be managed 
like crops, “cultivated” and “harvested” responsibly. According to Worster however: 
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“Midway through the third decade of the century, an ecological stance 
toward wildlife began to emerge in America. Leopold was rather slow 
to switch to this new attitude; but when he did, he came over with an 
eloquence and credibility that quickly made him one of the leaders of 
the new ecological element" (Worster 2013, location 4486). 
In Leopold’s writings ethics are based on the idea that the individual is part of a 
community of “interdependent parts" and what is needed is to expand the boundaries 
of this community to include “the land” (meaning everything from soils and waters to 
plants and animals). This is how a much needed land ethic that deals with the human 
– land interactions is created. This new ethic would change the prevailing relation 
which is “strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations” (Leopold 1993, p. 
96).  
Probably the most important point made by the new environmental paradigm, 
and what separates it the most from conservationism is the admission of the fact that 
the changes that man makes to the environment are different from the “natural 
evolutionary changes” and their effects cannot be foreseen. Leopold captures this 
view well:  
“By and large our present problem is one of attitudes and 
implements. We are remodeling the Alhambra with a steam shovel 
and we are proud of our yardage. We shall hardly relinquish the 
shovel, which after all has many good points, but we are in need of a 
gentler and more objective criteria for its successful use” (Leopold 
1993, p. 109). 
I believe that with the extension of the three traditions, Arcadian, Imperialist 
and human ecology, into conservationism and the formulation of a land ethic we begin 
to see further how the theme of environmentalism, the society-environment relation, 
starts to develop into a topic and how it begins to be linked to the form protest. John 
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Muir founded the Sierra Club, a conservation group that still exists today (although 
much changed), Gifford Pinchot used his position as a politician to influence forest 
management at state level and to promote planed use and renewal of resources while 
Aldo Leopold’s writings led to the development of a new environmental ethic. 
Therefore, in addition to the fact that these viewpoints represent different ways of 
seeing how the interaction between society and its environment should take place, 
they are observations that had an actual impact on society. These paradigms 
represent communications of the fact that the relation between society and its 
environment could be different and that there is a contradiction between how this 
relation is and the way it should be. Furthermore, by pointing to a contradiction in 
society, by creating a controversy and by linking this to the form protest they play a 
crucial role in the formation of the environmental movement. Thus, using a 
luhmannian perspective helps us understand the reasons for and the mechanisms 
through which the environmental movement starts to emerge. However, the topic 
needs to be brought together with the form protest more strongly in order to form a 
movement.  
 
4.2 Bringing the form and the topic together  
According to Hay, the history of the environmental thought and movement 
marks a discontinuity between the 1940s and late 1960s. He holds that the romantics 
and writings such as those put forward by Aldo Leopold were forgotten only to be 
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rediscovered much later by “an action focused movement belatedly seeking a theory” 
(Hay 2002, p. 16). Jamison (2001) also holds that the environmental movement sees 
an awakening moment in the 1960s, when all three traditions were mobilized in 
making the so called new environmental social movement. 
However, views like these ignore the fact that, for example the Sierra Club 
wasn’t idle during this time and organized various campaigns either for the formation 
of natural parks either for opposing the constructions of damns. Other nature groups 
such as Defenders of Wildlife (1947) were also founded. Conservationism and 
wilderness protection weren’t the only concerns during this time either as the effects 
of human intervention on the environment were starting to be felt. Although limited in 
scope, campaigns were conducted for clean water, safe disposal of waste and 
general better public health (Rootes 2004). Yes, these do not have the same scope 
as the movements of the 1960s but I believe that, as the rise of the new left in the 
1960s, these campaigns and nature clubs were the result of the conditions of their 
time and represent a continuation of environmentalism. Moreover, these also 
represent instances of definite dissent, so this reinforces the idea that the topic of 
environmentalism starts to be linked to the form of protest.  
There is no denying nevertheless that while the romantics, conservationists 
and the campaigns for public health mentioned above represent forms of protest that 
had an environmental topic, they never really went further than that initial 
accumulation of effects and weren’t able to sustain the movement beyond a point of 
aggregation. So it is true that the environmental movement changes during the 1960s 
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taking on a new breadth and scope. The Arcadian, Imperial and human ecology 
(Rootes 2004 prefers to use the notion of reform environmentalism for this third 
tradition) are all mobilized in transforming environmentalism. Jamison underlines that 
the human ecology tradition continues to bring to public attention new environmental 
problems, such as waste disposal and chemical pollution. The imperialist tradition 
was continued in transnational networks like the World Wildlife Fund and in the 
“cybernetic language of ecosystems ecology [while] “Rachel Carson continues the 
Arcadian tradition and her book Silent Spring (1962) announced a new kind of 
Arcadian ecology that was to have a major influence on the cognitive praxis of the 
emerging environmental movement” (Jamison 2001, location 1177-1191). 
What led to this re-birth of environmentalism and to its gains in scope? One 
reason is the fact that the effects of industrialization were becoming more and more 
visible, not only through disasters such as the nuclear meltdown in Idaho in 1961, the 
Vajont Reservoir disaster near Venice in 1963 or the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969, 
but also through general degradation of the environment like air pollution that had a 
direct impact on the lives of people. Also, a better scientific understanding of the 
impacts of technology and industrialization on the environment coupled with an 
increase in the level of education of the general population led to a greater 
environmental awareness. The expansion of the movement was also assisted by the 
growth of the mass media that made the spread of information and images much 
faster and easier. All these factors led to the establishment of critical views on the 
dominant socio-economical doctrines and to questions regarding science and 
technology development and policy making (Rootes 2004, p.613).  
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I believe that what we are witnessing at this point in time is the definite linking 
of the topic with the form protest and the formation of the environmental movement in 
luhmannian terms. More contradictions in regards to the environment-society relation 
are becoming visible and communicated and thus they start to be linked to conflict. As 
a result, more and more varied activist groups start to emerge in the 1960s and in the 
1970s. For example, The World Wildlife Fund (currently World Wide Fund for Nature) 
that was founded in 1961 focuses on conservation of wildlife while Greenpeace which 
was formed in 1971 focuses on protest against nuclear testing and The Land Institute 
founded in 1976 focuses on sustainable agriculture. In addition to the differences in 
the specific issues, there is also a difference in the tactics and the type of protest that 
these various groups employ. Some organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund 
use funds for political lobbying or the construction of sanctuaries for endangered 
species. Greenpeace becomes known for its media stunt strategies and women of the 
Chikpo movement in India surround trees in order to fight deforestation and protect 
their livelihoods.  
By using Luhmann’s theory as an analytical tool we are able to understand 
these groups as part of the same movement and analyze them together. Although 
there are differences in the specific concerns that each group brings to the fore, all 
these concerns represent issues related to the interaction between society and the 
environment, or even more specifically, related to the impact of human technology 
and lifestyle on nature. Thus the topic is the same for all these organizations, the 
society-environment relation. The difference comes from the fact that they point 
towards different issues in this relation and therefore towards different contradictions. 
   
 
184 
 
The fact that there is a variety of types of protest shows that environmentalism is 
capable of using various types of “utterances” of information (both utterance and 
information are used here as components of communication) and also that it starts to 
differentiate as a system. In fact, the distinctions, both in the specific topic and in the 
type of protest, point out to the fact that the environmental movement becomes a 
differentiated system marked by complexity. Thus looking at environmentalism 
through this lens allows us to see how it forms as a movement and how it deals with 
the variety of contradictions and topics for protest in regards the society-environment 
relation.  
Alongside these environmental groups, a process of policy reform and 
institution-building starts to take place. Most of the industrialized countries begin to 
create state agencies to deal with environmental concerns and vote on and enact 
comprehensive environmental legislation. Also, environmental research and 
development bloomed both in the private and the public sectors. In 1972 the 
protection of the environment was recognized as an area of international concern at 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. The book that set the 
tone and the agenda of the conference, Only One Earth, written by biologist Rene 
Dubos and economist Barbara Ward, is an example of an imperialist and 
anthropocentric point of view as it discusses the need for a new form of 
environmentalism, combining “efficient management of resources with empathetic 
understanding”. Their view is captured in the following quote: 
“Now that mankind is in the process of completing the colonization of 
the planet, learning to manage it intelligently is an urgent imperative, 
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Man must accept responsibility for the stewardship of the earth” 
(Ward and Dubos 1972, p. 25). 
Besides a political willingness (at both national and international levels) to deal 
with environmental issues, as part of the new environmental movement, a series of 
grass-roots initiatives in engineering took place in the early 1970s. In the United 
States, a group of “alchemists”, as they called themselves, moved from the university 
out to the country to experiment with ecological agriculture and energy technology. In 
Europe, many countries established research centers and projects in alternative 
technology. Some hippie communes and production collectives experimented with 
organic and biodynamic agriculture and showed an interest in renewable energy. 
Thus, environmentalism starts to present an interest in alternative ecological forms of 
energy, agriculture, living and engineering in general (Jamison 2001).  
Environmentalism goes through more changes in the 1970s when the first oil 
crisis sparks many political debates around energy, and especially nuclear energy. 
These energy debates had profound effects on how the environmental movement will 
develop. According to Jamison, one of the effects is the specialization and 
institutionalization of knowledge production. New disciplines and fields of research are 
developed while some already existing fields of research become fragmented or 
institutionalized. For example, energy-systems analysis emerges as a new discipline 
(dealing with cost-benefit analyses for varied energy sources), human ecology 
becomes an academic field and environmental studies and environmental science 
become separate fields. How did this influence the environmental movement? In his 
explanation, Jamison brings to the fore the fact that: 
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“As a result of these developments, many of the academic ecologists 
and other environmental scientists who were active in the formation 
of new groups and organizations eventually drifted away from 
activism and the more activist organizations, as opportunities for 
research careers emerged at the universities” (Jamison 2001, 
location 1288).  
There were however also efforts to create “new institutions” in order to link 
universities with environmental groups and also scientists that stayed, for lack of a 
better word, on the outside or on the fringes of professionalization. An example for 
this are the science workshops organized by science students in the Netherlands in 
which they offered their knowledge and expertise to citizen groups that needed them. 
Another example are the radical scientists (this is how they called themselves) that 
started to publish journals such as Science for the People in the U.S, Radical Science 
in Britain or Naturkampen in Germany. There were also “environmentally minded” 
engineers and technicians that built things such as the world’s largest wind power 
plant in Denmark (at the Tvind schools) or the Geodesic Dome, at the New Alchemy 
Institute in Massachusetts, which contains a self-sufficient ecosystem (Jamison 2001, 
location 1288-1292). Also,  
“environmental activists turned increasingly during this phase towards 
coercive and power strategies (the attempt to influence and coerce 
behavior) and away from the participation strategies (the attempt to 
change attitudes and induce voluntary compliance) that had been 
dominant in earlier phases” (Jamison et al 1990, p. 10-11).  
Jamison (2001) considers that the main characteristic of the environmental 
movement during the 1970s was its unity and coherence. In fighting nuclear power, 
different ecological traditions came together to create a new world-view and the 
movement combined theory and practice “in the pursuit of a common collective 
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struggle”. This unity however did not last long precisely because it was formed around 
fighting against something. It was natural then for the different groups, with different 
interests to separate once the issue was resolved or “taken off the political agenda”. 
And yes, the late 1970s were marked by a differentiation in interests within 
environmentalism. While activists in Europe were mostly concerned with nuclear 
power, in the United States genetic engineering and toxic waste became of great 
interest (after the discovery of such waste buried in a residential area in Buffalo). In 
India and the developing countries hydroelectric dams and deforestation were the 
main concerns.  
From a functional point of view, all these changes and developments in 
environmentalism, the policy reforms, the emergence of groups that experiment with 
alternative ways of interacting with the environment, the emergence of new academic 
disciplines and the spreading out of specialists in different directions (academia, 
businesses, think tanks or activist groups) show three things. One, these 
developments indicate how the environmental movement affects society. By 
addressing communications towards other systems, the environmental movement 
manages to irritate them enough to cause them to consider the society-environment 
relation in their operations (for example the political system implements policy reforms 
and the scientific system studies this relation from different angles). Two, they 
indicate how environmentalism is influenced in turn by changes in its environment, 
which is society. We see how the energy debates first unify the movement, by 
providing a cohesive topic for protest, and then how they differentiate it further, 
through the emergence of new institutions and new research fields. The environment 
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becomes more complex for the movement and thus new relations need to be 
considered. Three, these changes and developments further show how the 
environmental movement becomes more differentiated and complex in order to 
incorporate more elements, more views on the society-environment relation and more 
forms of communication. It also becomes evident that the movement shows a 
differentiation in the specific topic depending on local interests (environmental groups 
in the U.S, Europe and Asia point out different contradictions, depending on what is 
visible locally). Using this luhmannian view we can start to understand the patterns of 
differentiation of the environmental movement in relation to its topic for protest, its 
form of protest, its interaction with society and its geographical location.   
Environmentalism is marked by even further differentiation in the 1970s. 
Although environmental groups such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth (which 
emerge during the 1960s and the 1970s) seem revolutionary compared to 
conservation groups such as Sierra Club and the World Wildlife Fund and even 
though they appeared precisely because it was considered that the conservation 
groups weren’t doing enough, they weren’t that revolutionary in theory. Although they 
were critical in regards to social and political procedures they weren’t that critical in 
regards to the worldviews that led to those procedures (Rootes 2004, p. 615). A 
dissatisfaction with the lack of such criticism led to the formation of more radical 
environmental groups and organizations (like Earth First!) and to the development of 
eco-philosophy.  
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  Environmental philosophy can be divided into three major fields: radical 
Ecophilosophy, environmental ethics and anthropocentric reformism. Of course, these 
are general designations and each of these fields is comprised of varied approaches. 
Deep ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology for example, are all part of or 
associated with radical Ecophilosophy. There are two main reasons for which these 
philosophers see themselves as radical. For one, they consider that, through their 
investigations, they are able to point the social, conceptual and attitudinal causes of 
the ecological crisis. Second, they argue that the only way to avoid further damaging 
the planet is to have a revolutionary cultural paradigm shift. Practices such as 
recycling, regulating and imposing limits on industrial pollution help only in the short 
run because they don't address the root problems that led to the ecological crisis in 
the first place, they address only the symptoms (Zimmerman 1993, p.vi-vii). 
Although radical philosophers agree on the fact that simple reform is not 
enough, they disagree on what the roots of the ecological crisis really are. Deep 
ecologists believe that the problem lies in anthropocentrism, meaning, in the view that 
Man, to paraphrase Holmes Rolston III, is not only the measurer of all things but also 
their measure. Ecofeminists regard patriarchy as the root because it considers both 
women and nature inferior to men while social ecologists see the roots in the 
authoritarian social structures because they enable people to dominate not only 
people but also nature (Zimmerman 1993, p. vii). 
Deep ecology as a philosophical approach is rooted in the “ecological concerns 
of the 1960s”. The term as such entered the discourse of environmental thought when 
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Arne Naess published his paper “The Shallow and the Deep, long-Range Ecology 
Movement: A Summary” (1973). The shallow movement is described as concerned 
only with resource depletion and pollution and the “health and affluence of people in 
developed countries” and with short term solutions for long term problems. Deep long 
range ecology on the other hand, proposes a new ecological perspective that 
presupposes a new philosophical view of the world and a reconsideration of culture 
and lifestyles that would challenge the “industrial paradigm of reality” (Naess 1973, p. 
95). The paper also lists seven basic principles of deep ecology: “rejection of the 
man-in-the-environment image in favor of relational, total-field image; biospherical 
egalitarianism-in principle; principles of diversity and symbiosis; anti-class posture; 
fight against pollution and resource depletion; complexity not complication and local 
autonomy and decentralization” (Naess, 1973, p. 95-98). In 1984 these principles are 
replaced by an “eight point platform” written by Naess and Sessions. As these are the 
main principles of the deep ecology school of thought and they are stated so clearly 
by Naess, I will list them all: 
(1) The well-being of nonhuman life on Earth has value in itself. This 
value is independent of any instrumental usefulness for limited 
human purposes. (2) Richness and diversity in life forms contribute to 
this value and is a further value in itself. (3) Humans have no right to 
interfere destructively with nonhuman life except for purposes of 
satisfying vital needs. (4) Present interference is excessive and 
detrimental. (5) Present policies must therefore be changed. (6) The 
necessary policy changes affect basic economic and ideological 
structures and will be the more drastic the longer it takes before 
significant change is started. (7) The ideological change is mainly that 
of appreciating life quality (focusing on situations involving inherent 
value) rather than enjoying a high standard of life (measured in terms 
of available means). (8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points 
have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the 
necessary changes” (Naess 1984, p. 266). 
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As mentioned above, ecofeminism is also part of radical Ecophilosophy. One 
of the differences between deep ecology and ecofeminism comes from the fact that 
the latter is a theory of power, and in fact, criticizes deep ecology for not taking into 
account social structure and political power. Ecofeminism also incorporates different 
views and perspectives. However, even if there are different theoretical positions in 
ecofeminism, they all agree on the fact that “there are important connections between 
the domination of women and the domination of nature, an understanding of which is 
crucial to feminism, environmentalism, and environmental philosophy” (Warren 1993, 
p. 256). 
According to John Clark, social ecology, the third radical philosophy approach:  
“a form of dialectical naturalism, is the most extensively developed 
Ecophilosophy to appear. It is dialectical because it sees all of reality 
as being in a continual process of self-development and self-
transformation, and because it interprets phenomena in terms of their 
mutual determination as inseparable part of larger wholes. It is 
naturalism because it takes reality to be nature, and sees all beings 
as natural beings” (Clark 1993, p. 345).   
Thus the main tenet of social ecology is the fact that humans are part of nature 
and that our interactions are interactions not only within nature but also with nature. 
Thus while human to human and human-nature are different realms of interaction 
they are inseparable and “ecological consciousness and practice requires that 
humanity think and act as ‘nature rendered self-conscious’” (Clark 1993, p. 346). The 
solution to the ecological issues of the current age is to be found in a profound 
change not only in lifestyles but also in values and commitments. The “techno-
bureaucratic state power and capitalist economic power”, social ecologists argue, 
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need to be replaced by an organic community “regulated through common ecological 
values and commitment to a common life” (Clark 1993, p. 347).    
The beginning of environmental ethics be traced to Richard Sylvan’s call to 
fellow philosophers in 1973 to pick up where Leopold left off and develop a new ethic 
that includes the non-human world. The main argument of this approach is that 
ecological issues stem from not granting “moral considerability” to non-human 
beings”. In this view, there is a need of change in the ethics, attitudes and values 
toward the environment, which has to be regarded less as an object and more like a 
being. In other words, this change in ethic would suppose a change in morality, to 
include nature along humans in our system of values. In a less radical position of this 
perspective, it is argued that while the human-being is superior to nature, nature and 
non-human-beings still have their own value and they should be protected and 
respected for that (Zimmerman 1993, p. vii). 
As any other approach, environmental ethics include different views, some 
stronger and some weaker, in the sense that some verge on being radical while some 
on becoming anthropocentric. The strong positions criticize Western society intensely 
for its nature-human beings dualism while the weak positions consider human beings 
above nature but accept that at least some parts of nature have value in themselves 
(Hay 2002, p. 48-57).  
 Anthropocentric reformism, the third major field of eco-philosophy supports the 
idea that environmental problems arise from ignorance and greed. In this view:  
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“such factors can be addressed by enacting legislation, changing 
public policy, increasing education, altering tax laws, returning public 
lands to private ownership, emphasizing moral obligations to future 
generations of humans, promoting wise stewardship of nature, and 
otherwise encouraging more prudent use and more equitable 
allocations of natural resources.” (Zimmerman, 1993, p. viii).  
As it can be observed, this view differs in focus from the ones presented 
above. While deep ecology and environmental ethics focus on what are the roots of 
the environmental problems, this view stresses what has to be done empirically to 
solve and avoid them in the future. While holding that nature has only instrumental 
value for humans, this value ranges from food and resources to the “aesthetic 
pleasures” provided by scenic landscapes. Also, philosophically, some 
anthropocentrists, such as John Passmore, consider that humans have moral 
obligations only towards humans. Strictly ecologically, humans, plants, animals and 
soils are part of the same community because they are the subjects of the same life-
cycle. However, if one defining attribute of a community is having the same interests, 
human and non-human interests definitely do not coincide (Passmore 1974, p. 116).  
Thus, to summarize, from the point of view of deep ecology, the root of the 
ecological crisis is the “view that humans are the origin and measure of all value. 
Such a view breeds an arrogance that leads people to treat nature as nothing but raw 
material for satisfying human desires” (Zimmerman 1993, p. VII). Environmental 
ethics hold that the ecological crisis stems from a lack of an ethic that includes the 
non-human world while anthropocentric reformism argues that the roots of the 
ecological problems are “ignorance, greed and shortsightedness” (Zimmerman 1993, 
p. VIII). 
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Why is environmental philosophy important? Because not only had it inspired 
the formation of various environmental groups (i.e. Earth First!, Deep Green 
Resistance, Gaia Mater) and the views that it expresses on the society-environment 
relation found their way in the discourse of the movement, I believe it is in itself a part 
of the environmental movement. It reformulates in part the three environmental 
traditions that we talked about in the previous section, Arcadian, Imperial and human 
ecology, and it develops them further. Like those traditions, environmental philosophy 
places the environment-society relation in the realm of possibility, it gives it new 
meanings and creates more conditions for contingency. Furthermore, it plays one 
more very important role: it looks for causal determinants. By looking for and pointing 
towards the causes of the ecological crisis, it fulfills the role of the observer in linking 
causes in the environment to effects in the system and vice versa7. We thus now 
have more knowledge of the roles fulfilled by the environmental movement. Eco-
philosophy also address the issue of what changes need to be made in society when 
it comes to the environment in light of these causal relations. The fact that there are 
many different views on what these changes should be and on how they should be 
implemented illustrates even further how differentiated and complex the 
environmental movement has become. Some historical conditions also had a role in 
leading to this process. 
The 1980s marked an ideological shift to neo-liberalism, fact which changed 
environmentalism dramatically: 
                                                          
7 See the concept of causality in chapter 2 
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“In the world of science, technology, and the environment, neo-
liberalism led to a change from a social emphasis or policy agenda to 
a more explicitly economic and commercial orientation. A language of 
deregulation and strategic research – and new programs that 
stressed the importance of university-industry collaboration and 
academic entrepreneurship – came to replace the notions of societal 
relevance and technology assessment” (Jamison 2001, location 
1324).  
As this language (and neo-liberal ideology) spread through the broader society, 
more “patterns of differentiation” within the environmental movement emerged. First, 
two types of professionalization took place. On one side, within the business milieu, a 
variety of commercial activities, such as firms offering environmental impact 
assessments or consultation on energy conservation started to develop and 
corporations started to create environmental departments. Also, companies 
commercializing alternative forms of energy or technologies began to emerge. The 
second form of professionalization was the effect of the emergence of think-tanks, 
independent from both the private and public sectors and operated on a non-profit 
base. These think-tanks combined scientific expertise with publishing skills, as well as 
scientific research with investigative journalism, in order to provide information to the 
media, the public at large, and not least, to environmental groups (Jamison 2001, 
location 1324-1344). These types of professionalization led to more differentiation in 
the movement, as environmentalists went in varied directions. 
Second, environmentalism entered the political arena in an official or formal 
way, in the form of green parties. Inspired by the success of the green party in West 
Germany, green parties were created throughout Western Europe, North America and 
Asia. The formation of these parties was controversial, many activists believing that 
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the environmental movement cannot function as a formal political party. This 
controversy led to further splits within the movement, many activists having to choose 
one or the other. This formalization however, was complemented by a revival of old 
conservationist groups and by an increase in popularity and membership for activist 
groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. 
 Another differentiation took place through specialization of interests. At this 
point, environmentalism was already split into various groups (research units within 
universities, think-tanks, political parties or action groups) Each such group had a 
special/separate interest, an expertise or a way of dealing with environmental concern 
and thus the environmental movement became “divided into distinct branches, or 
wings, and in most places the branches themselves were subdivided along sectorial 
lines” (Jamison 2001, location 1349). The type of activism also saw a change: 
 “a process of deradicalization, oligarchisation, institutionalization and 
professionalization began, manifesting itself in a tremendous growth 
of membership numbers in organizations at national level, as well as 
in change from active participation to ‘chequebook activism’” (van der 
Heijden 1999, p. 201). 
Furthermore, neo-liberal ideology changed environmental politics and policy-
making by “shifting responsibility over decision-making directly into the hands of 
corporations” (Jamison 2001, location 1365). What was regulated before became 
deregulated (especially in the US and UK under Ronald Regan and Margaret 
Thatcher) and the new doctrine of sustainable development started to spread. The 
continued neo-liberal ideology leads to the process of globalization and an 
internationalization of environmentalism.  
   
 
197 
 
A few things happen in this context. First, local environmental issues and 
concerns are replaced by global issues such as climate change, ozone depletion or 
biodiversity decline. Second, the internationalization of the movement follows the 
internationalization of an environmental agenda with emphasis on trade, development 
and technological assistance, emphasis stressed by organizations like the WTO or 
IMF. The environmental movement starts to act at local, regional and international 
levels, contesting the dominating economic cultures (Farro and Vaillacourt 2001). 
There is also an opening towards new “actors and political constituencies” that lead to 
cooperation between different groups. The Brundtland Commission for example, was 
composed of scientists, governmental officials, non-governmental and business 
officials (Jamison 2001). Third, environmental problems start to be linked with other 
issues such as income and resource distribution. The greatest impulse towards 
internationalization though, was given by the discourse of sustainable development:  
“The quest for sustainable development was thus a mission that 
challenged the sectorial ‘autonomy’ of the environmental movement. 
In calling for the integration of economics and ecology and for the 
linking of environmental problems to other issues of income and 
resource distribution, poverty alleviation, armed conflict, and gender 
equality, the Brundtland Commission reframed the ecological 
problematic. Finally, the quest for sustainable development opened 
up environmentalism to social sciences. In order to provide a 
knowledge base for the comprehensive program of global recovery 
that was outlined in the report, there was a call for contributions from 
many areas of expertise and not only from natural science, which had 
previously occupied that role (Jamison 2001, location 1369-1374).   
The discourse of sustainable development managed to combine the different 
ecological traditions for a while but this success was short lived as varied dichotomies 
re-emerge when the discourse becomes practice. Sustainable development is an 
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inclusive, general concept that drew in various kinds of environmentalists and thus 
various interpretations: 
“the professionals within business and government, as well as within 
the ’mainstream’ environmental-movement organizations, 
transformed the quest into more instrumental terms while, for many 
local activists and so-called deep ecologists, sustainable 
development took on rather ethical and moral connotations” (Jamison 
2001, location 1379). 
Similarly to Jamison, van der Heijden thinks that the focus of the environmental 
movement in the west shifted from local pollution issues to global problems. Initially, 
in the west at least, the focus was on visible local issues that also had a visible result, 
from cleaner water or closing down of a polluting factory to implementing legislation 
and regulatory acts. However,  
“From the 1980s onward, important parts of the environmental 
movement increasingly shifted their focus to less visible, trans-
boundary or even global environmental problems like the extinction of 
species, the greenhouse effect and the depletion of the ozone layer. 
The platform on which these issues were articulated increasingly 
shifted from the individual nation-state to the international political 
arena. This reduced the visibility of the environmental movement at 
the national level” (van der Heijden 1999, p. 202). 
In Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, van der Heijden holds, the 
environmental movement flourished in the 1980s due to the fact that environmental 
issues and demands were linked and expressed together with demands for freedom 
of speech and social transformations. In Bulgaria for example, ninety local groups 
formed a network called Ecoglasnost that used the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in 1989 to broadcast their demands. Their platform included 
not only environmental issues but also freedom of information and social change. 
Another example is Hungary, where, in the mid-1980s people started to protest 
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against the building of two hydroelectric dams. Various groups, with various political 
beliefs managed to come together in 1988 and organize a march in Budapest that 
saw forty thousand people in the streets. This anti-dam movement helped in 
undermining the legitimacy of the regime (van der Heijden 1999, p. 204-205).  
The main focus of the environmental movement in this region during the 1980s 
was on water, air and soil pollution and its consequences on public health. These 
environmental issues were linked or seen as the direct effect of various features of 
the communist regimes, like centralization lack of information and growth- oriented 
planning systems. After the revolutions in 1989 and throughout early 1990s most 
environmental movements in Eastern Europe collapsed. While the distinctions 
between state-sanctioned and founded groups and independent NGOs evaporated, 
green political parties were formed in countries of the Eastern Block but their success 
was minimal. This collapse is the result of a lack of resources and political and 
economic instability (van der Heijden 1999).  
So the environmental movement becomes differentiated in different ways. As 
we have seen, environmental concern is incorporated in at least two types of 
professionalization (business and think tanks), green parties begin to form, the 
popularity of various activist groups rises and while local issues are still articulated, 
global environmental concerns are also expressed by the movement at an 
international level. Not only there are different specific topics that are addressed, and 
not only are they addressed in different ways but they also start to be addressed from 
within very different organizations. Are all these organizations part of the 
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environmental movement? Are “green” or “greening” businesses or green parties part 
of the green movement? I think that although all these various groups deal with the 
environment-society relation, they are not all part of the environmental movement but 
a response to it and they show how movement and society interact. If we look at this 
through the lens of Luhmanns theory, this becomes a discussion about system 
differentiation and complexity as well as about system relations and the role of the 
movement. Such a discussion can help us better understand the movement and its 
evolution, its relation with society and its role.    
 
4.3 Differentiation, relations with other systems and role 
If one recalls that the difference between element and relation is a theory of 
complexity and that the distinction between system and environment is a theory of 
differentiation, as well as that system and environment are linked through structural 
couplings (which are channels of reciprocal irritation) we can look at the 
environmental movement as a functionally differentiated system. The various strands 
of green thought and philosophy which provide the topic for the movement can be 
seen as the elements of the system. They are all connected and related through the 
general theme of society-environment relation.  
As it becomes more complex, or as more and more issues in the relation 
between society and environment become visible, as more contradictions are 
communicated or as more causal relations are pointed out, the system differentiates 
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into subsystems, each dealing with such an issue or contradiction. This explains the 
difference in the specific topic (i.e. nuclear energy, animal protection, or water and air 
pollution). These systems can accommodate protest in different ways, thus creating 
even more complexity and differentiation. A variety of options exist in the system: face 
to face interaction in street protests, sabotage, petition signing campaigns or 
providing alternative ways of harnessing energy, using resources or even for living.8 
The differentiation of the movement both in terms of topics for and types of 
protest can be seen in the great variety of environmental groups. These groups differ 
from one another not only through the specific topic and the form of protest they 
adopt, but also through their organization. Greenpeace for example has a governance 
structure, a management structure and a financial structure. It has a board of 
directors and regional directors, communication and program directors and so on.  
Earth First! on the other hand doesn’t have any central organization or leadership, 
anyone can create an Earth First! group only by following certain guidelines. Both 
groups are part of the environmental movement. Also, there is a variety of other 
groups like think tanks such as the Earth Watch Institute or Pembina Institute that 
could also be considered part of the environmental movement and because they 
choose different tactics or types of protest they are organized differently from an 
“activist” group (for a lack of a better word). As it can be seen however, these different 
forms of organization are related to the type of protest the group chooses as its form. 
Greenpeace needs a different organizational structure for its media campaigns as 
                                                          
8 Yes, we can argue that there is an infinity of possibilities or we can say that the possible number of subsystems 
is limited only by the possible number of communicated contradictions or pointed out causal relations. That is 
why this is discussed in the context of both the theory of differentiation and the theory of complexity.   
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opposed to Earth First! who focuses on civil disobedience or Earth Watch Institute 
which focuses on research.   
To go back now to the question of green and greening businesses and green 
parties as part of the environmental movement or not, it was mentioned earlier that I 
think that although they deal with the environment-society relation, they are not part of 
the environmental movement but a response to it. The various functional systems, like 
the economy and the political system, are “alerted” by the environmental movement 
that there are contradictions in regards to how they see the environment-society 
relation and how this relation should be and that there is a need to deal with them. 
Thus, the various systems react to this information and form subsystems which deal 
with these contradictions and interpret the society-environment relation according to 
the system’s code. For example, the economic system formulates an interpretation of 
these contradictions in the form of the natural capitalism view, which holds that 
capitalism in general didn’t deal properly with environmental problems because it isn’t 
“capitalist enough”. Society has to use its resources in a more productive way and 
derive “four, ten, or even a hundred times as much benefit from each unit of energy, 
water, material, or anything else borrowed from the planet and consumed” (Hawken 
et al 1999, p.8). This is obviously an environmental view that comes from within the 
economic system that observes the relation between society and its environment 
based on its own code and can understand it only through that code. Thus looking for 
ways to make a profit or to increase the economic benefits from this relation is natural 
for this system.  
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The natural capitalism view and the “green business” model are criticized from 
within the environmental movement. The capitalist mode of production is seen as 
taking place without any regard to ecological principles, and even more than that, as 
leading to exclusion of more and more people from the “productive activity” through 
resource expropriation, all in the name of free trade, globalization and transnational 
corporations’ interests. In addition, there are those who argue that although there is 
talk of “greening the industry” and resource use becomes more efficient, the growing 
waste and the exploitation of human resources are showing that the problem lies 
within the “very operating procedures of the capitalist system itself” (Jamison 2001, 
location 1441). This critique to the capitalist mode of production led to a new kind of 
integration within environmentalism: “an integration between environmentalism and 
various struggles for justice and dignity, equity and tolerance, and the pursuit of 
sustainable livelihoods” (Jamison 2001, location 1414). Thus, while differentiating 
within, the environmental movement also starts to go through a process of 
“integration” without by linking its topic with other issues such as justice and poverty. 
This integration is accompanied by a process of institutionalization.  
The linking of the topic of the environmental movement to these other topics 
led to the emergence of what is called the environmental justice movement (Rootes 
2004). I would argue however that this is not a new movement and only a new name 
for the same movement. The topic is in fact the same, the society-environment 
relation and it is an observation on how the way society impacts the environment 
impacts back on society. This type of environmentalism is most visible in the Global 
South. 
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According to van der Heijden, environmentalism in countries belonging to that 
classification presents four main trends. First, environmental groups articulate 
environmental demands together with developmental demands. Third World groups 
are mainly concerned with social justice and they emphasize “the need to pursue 
such objectives via mechanisms of environmental conservation. Social Justice and 
equity is attained by ensuring that the poor gain access to local environmental 
resources (that is, timber, fuel, clean water)” (van der Heijden 1999, p. 207).  
Secondly, there is a strong emphasis on forests and trees in Asia, on urban 
pollution in Latin America and on desertification in Africa. These different emphasis 
are of course due to the different issues each area is dealing with. In many countries 
in Asia for example, the environmental movement actually started with marginalized 
communities whose livelihood depended on natural resources like timber. In Latin 
America the situation is similar to the western one, the movement being formed out of 
a multitude of various different groups that address local issues (Escobar 2008) while 
in Africa controlling desertification is strongly linked to decreasing poverty (van der 
Heijden 1999, p. 208).  
The third trend is seen in the fact that although many environmental actions 
have a local character, local groups cooperated under national umbrella 
organizations. van der Heijden thinks that although most environmental groups in 
third world countries are community based and organized around local issues, a lot of 
advocacy groups and organizations that link these groups together start to emerge. 
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The fourth and final trend in environmentalism in the third world is the radical 
tendency of its discourse: 
“Despite the inclusion of many ENGOs in governmental consultation 
structures, important parts of the Third World environmental 
movement do not accept the hegemonic global discourse of 
capitalism, neo-liberalism, modernism, scientism and 
anthropocentrism. All over the Third World, environmental groups 
remain to articulate their struggle against environmental degradation 
with the struggle against capitalist economic structures and western 
political and cultural imperialism” (van der Heijden 1999, p. 209).  
Is the environmental movement today the same as it was described by van der 
Heijden and by Jamison? Jamison was talking of an emerging ecological culture 
which was seen as “an ongoing set of social and cultural processes that contain 
elements of both thought and action, and which are both ideational and material” 
(Jamison 2001, location 630-635). This culture is characterized by a collection of 
environmental critiques and contains several varieties of ecological resistance that 
sometimes are contradictory and sometimes only a little different; most of the times 
however, they compete to one another for public attention, funds, or “official favor”. 
Jamison considers that if there is to be hope for the sustainable development quest 
then these different types of ecological resistance need to come together and find a 
way to formulate and articulate a common agenda (Jamison 2001, location 2117).  
A decade later, Lynne Worehrle writes that the greening of society is a strong 
cultural wave as we enter the second decade of the century. This green culture 
presupposes “living by values and norms that view society as part of the larger 
ecological system while rejecting what is thought to bring harm to that system” 
(Woehrle 2010, p. 936). Different calls for reform are made, such as calls to the 
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reform of capitalism so “we can have our earth and perhaps consume it too” or calls 
to investing in research and using materials that can be recycled again and again or 
calls to a shift in production entirely. This green culture however can be best found in 
three applications of ecology: environmental justice, sustainable societies and global-
local patterns of environmental change (Woehrle 2010, p. 936).   
According to Christopher Rootes new media links environmental campaigners 
more effectively compared to the past and the rise of a global justice movement 
brings together, globally, very different groups around issues of climate change 
(Rootes 2013, p.95). Nevertheless, even when global and transnational issues are at 
the heart of protest, environmental politics still has a national characteristic. The local, 
national and transnational are more interrelated than ever, but the heart of the 
movement stays local: 
“Environmental protests and campaigns are mostly mobilized on local 
and national rather than transnational bases, and are focused 
primarily upon national targets. Even where the objects of 
contestation are transnational, local concerns are rarely directly 
translated into global issues; the routes from local contention to 
transnational decision-making usually lie through national institutions” 
(Rootes 2013, p. 96).  
This doesn’t mean that the environmental movement is only to be found in 
local campaigns of course. On the contrary, local groups and national organizations 
do reach out to international NGOs for help. All these levels are interconnected, and 
Rootes underlines the fact that local campaigns are more successful if they can link 
their issues to global issues (use frames such as “climate change” for example) 
because then they can attract the support of national and international environmental 
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groups with access to more resources. When talking of environmentalism at the 
global level, Rootes points out that it has grown in parallel with the ”ever tighter 
economic integration” and the push towards “free trade” sustained by organizations 
such as the World Trade Organization. Environmentalism, according to Rootes took 
very efficient advantage of the new international organizations but in doing that it also 
participated in making these institutions more relevant. 
In these global conditions a new movement, the Global Justice Movement, 
started to rise and to become stronger and environmentalism has to contend with it: 
“For many constituents of the environmental movement, the embrace 
of the campaign to alleviate the poverty of the world’s poorest 
peoples is a logical extension of their environmentalist agenda. Thus 
the World Wide Fund for Nature has recognized that improving the 
lives of people is a necessary condition for the preservation of the 
habitats those people share with endangered species. Friends of the 
Earth had come by a different route to the conclusion that the 
equitable distribution of Earth’s resources is essential if the 
environment is to be protected, and sustainable development is to be 
achieved” (Rootes, 2005, p. 692-693). 
Environmental groups thus start working together with global justice movement 
groups. Is the environmentalist movement becoming a part of the global justice 
movement? Maybe not at all levels, but the links between the two movements are 
reinforcing the view expressed by Jamison and van der Heijden, that a characteristic 
of the contemporary environmental movement is the fact that it links environmental 
issues with other issues such as poverty, resource distribution and democracy. And, 
as it was mentioned already, environmentalism today takes the form of the 
environmental justice movement. According to Scholsberg (2013), in this form, the 
movement articulates a variety of concerns from local food and energy to sustainable 
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materialism and climate change. Thus the environmental movement of today, like that 
of yesterday is formed of a variety of groups, acting at different levels, in different 
ways, articulating different concerns and linking various issues into one: human 
society’s relation with its environment.  
  I consider that the environmentalism overview performed thus far and its 
interpretation and analysis through the lens of Luhmann’s general theory showed that 
by using this theory as an analytical tool we can understand why and how the 
movement emerged, formed and firmly established, how it evolved and changed, 
what roles it performs in society and how it accomplishes them, how it interacts with 
society, changes it and is changed by it as well. For a clearer image of how all these 
questions are answered, in what follows, I will shortly bring together all the elements 
of the analysis performed throughout the chapter.  
We have seen how the origins of environmentalism can be found in the 
Enlightenment and how environmental concern starts to make its way in society 
through both writings and revolts against industrialization in the nineteenth century. 
These are among the first instances when society starts to notice that there is a 
contradiction between how it relates to its environment and how it should relate to it. 
Different views on how this relation should be are developed during this time. The 
Arcadian and the Imperialist traditions are identified as such views, and the Human 
Ecology, which emerges later, is another stance regarding the same issue. These 
reflections on the society-environment relation are later reformulated and developed 
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further in environmental philosophy and what we could call green literature or 
environmental thought.  
This environmental theory thus, doesn’t represent one integrated theory or 
view and it contains many observations on how the society-environment relation 
should be. Furthermore, green theory evolves in time, as we have seen, to do more 
than just point to this contradiction between how the environment-society relation is 
and how it should be and it starts to look for causal determinants in the society-
environment interaction. This means that as more and more effects of the way in 
which this relationship unfolds start to be felt in society, environmental thought starts 
to look at and point out how the way society impacts the environment impacts back on 
society.  
Looking at all this from a luhmannian perspective helps us understand why the 
environmental movement emerges and why it is so diversified. All these views on the 
society-environment relation represent self and other-observations of society. They 
place this relation in the realm of possibility, give it new meanings and create the 
conditions for contingency. The fact that society knows of the existence of so many 
possibilities for interacting with the environment increases complexity for the system 
and several options for the unfolding of the system-environment relation become 
available. But more importantly, as it was mentioned, these views also reinforce the 
fact that this relation marks a contradiction and by pointing towards it they provide a 
topic for protest. Thus green thought participates in the formation of the environmental 
movement by providing the reasons for which it emerges and it is sustained. 
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We have seen that starting from the earliest traditions, the different strands of 
environmental though have taken a more distinct form in society as goal oriented 
groups and organizations formed in order to protest over the society-environment 
relation. These organizations link the topic (the contradiction between how the relation 
between society and environment is seen as being and how it is seen that is should 
be) and the form protest in forming the environmental movement. As more 
contradictions in regards to the environment-society relation become visible and are 
communicated they start to be linked to conflict. As a result, more and more varied 
activist groups start to emerge. We saw that these groups differ from each other 
through the specific topic of protest, the tactics and the type of protest that they 
employ and through the way in which they are organized. By using Luhmann’s theory 
as an analytical tool we are able to understand that these groups do not represent 
different movements and concerns, they are in fact part of the same movement and 
can be analyzed together. These differences can be explained through both the 
theory of complexity (element/relation) and the theory of differentiation (system 
formation). Before going into that explanation however, there are a couple of things 
that need to be mentioned because the differentiation of the environmental movement 
takes place due to external causes as much as due to internal factors.  
We have seen that (at least part of) the external factors that environmentalism 
had to contend with are: policy regulations and deregulations, the emergence of new 
academic disciplines, research fields and different types of professionalization, public 
debates regarding the way society uses the resources from its environment, the 
emergence of green parties, globalization and a process of internationalization, a 
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diversification of interests based on geographical location. All these factors lead to 
even more diversification within the environmental movement, in terms of topic, type 
of protest and organization due to the fact that the environment becomes more 
complex for the movement and thus new relations need to be considered.  
If we go back now to the discussion about the differences from within the 
movement, we can understand them through the theory of complexity of the system. 
Recall that environmental theory is not an integrated field. Various views on how the 
society-environment relation should be are present within. These various views 
provide the topic for the movement and can be seen as the elements of the system. 
They are all connected and related through the general theme of society-environment 
relation. Therefore, protest groups have a variety of specific topics to choose from. 
However, the general topic is the same for all these organizations, the society-
environment relation. Each element of the system points towards one contradiction 
regarding this relation and each group links its form protest to one of these 
contradictions (or to a few). Thus the difference between the various groups comes 
from the fact that they point towards different issues in this relation and therefore 
towards different contradictions but they are still part of the same movement. 
Also, as the environment of the movement becomes more complex, more and 
more issues become visible in regards to how the relation between society and 
environment is seen, and thus more topics for protest linked to the same theme 
emerge. As more contradictions are communicated or as more causal relations are 
pointed out, the system differentiates into subsystems, each dealing with such an 
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issue or contradiction. This further explains the difference in the specific topic but this 
time through a theory of differentiation. These systems take the form of protest in 
different ways, thus creating even more complexity and differentiation. The 
differences in the type of protest come from the fact that a variety of options exist in 
the system (for example face to face interaction in street protests, sabotage, petition 
signing campaigns or providing alternative ways of harnessing energy). 
The different types of protest represent in fact different ways in which the 
environmental movement communicates to society that there are contradictions in 
regards to the way it interacts with its environment. Looking at protest this way, thus 
from a communication perspective and not an action one, allows us to focus on what 
the protest transmits and why, instead of the protest itself. We have seen that the type 
of protest is related to the type of organization a group chooses, to the contradiction 
that is linked to it and to the socio-historical context. As its environment became more 
complex, the environmental movement also became more differentiated and complex 
in order to incorporate more elements, more views on the society-environment 
relation and more forms of communication. So the environmental movement becomes 
differentiated in different ways. 
Although it was mentioned all throughout the chapter that environmentalism is 
differentiated it was never mentioned what form of differentiation it takes. That is 
because I think that all forms of differentiation described by Luhmann can be seen in 
the movement. A type of segmentary differentiation can be seen in the fact that many 
very similar groups, with the same goals and adopting the same type of protest as 
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form can be found within environmentalism. Differentiation between center and 
periphery can be observed on two different levels. First, as Luhmann holds, the 
movement itself can be seen as the periphery protesting against the center which is 
expected to listen to the protest and to take it into consideration in its decisions. 
Second, the organization of the movement can also be seen in the same terms. The 
center is represented by a committed core and by followers that can be mobilized for 
various actions and the periphery, while it probably includes some of the followers, is 
comprised by presumed sympathizers, fact which lets the movement assume that it 
represents general societal interests. 
Stratificatory differentiation can also be seen not only in the organization of 
some of the environmental groups but also in the interactions between these groups 
within the movement. We have seen how often times, small local groups and 
campaigns need the help of bigger national or international organizations with access 
to more resources and knowledge. Finally, functional differentiation can be seen in 
the diversification of specific topics and types of protest due to the variety of concerns 
and contradictions that make their way in society and takes place at the same time as 
the increase in complexity of the system and of the environment (society). I think that 
using Luhmann’s theory and the concept of differentiation we saw, not only how and 
why the movement emerged, but also how it evolved and changed and why it took the 
form that it has today. 
The analysis of environmentalism through the lens of this theory also showed 
how it impacted society and the kind of roles it fulfils. We saw that by addressing 
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communications towards other systems, the environmental movement managed to 
cause them to consider the society-environment relation in their operations. As a 
result the political system implemented regulations, the scientific system started to 
study this relation from different angles, the economic system also implements 
reforms. Also, various organizations that deal with the environment-society relation 
appear within various functional systems as a response to the environmental 
movement or to the contradictions that it highlights. All these impacts point towards 
the role of the movement in society. This role has three components: 1) pointing out 
to contradictions and thus activating society’s immune system, 2) observing causal 
relations and causal determinants between society and its environment and 3) 
providing society with a form of self-observation that it could not obtain otherwise.    
It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that I think that 
environmentalism points out the contradiction between how the relation between 
society and its environment is seen as being and how it is considered that it should 
be. Environmental thought and environmental philosophy outline this contradiction 
well and also point out the causal relations between environment and society. The 
environmental movement thus observes society through the lens of this relation and 
makes the connections between causes in society and effects in the environment and 
vice-versa. This contradiction is communicated to society through the form of protest 
and society needs to act to remove the contradiction. The first system to have to deal 
with this removal is the immune system, which for society is the legal system. The 
formulation of laws and regulations that regard pollution, waste disposal or animal 
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protection are examples of reactions of this immune system after the contradiction 
made its way in society.   
By observing this relation between society and environment in order to see the 
contradictions between what is and what should be, the environmental movement 
also grants society with the possibility of self-observation from another perspective as 
opposed to the functional systems which observe the relation through their own code. 
The functional systems have no other choice but to be biased, and although this is 
true for the environmental movement as well, society needs a system that will point 
out contradictions and effects as much as it needs a system that points out material or 
economic uses. 
In addition, there is one more important contradiction that is making its way into 
society thanks to the environmental movement. According to Luhmann, autopoietic 
systems have as a primary goal the continuation of autopoiesis and they do not 
concern themselves with the environment for this reason. They are more interested in 
the next step of the autopoietic process than with the future. I believe that the 
environmental movement is able to point out this contradiction between autopoiesis 
and the indifference towards the environment. It points out that if the disregard for the 
environment continues, autopoiesis does not (i.e. overfishing will lead to the extinction 
of fish and thus fishing will also disappear).  
Although, as we have seen, there are numerous advantages in using 
Luhmann’s general theory in order to understand social movements and their 
interaction with society, I believe that the theory also has a few shortcomings that 
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were brought to light by the analysis of the environmental movement. To start, 
Luhmann holds that the socialist movement (which is different from the new protest 
movements and the environmental movement) observed society based on the 
consequences of industrialization. It was the only one to do so and “it was also 
capable of offering a theory that could explain both society and the grounds for 
protest” (Luhmann 2013a, p. 161). As we have seen however, starting from 
romanticism and until today, environmentalism always included a critique to 
industrialization in one form or another. Thus the socialist movement wasn’t the only 
one to observe society based on the consequences of industrialization. There is a 
difference though. While socialism observed society based on the consequences of 
industrialization on society, environmentalism, as we saw, at least to start with, 
observed it based on the consequences of industrialization on the environment. It 
later evolved to observe also how these consequences reflect back to society. 
Another point of critique, comes from the fact that Luhmann sees the topic for 
protest of the environmental movement as being in the environment. In “Ecological 
Communication” (1989), Luhmann asserts that the theme of the new social 
movements and intrinsically of the environmental movement is the environment. This 
is a first point where I diverge from him because I consider that the theme of the 
environmental movement is in society. As it was claimed at the beginning of this 
chapter, at a first glace it might seem that environmentalism finds its topic for protest 
in the environment and not within society, but if we look at environmental theory we 
can clearly see that the topic is in fact within. We know that from a luhmannian 
perspective, a theme becomes a topic for protest if it is linked to a contradiction. I 
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believe that environmentalism points out the contradiction between how the society-
environment relation is seen as being and how it is considered that it should be and 
environmental theory outlines this well.   
Although Luhmann would probably argue that some, if not most of the views 
present in eco-philosophy/environmental thought are not valid because they look 
towards the environment and not society I would argue that they do not refer only to 
the environment but also, even more so, to how society needs to change so its impact 
on the environment is not destructive. Thus, they talk about how the deterioration of 
the environment influences society as well as about how society has an influence on 
the environment. They do not talk about what changes need to be done to the 
environment; on the contrary they talk about what changes need to be made in 
society when it comes to the environment.  
If we formulate the topic of the environmental movement in these terms, we 
solve another issue of the theory that I think the analysis brought to light, namely the 
assertion that protest movements never offer solutions and are incapable of reentry. 
We saw that environmentalism presents an interest in alternative ecological forms of 
energy, agriculture, living and engineering in general (Jamison 2001). We also saw 
that some environmental groups took the form of think-tanks or alternative ways of 
living communities. If we accept Luhmann’s writings without a critical eye we cannot 
consider these experiments as part of the environmental movement because, for him, 
the protest movement never offers solutions, never takes responsibility for the wanted 
change and is incapable of re-entry. However, I would argue that exactly the 
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existence of these initiatives shows that on the contrary, as any autopoietic social 
system, a protest movement is capable of re-entry exactly through offering solutions. 
The protest is against views on the environment- society relation that enable modes 
of production that have a negative impact on the environment. The contradiction is 
between how things are and how they should be. By offering a solution, in other 
words by showing how things should be, this distinction is reintroduced in the system 
and leads to system differentiation. Thus, the difference between inside and outside is 
maintained not only through the form protest but also through this distinction which is 
now not only between how things are and how they should be but also between how 
things are within the system and how things are in its environment: society. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
We could say, as Luhmann does, that, at least in part, the environmental 
movement finds its topics in the environment, not in society. Nevertheless, I believe 
that this overview shows that while yes, there are environmental views that look 
“outside” so to speak, in the environment, the theory finds its grounding in society as 
well. The focus is on how our attitudes towards the environment impact society, and 
thus on how society impacts society. As we have seen, environmental thought is not 
an integrated theory. It incorporates different views on the human-environment or 
society-environment connection. Conservation or protection, domination or 
interdependence are all different ways of reflecting on how society should treat its 
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environment. However, even if different, they see society and environment 
interconnected and they all hold that society, its rules, attitudes and actions have a 
profound impact on the environment.  I say “or”, as in “either or” but in fact these 
views coexist, and not only as abstract philosophies detached from reality but also as 
attitudes and programs for various environmental groups. These views provide a 
theory for the environmental social movement, which, we have also seen is 
comprised of organizations and groups as varied as environmental and social 
movement theory.  
Thus, I consider environmental thought and philosophy as being the theory for 
the protest movement. We have seen that, according to Luhmann, in a complex 
society, when there is instability, unexpected aggregations of effects emerge. Such 
phenomena become social movements only if they have a theory rich enough to 
sustain them beyond the initial moment of emergence. As we have seen throughout 
this chapter, environmental thought is capable of offering that rich theory to sustain 
the movement. Through its multiple observations on the society-environment relation 
it offers a multitude of topics for protest, such as stability (the sustainable 
development discourse), inequality (eco-feminism), danger (the energy debates 
around nuclear power), to choose some of Luhmann’s examples. This variety is also 
what confers greater complexity to both movement and society. 
In addition to the topic for protest, a protest movement needs a goal-oriented 
mobilization. We have also seen, a variety of “mobilizations” with various goals took 
place throughout the history of environmentalism. Local protest against pollution, 
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public energy debates, the construction of alternative technologies, all represent 
different “mobilizations” with different goals. One wants the neighborhood’s water 
supply clean, one wants its country free of the risks posed by nuclear plants, another 
wants to show alternative technologies should be considered while others want to 
change resource use. Mobilization here however is not used only to represent an 
event, a street protest or a petition signing event. A protest movement needs to 
incorporate elements of both organizations and interactions so mobilization refers to 
how groups or organizations such as Greenpeace, Earth First! or a community group 
form and organize as well as to the face-to-face interaction of street protests. Various 
organizations were formed throughout the history of environmentalism: conservation 
groups such as Sierra Club who focus, obviously, on conservation, groups focused on 
sabotage such as Earth Liberation Front, or think tanks that address environmental 
concerns through research.   
We can therefore see that environmentalism incorporates both organization 
and interaction, and even a variety of both. We can argue that this shows that, as any 
autopoietic system, environmentalism, is functionally differentiated. Professionals go 
to think tanks where they use their skills for research (or businesses where they can 
help in “greening” the industry), community organizers do what they do best too, and 
even “professional activists” (such as Greenpeace activists) focus on pointing out 
environmental issues to the rest of society.  
So if the field of social movement theory is not sufficient to explain collective 
action, is the general theory developed by Luhmann better suited for investigating, 
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analyzing and explaining social movements? I believe that the analysis of the 
environmental movement showed that yes, it is. Although there are a few points 
where I diverge from Luhmann’s view (the topic of the environmental movement and 
the capability and willingness of protest movements to offer solutions and to 
accomplish the operation of re-entry and thus to differentiate functionally), I think that 
his theory offers us the tools necessary to analyze and understand social movements 
better compared to the theories presented in chapter two. While all those 
perspectives analyze important facets of social movements they do not do so in an 
integrated manner and thus we remain with a fragmented view of movements.   
Looking at environmentalism from a Luhmannian perspective enables us to 
understand all its facets and forms. This approach gives us the possibility to 
understand the overall movement, to include in our analysis not only the theory, or the 
practice, or the organization, but all of them. From this point of view, a group that 
focuses on protest against pesticides for example, is part of the same movement with 
Rachel Carson who showed her view on pesticides by writing poetry and with the 
scientist working to find a way to minimalize their negative environmental impacts. It 
also lets us look at environmentalism as one “movement” over time, a movement that 
went through different phases and forms, included different ideas and discourses and 
had various impacts on society. 
We can also use this approach to analyze some of the events related to the 
environmental movement. For example, Jamison talks about how as a result of the 
environmental protests during the 1970s legislation and acts regulating pollution were 
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implemented in a lot of the industrialized states. Remember that for Luhmann law 
functions as the immune system and memory of society and that protest movements 
trigger the alarm for this immune system. From this perspective then we can see that 
the legislation introduced back then to regulate pollution was implemented as a result 
of the fact that the environmental movement triggered the alarm on what said 
pollution is doing to the environment.  
Things get complicated however, when a few years later, during the 1980s the 
same legislation and regulations (at least in part) are withdrawn. So if you explain 
regulation in these terms how do you explain de-regulation? An argument can be 
made however that the initial legislation was introduced as a response to the protest 
movement, not to environmental factors. The movement was signaling what will 
happen in the future if we continue on the same course. It was not reflecting on the 
present conditions. Thus deregulation was nothing other than redressing the situation 
as the system saw it at the time. It needs to be said, this is an illustration of how and 
why things happened, not of how they should happen. The theory is not normative in 
any way or form.     
  No matter if we talk of ethics or utilitarism, there seems to be a profound 
disconnect between Luhmann and environmentalism due to Luhmann’s focus on the 
distinction between system and environment. Environmentalism places us in nature in 
a way (directly or indirectly), while Luhmann seems to separate us from it. Can the 
two positions be reconciled? I hold that we can use Luhmann’s theory in such a way 
that we can bring the two positions closer together in order to better understand the 
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links between society and environment. The way I understand it (and I do not say that 
Luhmann would agree) is that Luhmann never places the system above its 
environment. He also places the human being in the environment, not in the system 
of society. So yes, a sort of reconciliation is possible because, it can be argued, in 
fact Luhmann doesn’t separate the human-being from the environment; he separates 
only society from it. So the two positions are not as dissimilar as they seem. Where 
they differ though is on how we should go about addressing environmental issues.  
 
  
 Conclusion 
 
The argument that the field of social movement theory is not sufficient enough 
nor integrated enough to offer a clear image or understanding of its own object of 
study has been repeated throughout this thesis. It was also repeated that the general 
systems theory developed by Niklas Luhmann can supplement the collective action 
research field and offer us the tools needed in obtaining an integrated, coherent and 
comprehensive knowledge of social movements. The environmental movement was 
analyzed through the lens of this general systems theory as an example of how we 
can employ it in order to obtain this coherent understanding. It was also pointed out 
that the interest in finding the answer to the research question (if the field of social 
movement theory is not sufficient to explain collective action, how is the general 
theory developed by Luhmann better suited for investigating, analyzing and explaining 
social movements?) comes from the view that to know society we have to know the 
mechanisms of social change and movements are one of these mechanisms. 
The detailed overview of the theory proposed by Luhmann showed us that this 
perspective provides us with one integrated view of society that enables us to 
understand movements into the larger shifting social and historical context. For 
instance, the links drawn between the forms of differentiation of society and the kinds 
of mechanisms used to connect conflicts and contradictions specific to each type of 
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society, enable us to see how the social context affects collective action. This 
overview also presented concepts from within the theory that can be used as tools in 
analyzing all facets of movements at the same time in a cohesive manner. The 
concept of differentiation comes to mind once again but this time in regards to the 
organization of the movement, the notion of protest in regards to the form, and 
contingency in regards to the role of a movement are just a few examples of such 
concepts.  
The examination of the field of social movement theory indicated that if there is 
one thing on which all the perspectives within it can agree on, that thing is the fact 
that the main goal of social movements is to bring change. It also pointed out that this 
field offers us only a fragmented view of social movements due to the fact that each 
approach within looks at them from a certain angle or analyses a different facet, 
neglecting the other dimensions. It was thus emphasized that collective behavior 
perspective focuses on mobilization while resource mobilization highlights 
organization and resources. At the same time the political processes approach 
concentrates on strategies for outside interactions, the framing perspective centers its 
research on meaning construction, while the new social movement theory focuses on 
identity. 
The analysis of the environmental movement displayed how, by using 
Luhmann's theory or concepts developed within, we can incorporate all facets of the 
movement into one comprehensive view. Looking at social movements from within 
the communication systems theory proposed by Luhmann we can understand how 
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and why movements form, how they are organized, what their role is in society and 
through what processes they fulfil this role. How movements form can be explained 
through the processes of finding a topic for protest and creating a controversy around 
it and of bringing the form protest and the topic together in forming an autopoietic 
system. Such a system becomes a protest movement only if is capable of goal 
oriented mobilization and action (which finds its way in society by its ascribed 
meaning) and self-description as a movement. The organization of the movement can 
be clarified through the way the system is differentiated, functionally or otherwise, and 
through the theory of complexity represented through the difference between element 
and relation. The roles fulfilled by social movements in society can be explained 
through, on one side, the functions that such systems assume within the immune 
system of society and, on the other side, through the operation of observation that 
they perform in order to provide society with a type of self-description that no other 
system can deliver. 
I also think that through the lens of this theory we can see not only how social 
movements change society, but also how they are in turn changed by it, and we can 
follow the dynamic relations between the two. For instance, we saw in chapter four 
how the efforts of organizations like the Sierra Club led to the creation and 
maintenance of natural parks or how protests against waste disposal and pollution led 
to regularizations in this domain. However, we also saw how, as more effects of the 
society-environment interaction became visible, the movement had to change in order 
to be able to cover all the possible topics for protest present in society.  
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This approach also gives us the possibility to understand the overall 
movement, to include in our analysis not only the theory, or the practice, or the 
organization, but all of them. It lets us look at a movement as one “movement” over 
time, a movement that went through different phases and forms, included different 
ideas and discourses and had various impacts on society. The last chapter of the 
dissertation illustrated this by showing how both environmental thought and 
environmental organizations evolved over time and how they support each other, 
green thought giving birth to environmental organizations and vice versa (i.e. deep 
ecology is the foundation for Earth First!, and the conservation societies were the 
wellspring of conservationism). 
There are many advantages in using the systems theory as proposed by 
Luhmann to understand social movements. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
environmentalism brought to light the fact that the theory also presents a number of 
limits. I think that it showed that although Luhmann considers that the topic of the 
environmental movement is in the environment, the topic is actually in society. By 
placing this topic in society we also solve the problem of the form protest blocking the 
movement from offering solutions for resolving contradictions. Pointing out that the 
topic of the environmental movement is the contradiction between how the society-
environment relation is seen as being and how it is seen that it should be, is exactly 
what opens up the possibility for the movement to offer solutions and frees it from at 
least one side of the paradox of the form protest. Being partially free of this paradox is 
also what enables the movement to perform the operation of re-entry and thus it also 
makes it capable of self-description and differentiation. This analysis thus showed 
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some of the limits of the theory but also how they can be overcome and how the 
theory can be improved and built upon. 
I realize that, as Maheu (2005) says, social movements are both a theoretical 
concept and a reality on the ground and that there cannot be a perfect fit between the 
two, but a constant tension. However, I consider that if abstract enough, social 
movements, as a concept, will be able to explain the reality on the ground. Where the 
tension comes from, in my view, is from maintaining a balance between being able to 
explain this reality and not becoming so abstract that anything will fit the concept. 
Even though the interest of this dissertation is theoretical, I think that this 
endeavor has value beyond the purely theoretical discussion by contributing to a 
better understanding of society today. If one looks at the current major topics of 
discussion one cannot but notice an abundance of debates regarding issues like 
global warming and climate change, the ozone layer, resource consumption, 
biodiversity, pollution, protection and preservation of wildlife. The protection of the 
environment and the preservation of nature, sustainable development, renewable 
resources are paramount issues in present day’s debates. Some of these issues have 
been present in the public discourse for at least three decades. All these concerns 
have to do with society’s relation to its environment. Knowing how society sees this 
relation and how it is trying to change it is important in understanding society itself. 
Thus understanding social movements in general and the environmental movement in 
particular leads to a better understanding of society.  
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There are however also limits to this project. These limits suggest the 
perspectives, questions and interest for future research and therefore they can be 
presented together. First, the one limit that cannot be connected to a future research 
perspective is the fact that I do not speak or read German. I thus lack access to a 
large corpus of Luhmann’s works. More and more of these works are translated in 
English or French however so this can be overcome. The other limits have both a 
practical and a theoretical component. Second, I would say (and probably this is a 
shortcoming that I share with Luhmann) that this is a deeply western perspective. 
Although I speak a little about the environmental movement in Asia or Latin America 
the main body of the thesis draws not only on empirical examples from the West but 
also on Western theories and the evolution of environmentalism in the West. 
Therefore, studying theories with different origins and the environmental movement in 
other parts of the world, as well as other environmental worldviews is a future 
research perspective.  
Third, this dissertation focuses on one particular social movement in order to 
illustrate how the general theory can be used to explain this social phenomenon in a 
comprehensive way. Using this theory and the concepts developed within in order to 
analyze other social movements would lend more thoroughness to the effort or it 
might point out more limits. A fourth limit rests with the fact that other Luhmann 
scholars are not incorporated. This links with a future research interest in seeing how 
others read and interpret the theory and how they apply it as an analytical tool, and 
beyond a better understanding, this can lead to an enhancement of the theory.   
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What is of a particular interest for me however, is to study in more depth how 
this specific movement, the environmental movement, impacted some of the 
functional systems of society. Some of these impacts were mentioned briefly, for 
example regulations coming from the legal system or the discourse of green 
businesses from the economic system. A more in-depth analysis of how various 
systems were influenced by the environmental movement, and not only those 
mentioned but also systems like education and art, would lead to an even better 
understanding of the movement and society.  
Such an analysis would provide us with a better knowledge of the relations 
between social movements and society, of the way in which structural couplings 
function and of how systems use their code to interpret irritations from the 
environment. It would also draw the links between the environmental movement and 
functional differentiation more clearly than it is done in this endeavor. Are functional 
systems reacting to irritants in society, for instance the environmental movement, or 
are they reacting to irritants from the environment of society itself, meaning nature? 
When I say environment here I think of it in a double sense. Society is the 
environment of the functional systems but it is clear that these are impacted by the 
environment of society as well, by the natural world. I think this relation deserves 
further study.   
If I look at my own work from within Luhmann's general systems theory I would 
say that this thesis is in fact an observation, or at least an attempt to observe 
sociology. The review of the social movement theory can be interpreted two ways, 
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depending on the level at which it is placed. On one side, if it is considered an 
observation on social movements, it is a second order observation because I am 
looking at other observations on social movements, not at the movements 
themselves. On the other side, if it is considered an observation of the field of social 
movement theory, it is a first order observation because (with very few exceptions) I 
look at the perspectives themselves, not at other observations on them. The 
environmental movement overview however can be considered entirely second order 
observation as I am using solely other observations on it. 
From this point of view I could argue that the main thesis here is that the field 
of social movement theory is a system, its elements are the various perspectives and 
approaches within but for this system to be able to fulfill its function fully, its 
complexity needs to be increased. In other words, the field needs second order 
observations in order to create the relations between the elements. This is an 
observing system, it observes social movements and thus produces other reference. 
It nevertheless needs self-reference as well if it is to maintain its autopoiesis. This 
thesis represents an attempt at a second order observation and self-reference.    
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